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FATIMA: THE ROSARY AND THE HEART OF MARY



FATIMA is a name of light and hope for all those souls who are striving for the kingdom of God. The Basilica of Our Lady of the Rosary, with its tall, white tower rising up over the hill, is as a lighthouse in this turbulent hour of the world. The hours of history sometimes can be very long. This present hour, so tremendous, is still the same which thirty years ago obliged Our Lady, Mother of God and men, miraculously to appear in order to give us a message of salvation. The evils of humanity not only persist but are increased. But she also, invisibly present, persists in her eagerness to help us. Her saving watch-words still retain their full vigor and are awaiting fulfillment.

We ourselves wish to help make known and accomplished those things most insistently recommended by her, that is, the practice of the Rosary and the devotion to her Immaculate Heart. This is the second time that we have attempted this,

for as early as July, 1944, we presented a study concerning the value and relationships of the two devotions in the Hispano-Portuguese Assembly, celebrated in Fatima by the Spanish Mariological Society.* In the same place where our heavenly advocate appeared as Our Lady of the Rosary and besought veneration and reparation for her maternal Heart, we attempted to explain, in the light of sacred science, the causes of her requests. Why, we asked, are these devotions petitioned? What titles of excellence, or of efficacy, make them so commendable? Why is it Our Lady of the Rosary who beseeches devotion to her Heart? Is it perhaps because they constitute one and the same devotion, since it would be unfitting to separate them, or is there a great advantage in uniting them? What natural connection exists between them?

Today, we again respond not only on account of the occasion of Our Lady's message, but also because the message itself is conformed to a value and to a permanent connection between the Rosary and her Heart, which merit a more attentive study. The Rosary is a means of perennial efficacy for transfusing into our souls the evangelical spirit. For it is not only consubstantial with the Gospel, but it is a gospel in action: a popular evangelical program of faith, morals, and Christian piety. It is, at the same time, a constant revelation of the Heart of Christ and of the Heart of His divine Mother. For the Rosary unceasingly proposes for the loving commemoration of souls the great accomplishments of Their love, which are the mysteries of the redemption. Without a doubt this is the divine reason for Fatima, for Our Lady knows very well the theology of her Rosary and of her Heart. Thus, by way of serving her maternal intentions, we wish to reflect upon her the little that our limitations will permit.

To this end we shall recall first the history of the Rosarian and Cordimarian revelations of Fatima. Then we shall consider the value or efficacy of both devotions and their mutual

* This study was published in *Estudios Marianos*, IV, Madrid, 1945, pp. 341-410, under the title: "La Devocion al Immaculado Corazon de Maria y el Santisimo Rosario." It has been especially adapted by the author for publication in English.

connection or dependence, with the consequences which derive from all this.

I. THE ROSARY AND THE HEART OF MARY IN THE APPARITIONS OF FATIMA

We shall begin our study by recalling the Rosarian-Cordimarian message of Fatima which was delivered during the apparitions and was contained in the recommendations of the heavenly visitor and in the conduct and testimony of the children. The message itself, as understood by its best interpreters, will be the final proof of our doctrine concerning the compenetration of the two devotions. Being desirous of historical authenticity we shall limit ourselves in this chapter to its ordered presentation, reproducing to the letter the narration which seems to us most exact.

I. THE VISIONS THEMSELVES

The wonderful Lady who appeared to the children seems to be between fifteen and eighteen years old. Her tunic, white as snow and ringed at the neck with a cord of gold, descends to her feet which hardly touch the leaves of the oak tree. A mantle, similarly white and bordered with gold, covers her head and almost her whole person. From her hands which are joined at her breast, as in prayer, there hangs a Rosary with white pearl-like beads, terminating with a small crucifix of burnished silver. Her face, of most pure and extremely delicate features, is surrounded by an aureola of sun, but it appears as though shadowed with sorrow.¹ Thus she appeared six times.² In the first and third vision she promised the children: "In

¹ L. G. DaFonseca, S. J., *Our Lady of Light*, p. 2. We quote preferably Father Fonseca because his work is the best concerning Fatima with which we are acquainted.

² Notice how the children testify to this in the questionings. Cf. Fonseca, *op. cit.*, pp. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. In the sixth and last vision she appeared in the same guise, although later she assumed others signifying the three phases of the mysteries of the Rosary: The joyful (vision of the Holy Family), sorrowful (vision of Our Lady of Sorrows), and glorious (vision of Our Lady in majesty or Our Lady of Carmel) cf. Fonseca, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11.

October I shall tell you who I am.”³ In the sixth and last apparition, which occurred on the thirteenth of October, Lucia asked the vision: “Who are you, and what do you want of me?” The vision responded: “I am the Lady of the Rosary.”⁴

Lucia asked if she were going to leave her alone, and the vision answered, “No, daughter. Do you suffer much? . . . Do not lose heart! I will never abandon you. My Immaculate Heart will be your refuge and the road which will lead you to God.” While saying these words the Lady opened her hands, and for the second time that intense light reverberated over the children in which they saw themselves as though submerged in God. It seemed as though Francisco and Jacinta were in a ray of light which went up toward Heaven, where they were soon to be taken. Lucia, however, seemed to be in a ray that extended over the earth. In front of the right hand of the vision they saw a heart surrounded with thorns which pierced it in every part. They understood that it was the Immaculate Heart of Mary, and that she was asking for penance and reparation.⁵ Thus, for a moment during this apparition, in front of her right hand which held the Rosary, the Blessed Virgin revealed a symbolic heart illuminated by the light which was projected from her hand.⁶

II. OUR LADY'S RECOMMENDATION

The Blessed Virgin recommended the holy Rosary in all six apparitions. In the first apparition: After a few moments the apparition recommends to the little children to recite the Rosary with devotion every day as they had done a little

³ *Ibid.*, p. 3 and p. 5.

⁴ Lucia again asked, “Who are you, and what do you want of me?” The vision finally responded that she was the Lady of the Rosary . . . *Ibid.*, chap. VIII, *The Sixth Apparition*, p. 4.

⁵ *Ibid.*, chap. III, *The 2nd Apparition*, p. 4.

⁶ In conformity with the indications of Lucia and with the approbation of the Bishop of Leiria as of March 25, 1943, this figure of Our Lady of the Rosary showing us her Heart is being reproduced in images and holy cards. Cf. Jose de Castro, O.F.M.C., *Apariciones de la Santisima Virgen en Fatima*, Seville, 1943, chap. XXV, pp. 262-263.

while before, in order to obtain peace for the world.⁷ In the second: "What do you want of me?" Lucia had asked anew. The apparition responded that they should return there the thirteenth of the next month and she recommended again the recitation of the holy Rosary.⁸ In the third: The beautiful lady, after having reminded them not to fail to come the 13th of the following month, insisted for the third time upon the daily recitation of the holy Rosary in honor of the Blessed Virgin with the intention of obtaining the anxiously desired end of the war, for she alone could help them.⁹ In the fourth: She exhorted them again to recite the holy Rosary and to be present in the *Cova da Iria* the following months on the prefixed day and hour.¹⁰ In the fifth: The Blessed Virgin told the children to persevere in the recitation of the Rosary in order to obtain the cessation of the war, and she promised to return in October with St. Joseph and the Child Jesus.¹¹ In the sixth: Lucia repeats again the question, "Who are you and what do you want of me?" And finally the vision responds that she is Our Lady of the Rosary and that she desires in that place a chapel in her honor. She recommended for the sixth time they continue to recite the Rosary every day, adding that the war was almost over and that the soldiers would not be long in returning to their homes.¹²

In the first, second, and third apparitions the Virgin of the Rosary spoke to the little shepherds beseeching devotion, reparation, and consecration to her Immaculate Heart. In the first: "Do you wish to offer yourselves to Our Lord, disposed to sacrifice yourselves and to accept with pleasure all the sufferings which He may will to send you, in reparation for so many sins by which the Divine Majesty is offended, in order to obtain the conversion of sinners, and in reparation for the

⁷ Fonseca, *op. cit.*, chap. II, the 1st Apparition, p. 4.

⁸ *Ibid.*, chap. 3, The 2nd Apparition, p. 2-3.

⁹ *Ibid.*, chap. IV, The 3rd Apparition, p. 5.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, chap. V, The 4th Apparition, p. 10-11.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, chap. VI, The 5th Apparition, p. 5.

¹² *Ibid.*, chap. VIII, The 6th Apparition, p. 4.

blasphemies and all the offenses against the Immaculate Heart of Mary.”¹³ In the second: Lucia continued; “I would like to ask you to take the three of us to Heaven.” “Yes, I shall come to take Jacinta and Francisco very soon. But you must remain longer here below. Jesus wishes to use you to make me known and loved. He wishes to establish in the world the devotion to my Immaculate Heart.” “Then I must remain alone?”, she asked sadly while she was thinking, no doubt, of the persecutions which were harassing her for almost three weeks. “No, daughter. Do you suffer much? . . . Do not lose heart! I will never abandon you. My Immaculate Heart will be your refuge and the road which will lead you to God.”¹⁴

In the third: “Afterwards, in order to renew my cooled fervor,” Lucia humbly confessed, “She admonished us again: ‘Sacrifice yourselves for sinners and say frequently, especially when making some sacrifice: O Jesus! for your love, for the conversion of sinners, and in reparation for the sins committed against the Immaculate Heart of Mary.’¹⁵ You have seen hell where the souls of poor sinners go. In order to save them Our Lord wishes to establish in the world the devotion to my Immaculate Heart. If it is done what I shall tell you, many souls shall be saved and peace shall come. The war will end soon. But if they do not cease to offend Our Lord, it will not be long. In the next pontificate (that of Pius XI) there will begin another much worse. When you see a night illuminated by an unknown light know that that is the great sign which God is giving you that the punishment of the world for its many transgressions is near. It will be by means of a war, hunger, and persecutions against the Church and against the Holy Father. In order to prevent this I shall come to ask the consecration of the world to my Immaculate Heart and the Communion of reparation on the first Saturday of the month. If they are attentive to my supplication Russia will be converted and there will be peace. Otherwise, an impious propaganda will diffuse its

¹³ *Ibid.*, chap. II, The 1st Apparition, p. 3-4.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, chap. III, The 2nd Apparition, p. 4.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, chap. IV, The 3rd Apparition, p. 6.

errors throughout the world, raising up wars and persecutions against the Church. Many good people will be martyred, and the Holy Father will have much to suffer. Various nations will be annihilated . . . at the end my Immaculate Heart will triumph.' ” ¹⁶

III. THE SHEPHERD CHILDREN

The shepherd children, as a consequence of the apparitions, practiced with fervor their recitation of the Holy Rosary. They earnestly counseled its practice proclaiming that it is what the Blessed Virgin most recommended to them. They not only practiced the devotion to the holy Rosary, but sometimes they spent entire hours reciting it.¹⁷ Finding themselves imprisoned because of the apparitions they remembered that they had not yet recited the Rosary. Jacinta, removing a medal which she was wearing about her neck, asked a prisoner to hang it on the wall. Then, kneeling before that improvised altar they began to recite. The prisoners also knelt down and recited with them.¹⁸

In the first apparition Lucia asked the Blessed Virgin if Francisco also would go to Heaven. She answered that he would, but that first it would be necessary to recite many Rosaries. “When they told him these words a little later, he became radiant with joy because of the promise. Crossing his hands on his breast he exclaimed, ‘Oh my Lady, I will recite as many Rosaries as you wish!’” From then on he did not let a day pass without offering this homage to the Queen of Heaven. Frequently he asked his sister or his cousin to recite it with him. But perhaps more often he recited it alone.

Many times while the others were playing he used to retire a little and walk in silence. “Francisco! What are doing?,” they used to ask him. In response he merely used to raise his arm showing his Rosary. “Come and play now. Afterwards the

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, chap. IV, The 3rd Apparition, p. 8.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, chap. XI, p. 14. Also, cf. chap. XI, p. 5 and Albino Menendez-Reigada, O. P., *El Mensaje de Fatima*, p. 38.

¹⁸ Fonseca, *op. cit.*, chap. V, p. 8.

three of us will recite together." "Afterwards? Now and later! Don't you remember that the Blessed Virgin said that I must recite many Rosaries?" Other times he used to hide himself, and on being called he would answer from behind a wall or some bushes where he would be found on his knees reciting. "Why didn't you call us so that we could recite it with you?" "I like it better to recite alone in order to think and console Our Lord Who is so afflicted by so many sins."¹⁹

In the questionings the children unanimously confirmed the recommendation of the Rosary which Our Lady made to them. "What was she most insistent in recommending to Lucia?" they asked Jacinta. "The recitation of the Rosary every day," she responded.²⁰ They in turn recommended it also: "Mother, it is necessary to recite the Rosary every day. The Blessed Virgin wishes it," said Jacinta.²¹ Lucia recommended the family recitation of the Rosary "because the Blessed Virgin wished it."²²

Besides this fervent practice and recommendation of the Rosary, they showed themselves to be captivated by devotion to the Immaculate Heart. In this consideration the life of the children is also an incomparable commentary of the apparitions. From the time of the heavenly visits they began to be truly ideal models in devotion to the Immaculate Heart. They loved it ardently; they spoke of it with eloquence; they invoked it; they multiplied their sacrifices in order to console it and to make reparation for the blasphemies and offenses by which it is offended.²³

When they were in jail Francisco consoled his sister by inviting her to offer her sacrifices for sinners: "Jacinta, crying, with her hands joined, raised her eyes and added: 'And also for the Holy Father and in reparation for the offenses commit-

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, chap. XII, pp. 3-4. "According to the testimony of his mother, he used to recite the Rosary eight or more times in 24 hours." Castro, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

²⁰ Fonseca, *op. cit.*, chap. VII, pp. 5, 7, 12.

²¹ *Ibid.*, chap. II, p. 6.

²² *Ibid.*, chap. III, p. 5.

²³ *Ibid.*, Epilogue, p. 3.

ted against the Immaculate Heart of Mary.’²⁴ And Lucia, saddened by the sufferings which the apparitions were causing her, was encouraged by Francisco saying: ‘Don’t worry! Didn’t Our Lady say that we shall have to suffer much in order to make amends to Our Lord and to her Immaculate Heart for the many sins by which they are offended? They are so sad! . . . If with these sufferings we can console them we ought to be content.’²⁵

Jacinta, already wasted on account of her infirmity, made this extraordinary request of Lucia: “It will be only a little while now till I go to Paradise. You stay here below in order to make it known that Our Lord wishes to establish in the world the devotion to the Immaculate Heart of Mary. When you ought to speak do not hide yourself! Tell everyone that God grants us His graces through the mediation of the Immaculate Heart of Mary. Tell them to ask her. Tell them that the Heart of Jesus wishes that the Immaculate Heart of Mary be venerated together with His Heart. Tell them to beg for peace from the Immaculate Heart of Mary, for Our Lord has confided it to Her. If only I were able to instill in the hearts of all the fire that I feel here within, which makes me so delighted in the Hearts of Jesus and Mary.”²⁶

“The Blessed Virgin has come to see us,” she said, referring again to her cousin, “and she says that soon she will return to take Francisco to Heaven. She asked me if I wished to continue converting sinners. I answered ‘Yes,’ and she added that I shall go soon to a hospital and that I shall suffer much; but that I may bear it all for the conversion of sinners, in reparation for the offenses committed against the Immaculate Heart of Mary, and for the love of Jesus.”²⁷ The little victim of expiating love suffered beyond measure: “Yes, I am suffering; but all for the conversion of sinners or to expiate for the offenses which are made against the Immaculate Heart of Mary.”²⁸ And Lucia testifies: “I found her always equally

²⁴ *Ibid.*, chap. V, p. 7.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, chap. XI, p. 11.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, chap. XI, p. 19.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, chap. XII, p. 6.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, chap. XIII, p. 1.

joyful in suffering for the love of God and for the Immaculate Heart of Mary, for sinners, and for the Holy Father. This was her ideal, and she spoke of it always.”²⁹ In her most recent testimony, Lucia notes, “The war or peace of the world depends upon the practice of this devotion (The Rosary) and on the consecration to the Immaculate Heart of Mary.”³⁰

II. VALUE OF THE ROSARY AND OF THE DEVOTION TO THE HEART OF MARY

For what divine reasons are the Rosary and the devotion to the Heart of Mary so commendable that she recommends them with such insistence? What secret virtue makes them so efficacious for re-Christianizing souls? In order to answer these questions satisfactorily we shall study from a theological aspect the value of both devotions, first establishing a notion of them and determining a just criterion for valuing them.

I. NOTION OF THESE DEVOTIONS

Devotion, properly speaking, is the first act of the virtue of religion, consisting in the will to give oneself to God and to things divine. Because devotion is the first religious act which subordinates the will to God, it necessarily informs all the other religious acts, both interior and exterior,³¹ for no act ordains us to God without the previous subordination of our will to Him. There is no religious act, therefore, that is not devout.³² From this proceeds the common identification between “devotion” and religiousness or piety, and between “devotions” and religious practices. Since devotion informs piety and religious practices, they legitimately appropriate its name. A devotion, therefore, is a manner of practicing devotion or piety. Or, in other words, it is a religious or devout practice in its precise meaning, by which man is directed to God, to the Blessed

²⁹ *Ibid.*, chap. XIII, p. 2. Also cf. chap. XI, p. 11; chap. XII, p. 2; chap. XIII, pp. 1, 6.

³⁰ Castro, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

³¹ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 82, a. 1, ad 1um.

³² *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 83, a. 15, c.

Virgin, or to the saints, and by which he gives them due veneration. The devotions of the Rosary and of the Heart of Mary are, therefore, special ways by which souls direct themselves to the Blessed Virgin and pay her the veneration which they owe her.

The devotion of the Marian Rosary consists in the consideration of the intimate lives of Jesus and Mary as portrayed in the fifteen principal mysteries of their joy, sorrow, and glory. This is accompanied by the recitation of one *Our Father*, ten *Hail Mary's*, and one *Glory* for each mystery in reverence for the most sublime dignity of Mary as Mother of God and of men.³³ As may be seen from its definition, the Rosary is composed of a principal element—the mysteries of the intimate lives of Jesus and Mary, and of a secondary element—the

³³ The notion which we propose is based on those of the Roman and Dominican Breviaries in the lessons of the second nocturn of the feast of the Rosary. Similar also is that which St. Pius V gives in his Constitution *Consueverunt Romani Pontifices* of September 17, 1569, and which Leo XIII proposes in his Encyclical *Supremi Apostolatus*. This great pontiff not only merits to be considered as the Pope of the Rosary, but also as its doctor and apostle. His principal Rosarian Encyclicals ought to be remembered and studied. They are the following: *Supremi Apostolatus*, September 1, 1883; *Superiori Anno*, August 30, 1884; *Octobri Mense*, September 22, 1891; *Magnae Dei Matris*, September 8, 1892; *Laetitiae Sanctae*, September 8, 1893; *Jucunda Semper*, September 8, 1894; *Adjutricem Populi Christiani*, September 5, 1895; *Fidentem Piumque*, September 20, 1896; *Augustissimae Virginis Mariae*, September 12, 1897; *Diurni Temporis*, September 5, 1898.

[*Translator's note*: The English translations of these Encyclicals together with other Apostolic Letters and Constitutions of Leo XIII on the Rosary indulgences, have been collected by William Raymond Lawler, O. P., and they have been published by the St. Anthony Guild Press, Paterson, New Jersey, 1944, under the title *The Rosary of Mary*.]

With reason Father Arthur Cayuela, S. J. writes: "The testimony of the Popes concerning the excellence of the Rosary could not have been more unanimous. . . . Concerning no other matter have the Popes ever published so many Encyclicals; no other practice have they recommended with so much insistence." *El Rosario En Familia*, pp. 13-14.

Already there must be more than five hundred Rosarian documents from the Apostolic See. Cf. *Acta Sanctae Sedis necnon Magistrorum et Capitulorum Generallium Sacri Ordinis Praedicatorum pro Societate SS. Rosarii, Confraternitatibus SS. Rosarii, sodalitatibusque Rosarii-Viventis et Rosarii Perpetui*. vol. I, Lyons, 1880, vol. II, Lyons, 1891. Cf. also Paulino Alvarez, O. P., *Las Glorias del Rosario*, pp. 180 and following.

above mentioned prayers. Taken together these two elements materially integrate the Rosary.

Consequently, the Rosary comprises two fundamental acts: one principal, causal or quasi-formal, which is the recalling and loving contemplation of the intimate lives of Jesus and Mary; and the other secondary, consequent, and material, which is the recitation of the vocal prayers. The meditation and recitation united integrate the practice of the Rosary.

Of the meditation on the mysteries, it can be said: a) It is the principal act, because it is more perfect, more important, and more beneficial than the recitation. Therefore the recitation is secondary. b) It is causal, because from the thought and affection of the mysteries ought to proceed the recitation of the prayers, which are their expression. Therefore the recitation is consequent. c) It is quasi-formal, because just as the soul is the form of the body, because it gives it being, life, and perfection, so also the meditation ought to inform the recitation, communicating to it its own thought and affection.⁸⁴

⁸⁴ In the virtue of religion, which gives worship to God on account of His excellence, and in the subordinate worship of *dulia* which gives veneration to the saints and of *hyperdulia* which pays cult to the Blessed Virgin on account of that which they participate of Him, one must distinguish: a) the acts by which the worship is given (material object); b) the worship which they give (formal *quod* object); c) the reason why it is given, which is the reverence due to the excellence of the person, or his excellence insofar as it is worthy of reverence (formal *quo* object); d) to whom it is given (object *cui* or subject). Cf. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 81, a. 2.

According to this: a) The material object of the Rosarian cult is the consideration of the mysteries and the recitation of the vocal prayers. b) The formal object *quod* of the Rosary is the cult which, by the aforesaid acts informed with the purpose of honoring Mary on account of her excellence as Mother of God and of men, is paid to her, and in her and through her to Jesus, and in them and through them to the Most Holy Trinity. c) The formal object *quo* of the Rosary is the reverence due to the excellence of the most holy Virgin in her intimate life with Jesus as recalled in the mysteries. Or, in other words, it is reverence due to her on account of her excellence as Mother of God and of men and as mediatrix and coredemptrix of the human race. For thus the Rosary presents her in the mysteries and in its supplications. d) The object *cui* or direct subject of the Rosary is the most holy Virgin, Mother of God and our Mother, and in her and through her Jesus, and in them and through them the Most Holy Trinity. In the above given definition of the Rosary all these diversities of object are contained.

The Rosary contains all the conditions which integrate the perfection of worship. a) It is veneration of the Blessed Virgin in her most sublime position as Mother of God and of men. b) It is love, union, and intimate communion through the loving recollection of her most holy life. c) It is a petition to the most holy Virgin, and to God through her mediation and through the mediation of Jesus. d) It is imitation since it recalls good example and holy sentiments. Insofar as one loves, unites himself with, and imitates the Rosary there is born in him the spirit of reparation. e) It is a surrender of the mind, will, and of one's works to the service of Mary. The Rosary leads to a total consecration of the soul to the Blessed Virgin as a recompense for her love and as recognition of her sovereignty. This it accomplishes inasmuch as it presents Mary as our Mother, who lovingly communicates to us that life which was gained with so much sorrow, and as our Queen and our Lady upon whom we depend for everything. With regard to the effects of the Rosary and its theological fundamentals, later we shall see that the Most Holy Rosary is not only a devotion theologically solid, but that it is also a Mariology and even a supplicating Theology.

Devotion to the Immaculate Heart is the veneration of the most holy Virgin in her physical Heart, mirror and symbol of her love. In other words, it is the veneration of Our Lady on account of the excellence of her love as reflected and symbolized in her physical Heart.⁸⁵ The Cordimarian cult is founded on the

⁸⁵ In the object of the Cordimarian devotion, we ought to distinguish: a) The object *cui* or subject ultimately and properly such, which is the person of the Blessed Virgin, and the proximate object *cui*, which is her Heart. In other words, the object *cui* is Our Lady in or by means of her Heart; b) The material object, which consists in the acts of Cordimarian veneration; c) The formal object *quod*, which is the veneration offered by means of these acts to the Heart of Mary on account of the reverence due to its excellence; d) The formal object *quo*, which is reverence for the excellence of the Heart of Mary, or reverence for Mary on account of the excellence of her Heart. All this may be summarized by saying that Cordimarian devotion venerates the Heart of Mary on account of the reverence due to the sublimity of her love, or the Blessed Virgin on account of the excellence of her Heart.

excellence of Mary's love as participated and symbolized in her physical Heart.

Thus, this fundament may be illustrated according to three aspects:

1) *Physico-Psychological aspect.* The heart by its very structure and function is intimately related with and reflects love and the other affections of the soul, and therefore it participates in their excellence. For this reason it is a natural symbol of love universally recognized. The heart is one of the most important of the bodily organs. It causes and regulates the circulation of the blood, and it is intimately connected with the nervous system. By its natural structure and function it is the organ principally affected by love and by the whole affective life of the soul. Although it is not the organ of the affections, it is as though it were. For so acting do they affect it, that although it does not cause them, it is, nevertheless, intimately joined with them and reflects them. Consequently, by right the heart is the symbol of love and of all affections. With reason, then, the physical Heart of the Virgin Mary is venerated. For it participates, reflects, and symbolizes her love.

2) *Moral aspect.* Love, whose excellence in the Blessed Virgin is the motive for the Cordimarian devotion, not only is the first of the affections of the soul, both in the sensible and in the rational order, but it is also the principle and root of all the affections, and even of all actions.³⁶ The appetitive faculty, especially the will, is the universal psychological motor. Therefore it actuates all the other faculties, informing with its acts all other acts.³⁷ In the moral order the goodness and malice of human acts are measured subjectively according to the desire or

³⁶ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 28, a. 6.: *Finis autem est bonum desideratum, et amatum unicuique. Unde manifestum est quod omne agens, quodcumque sit, agit quamcumque actionem ex aliquo amore.*

Ex amore, causatur et desiderium, et tristitia, et delectatio, et per consequens omnes aliae passiones; unde omnis actio quae procedit ex quacumque passione, procedit etiam ex amore sicut ex prima causa; unde non superfluunt aliae passiones, quae sunt causae proximae.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, I, q. 82, a. 4; I-II, q. 9, a. 1; I-II, q. 17, a. 1.

consent which is present in them. Love, therefore, comprehends our psychological and moral life.

3) *Supernatural aspect.* Charity, the divine form of our will, is in our supernatural psychology. Charity is the virtue of virtues.³⁸ The divine love of charity is the principle, motor, form, perfection, and merit of all our supernatural acts.³⁹ The whole divine life of the soul is reduced to love, since love informs the actuation of all the supernatural energies. Thence it follows that the heart comprehends the whole life of the soul and all its perfection. "Charity," says St. Thomas, "is the life of the soul just as the soul is the life of the body."⁴⁰

The Heart of Mary signifies jointly her physical Heart and her love which is called her "Spiritual Heart." It signifies her physical Heart inasmuch as it is a reflector and symbol of her love. The content of the Heart of Mary is principally her love in itself in all its fulness and perfection, and consequently, her whole life in all its manifestations and mysteries, inasmuch as it is actuated and informed by love.⁴¹ Thus honor is given to the Heart or love of the Blessed Virgin in itself and as the fount of her life and of her mysteries.

Cordimarian devotion has as connatural acts: a) Veneration, essential to all worship; b) Love, due in a singular way to the

³⁸ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 23, aa. 7-8; I-II, q. 65, a. 2.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 23, a. 8.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, q. 23, a. 2, ad 2. Formaliter charitas est vita animae, sicut et anima vita corporis.

⁴¹ It was discussed repeatedly in our Assembly at Fatima whether the devotion to the Heart of Mary comprehends also her intellectual life. We said then, and we repeat now, that the devotion to the Heart of Mary is referred immediately to the affective life of the Blessed Virgin, that is, to her love. Since love informs the intellectual life of the Blessed Virgin, the Cordimarian devotion is referred to it also, but consequently. In every just soul, and even more so in the Blessed Virgin charity is the life of its life.

In order to understand the necessity, extension, and meaning of this information of charity in the entire life of the soul the doctrine of St. Thomas should be recalled: a) Concerning the will as universal mover of the potencies. (I, q. 82, a. 4; I-II, q. 9, a. 1; etc.) b) Concerning charity as form of all the virtues. (II-II, q. 23, a. 7-8; I-II, q. 65, a. 2; etc.) c) Concerning the information of faith by charity. (II-II, q. 4, per totum; I-II, q. 65, aa. 4-5; etc.) d) Concerning the information of the gifts by charity. (I-II, q. 68, a. 5 & 8; II-II, q. 45, a. 2; etc.).

maternal and most amiable Heart of the Blessed Virgin; c) Consecration or total self-surrender, in acknowledgment of our dependence and as a necessary reciprocity to the Heart of our Mother and Queen; d) Reparation, a spontaneous and necessary effect of love which, upon willing the good of the most holy Heart of Our Lady, wishes to see it fittingly corresponded to, and it attempts to avoid and to make amends for its offenses. Reparation flows spontaneously from love;⁴² e) Imitation, through the conformative virtue of love; f) Invocation, since the Heart of Mary is maternal, it is most loving and most powerful.⁴³ From the object and connatural acts of the Cordimarian devotion may be gathered its effects, which are similar to those of the Rosary as we shall see later.

II. CRITERIA OF EVALUATION

The mere description of the two devotions suffices for making a mature judgment concerning the respective solidity of each and their pure theological physiognomy. But, by contrasting them more deliberately with an identical criterion of appraisalment of devotions, what they merit will be made more evident.

Just as it is impossible to have a science concerning individual preferences and conveniences, so also it is impossible to fix a subjective criterion to evaluate devotions. But devotion has its theological reason of being and, therefore, devotions ought to have this reason of being also. For, as we have said, they are determined forms of practicing devotion or piety. From the

⁴² Father Lebrun in his work *La devotion au Coeur de Marie* (Paris, 1917), conceives reparation as secondary and less pertinent to the Cordimarian devotion. He himself confesses that he differs in this from Father Gallifet and the current practical opinion. Day by day, reparation is coming to be considered more connatural to the Cordimarian cult. In conformity with the reasoning and psychological observation of the Angelic Doctor, we judge it to be a spontaneous effect of love. *Manifestum est quod quanto aliqua virtus intensius tendit in aliquid, fortius repellit omne contrarium . . . Amor autem amicitiae quaerit bonum amici: unde quando est intensus, facit hominem moveri contra omne illud quod repugnat bono amici.* (I-II, q. 28, a. 4, c.).

⁴³ The well-known prayer *Ave Cor Sanctissimum* of St. John Eudes expresses the principal acts of the Cordimarian cult.

reason of being of religion, worship, or devotion, the objective theological criterion for appraising devotions ought to be deduced.

What, then, is the reason of being of religion? There may be pointed out two correlative fundaments of the religious obligation or divine worship which religion fulfills. One is from the point of view of God, and it is His infinite excellence or perfection and His position as the First Creating Principle, Ultimate End, and Beatifier of man.⁴⁴ The other is from the point of view of man, and it is his need and dependence in respect to God.⁴⁵ The acknowledgment of God's excellence and of our dependence in respect to Him is the essential constituent of religion. To practice it is to manifest to God this acknowledgment and this dependence.⁴⁶ To this are ordained the diverse interior and exterior acts of religion: devotion, which is the first act as we mentioned above, prayer, adoration, sacrifice, etc.⁴⁷

The essential purpose of religion, then, is divine reverence which man is obliged to give. But on the part of man, the religious obligation lies in his need and dependence in respect to God. Therefore, in the very motivation of the religious obligation is included also the intent of making us perfect. Religion accomplishes this by subordinating and uniting us to God from Whose goodness must come our goodness and in Whose union our perfection consists.⁴⁸ These two ends mutually include

⁴⁴ Cf. II-II, q. 81, aa. 1 and 4.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 85, a. 1: Naturalis ratio dictat homini quod alicui superiori subdatur, propter defectus quos in se ipso sentit, in quibus ab aliquo superiori eget adjuvari et quidquid illud sit, hoc est quod apud omnes dicitur Deus.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, q. 81, a. 3 ad 2.

⁴⁷ By devotion our will is subordinated and offered to God. (Cf. II-II, q. 82, a. 1.) By prayer our mind is elevated, subordinated, and offered to God. (II-II, q. 83, a. 1 and a. 3, ad 1 and ad 3.) By adoration the reverence and subordination of the spirit is united to that of the body. (II-II, q. 84, a. 2) By sacrifice man signifies in the offering of something sensible the entire oblation of his soul to God as to his First Principle and Creator and his Ultimate and Beatific End. (II-II, q. 85, a. 2.)

⁴⁸ Cf. II-II, q. 81, a. 7, c: Deo reverentiam et honorem exhibemus, non propter seipsum, quia ex se ipso est gloria plenus, cui nihil a creatura adjici potest, sed

each other, for man is not able to worship God without benefiting himself, nor is he able to seek his good in God without worshipping Him.⁴⁹

Thus religion or devotion has a two fold end and effect which is the glory of God and the good of man. St. Thomas divides the second purpose of worship into two, and consequently, he assigns three ends: "Divine worship," he says, "is ordained primarily to pay reverence to God. . . . Secondly, it is ordained to this that man be instructed by God Whom he worships. . . . Thirdly, divine worship is ordained to a certain direction of human acts according to the laws of God Who is worshipped."⁵⁰ All this may be summarized by saying that religion or devotion has for its end the glory of God and the divine perfection of man.

Moreover, devotions have this same reason of being and this same purpose. Therefore this is the objective criterion for evaluating them according to a theological standard. Theologically speaking, a form of devotion is more or less perfect according to its aptitude for glorifying God and sanctifying souls, that is, according as it brings together more or less perfectly the conditions necessary for this effect. Later, we shall treat of these conditions more precisely.

Although this criterion is deduced from the exactions of the virtue of religion which gives due worship to God, which worship is specifically distinct from that due to the Blessed Virgin and to the saints, however, it is equally true in the worship of *hyperdulia* and *dulia*. Their reason of being is analogous and subordinated to that of the divine worship, and their acts and ends ought to be informed by the acts and ends of religion. This does not mean that the worship of *dulia* and *hyperdulia* ought to be merely relative, for veneration is due

propter nos, quia videlicet per hoc quod Deum reveremur, et honoramus, meus nostra ei subicitur; et in hoc eius perfectio consistit.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 88, a. 3, c.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 92, a. 2, c: Ordinatur primo divinus cultus ad reverentiam Deo exhibendam. . . . Secundo ordinatur ad hoc quod homo instruatur a Deo, quem colit. . . . Tertio ordinatur divinus cultus ad quamdam directionem humanorum actuum secundum instituta Dei, qui colitur.

to excellence. Creatures divinely excellent are able to be honored for the excellence which they possess, and so much the more may they be honored inasmuch as they possess greater excellence. The greater their excellence, the nearer they approach to the divine excellence. For this reason the Blessed Virgin, who most nearly approaches the divine excellence, merits a proper and superior worship of *hyperdulia*.⁵¹ But the excellence of creatures is a participation of the divine. Therefore, to its acknowledgment and veneration is united connaturally the acknowledgment and worship of the excellence of God, Who is infinitely higher and more venerable. The worship of *dulia* is subordinated, then, to the divine worship by its own reason of being. Consequently, as St. Thomas teaches, this virtue itself and its acts and ends are subordinated to the virtue, acts, and ends of religion.⁵²

We say this is so by its very reason of being. If we consider the essence of religion, we see that not only this virtue of honoring divinely excelling creatures but also all the virtues can and ought to be informed by religion which elevates them from their particular and inferior ends to the highest end which religion serves. All human acts ought to be religious acts, subordinating themselves to the virtue of religion whose proper duty is to ordain the life of man to God. Subordinated thus to religion human life is supremely exalted. Man's actions, already noble and good by reason of the respective virtues from which they proceed, become much more so due to the elevation to the divine which religion confers upon them.⁵³ From this general reason together with the particular reason proposed

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 103, a. 4, ad 2; III, q. 25, a. 5.

⁵² *Dulia* in its general meaning includes all the virtues which give due veneration to superior rational creatures. Taken in this sense it includes piety and observance. (Cf. II-II, q. 103, a. 4, c.), while in its proper sense (Cf. *ibid.*, a. 3) it is part of observance. In its ordinary use, by *dulia* is understood the virtue which gives due veneration to supernaturally excelling creatures. Notice how St. Thomas declares the subordination of the virtues which honor creatures to the virtue of religion: II-II, q. 101, a. 1; q. 102, a. 1.

⁵³ Cf. *ibid.*, II-II, q. 81, a. 1 ad 1; II-II, q. 81, a. 4, ad 2; II-II, q. 81, a. 8; II-II, q. 88, a. 6, c.

before it is evident that the veneration of the saints will be so much the better inasmuch as it more directly and more efficaciously leads to God.

The liturgical or official veneration of the Blessed Virgin and of the saints is an irrefragable confirmation of this doctrine. The virtue of religion fully informs this veneration with its ends of divine glory and the sanctification of souls without, however, diminution of the honor which is given to the saints. The purpose of religion or *latria* is clearly expressed in the prescribed invitation with which the liturgical Office is always begun: *Venite exultemus Domino. . . .*⁵⁴ Throughout the entire Divine Office God is glorified in His saints whose examples are evoked for the edification and example of the faithful. In the proper prayer of the Office God is thanked for exalting His saints, and He is besought that He may be attentive to the supplications they make for us in consideration of Our Lord Jesus Christ: *Per Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum.*⁵⁵

This compenetration of the worship of *dulia* (and *hyperdulia*) with the divine worship is the reason why it is practically considered as religious worship and as a connatural manifestation of religious piety. From this proceeds the common use of the same terms in both kinds of worship. The word "devotion," the principal act of religion, clearly indicates this. For the same term is used for pious sentiments in respect to the Most Holy Trinity as for those in respect to the Blessed Virgin and the saints. However, strictly understood, it has a diverse extension in each case. In the present case it has joined with the extension of worship due to the saints that of the supreme reverence which is due to the Saint of Saints.

⁵⁴ Notice how in the diverse Invitatories latreutic worship proceeds from the veneration of the saints: Common of a martyr: *Regem sempiternum venite adoremus* plus *Qui Martyrem suum. . . .* Common of a confessor: *Confessorum Regem adoremus* plus *Qui celestis regni. . . .* Common of a virgin: *Agnum sponsum Virginum* plus *Venite adoremus Dominum. . . .* Common of the Blessed Virgin: *Solemnitatem Virginis Marie celebremus* plus *Christum . . . eius Filium adoremus Dominum.* Cf. Santiago Alameda, O.S.B., *El Oficio Divino* (Salamanca, 1932), III.

⁵⁵ This is easily verified by consulting the collects in the missal or breviary.

The cult of the Blessed Virgin is ordained not only to the veneration of her but also to the veneration of the divinity and to the sanctification of souls. To these ends Marian devotions ought to adapt themselves, and they will be so much the more excellent, theologically speaking, insofar as they are more apt and efficacious for obtaining these ends. This seems to us to be the true objective criterion for the right estimation of Marian devotions.

Consequently, in order to evaluate a certain Marian devotion one must examine: (1) its latreutic extension or its aptitude for glorifying God; (2) its hyperdulic extension or its capability for glorifying Mary; (3) its saving or sanctifying efficacy. And since sanctity is attained in the union with God by means of the intimate union of the soul with Jesus and Mary, and since it is accomplished by divine grace with the exercise of the theological and moral virtues and particularly by means of prayer, the sanctifying efficacy of a Marian devotion may be proved by its aptitude: (1) for conforming souls with Jesus and Mary; (2) for obtaining grace; (3) for increasing faith; (4) for strengthening hope; (5) for inciting charity; (6) for the moral instruction of souls in the virtues or evangelical life; (7) for leading us to pray perfectly. With these criteria let us contrast the theological value of the Rosary devotion and the devotion to the Immaculate Heart of Mary.⁵⁶

III. DIVINE GLORIFICATION

The intent of glorifying God is so obvious in the Rosary even as to make it appear to be a devotion primarily latreutic, and often it is considered as such.⁵⁷ However, perhaps it is

⁵⁶ We do not claim that these devotions have been formed according to and as effects of theological canons, for they are daughters of the spirit of piety rather than of the reasoning of theologians. But this spirit of piety is most wise, as it is an instinct and derivation of the Holy Spirit Who is the Spirit of Truth. Afterwards, the theologian examines with astonishment the wonderful wisdom of these divinely ingenious institutions.

⁵⁷ In the Secret of the privileged votive Mass of the Rosary is said: *Annue, quaesumus misericors Deus, precibus nostris: ut quicumque intra Rosarii Dei*

preferable to conceive of it as a devotion specifically Marian in which Mary and the veneration of Mary appear wisely subordinated to God and to the divine worship. The Rosary is *hyperdulia* informed with *latria*. The Rosary glorifies: (1) The Most Holy Trinity; (2) Especially Jesus Christ. And the Rosary accomplishes this glorification: (1) In the mysteries and truths which it contains; (2) in its oral prayers.

It gives glory to the Most Holy Trinity in its mysteries. The Rosary begins by calling to mind the sacred mystery of the Holy Trinity upon reminding us that the Word of the Father became incarnate in the most pure womb of the Blessed Virgin through the operation and grace of the Holy Ghost. And throughout the mysteries of His hidden life and His Passion and death there appears the Son of God reconciling us with the Father and meriting for us the communication of the Holy Ghost, Whose mission is recalled expressly in one of the mysteries. In its glorious mysteries the Rosary commemorates the triumph of the work of Redemption in the glory of Jesus and Mary enwrapped in the Blessed Life of the Trinity, the possession of which they merited for us also. Likewise, the Rosary glorifies the august Trinity in Mary, who in it appears intimately related with the divine persons: The first born daughter of the Father, the mother and associate of the Son, and the spouse and tabernacle of the Holy Ghost. The Sacred Trinity admirably manifests Itself in Mary, full of grace, the greatest work of the divine love, perfected triumph of the Redemption, prototype and mother of the sons of God.

The Most Holy Trinity is glorified in the Rosarian prayers.

genitricis Mariae, eius soli filio dicati, ambitum virtutis continemur, plena tibi atque perfecta corporis et animae devotione placeamus. St. Pius V in his Constitution *Consueverunt Romani Pontifices* of September 17, 1569 writes: *Respiciens* (Btus. Dominicus) *modum facilem et omnibus pervium et admodum pium, orandi et precandi Deum; Rosarium, seu Psalterium eiusdem Beatae Mariae Virginis nuncupatum excogitavit.* In the fifth lesson of the old Office of the Rosary (1590) was read: *Hoc autem Rosarium sive Psalterium est modus quo facile admodum et pie Deum exoramus; quo . . . Beatissima Virgo colitur et veneratur.* (*Acta S. S. SSmi. Rosarii*, vol. II, 4, p. 1225). In the Office in the fifth lesson of Matins is read: *Est autem Rosarium, sive Psalterium, sacra quaedam formula precandi Deum in honorem Beatae Mariae: . . .*

The Rosary directs its petition primarily to God according to the perfect formula taught to us by Christ. And in the prayers to the Blessed Virgin she is saluted as full of the grace of God Who is with her; she is proclaimed blessed because of the blessed Fruit which is her Son; and as Mother of God she is besought to obtain of Him the gifts of His goodness—our well-being. Moreover, the Rosary crowns its glorification of the Most Holy Trinity by terminating each decade with the doxology: “Glory be to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost, as it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be, world without end. Amen.”

Jesus Christ is glorified in the mysteries of the Rosary. The Rosary is an abridged Gospel which relives the mysteries of Jesus, true God and true man, Saviour of the human race. By means of the Rosary the most holy life of the Saviour is made the constant object of the loving contemplation of souls. In the Rosary Jesus is the blessed Fruit of Mary, who in giving Him to us became at the same time His mother and ours and blessed among all women. The Rosary, therefore, is a perennial homage to our Redeemer. Jesus Christ is given glory in the prayers of the Rosary. The Rosarian prayers make this homage to Jesus Christ exterior, not only by adoring Him in the Blessed Trinity and by seeking and asking as He taught us to seek and to ask, but also by proclaiming His Divinity, blessing and invoking His Name in each *Hail Mary*.

Latreutic extension is not so apparent in the devotion to the Heart of Mary as it is in the Rosary, but he who does not see Mary clothed with the Sun of the Divinity does not really see her. The Lord is with her. It is not possible to enter into the Heart of Mary without entering into God. The Heart of Mary is a true *Holy of Holies* of the Most Blessed Trinity with Whom she lives in vital and ineffable communion. Every soul through grace is a little god. Mary is as divine as anyone can possibly be without being God. The Virgin Mary relives in her spirit in a most lofty and incomparable manner the adorable life of the Trinity. Her Heart is a living mirror of the hidden mystery of the Deity. Thus, in Mary the soul finds God. Upon pene-

trating into her most holy Heart the soul adores the thrice holy God.⁵⁸ But moreover, if the excellence of creatures of itself leads to the veneration of the Creator, the divine excellence of the most pure Heart of Mary, supreme realization of the divine Wisdom, Love, and Power, proclaims better than all other creatures together the infinite perfection of God. She is the true heaven which reveals the glory of the Creator. The soul finds in the Heart of Mary, together with that of Christ, the supreme *benedicite* of divine praise.⁵⁹ And to that *benedicite* of the soul is joined the *Magnificat*, which the Heart of Mary raises unceasingly to the merciful God Who has made her great and blessed: "My soul doth magnify the Lord. And my spirit hath rejoiced in God my Saviour. Because he hath regarded the humility of his handmaid, for behold from henceforth all generations shall call me blessed. Because he that is mighty hath done great things to me: and holy is his name."

⁵⁸ The doxology of the Cordimarian hymns of St. John Eudes has this profound thought: O sacrosancta Trinitas, Aeterna vita cordium, Cordis Mariae sanctitas, In corde regnes omnium. Cf. Carlos Sauve, S. S., *La intimidad de Maria* (translated into Spanish by Ruiz Amado, S. J., Barcelona, 1924).

⁵⁹ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 55: "We might consider the relations of Mary with the infinite perfections of the Most Holy Trinity; we might dwell on the relations of intimacy, familiarity, and union with which each Divine Person privileges her. How near must she not be to the Divine Majesty to Whom her royal dignity must be as a perpetual adoration! How near must she not be to the infinite simplicity, to which her candor is probably paying continuous homage; to the infinite sanctity, which her immaculate purity must be glorifying unceasingly; to the omnipotence, which might represent to us her authority over the Child God and over the world! How close must she not be to charity, to tenderness, to the infinite mercy, which her goodness and love will sweetly reveal to us! . . ."

"Mary," says Father Faber, "is worth more than the whole creation. For she is the most worthy of creatures, the most beautiful, the most powerful, and the one most loved by God. And thus it is that before the eyes of the Eternal One she is the cantic which is fitting for Him in Sion. Mary is all praise and thanksgiving. Mary is the repose of the merciful complacency of the Creator. And thus the praise of Mary is an almost infinite veneration which we may offer to the King of the ages in humble adoration. In ancient times the servants of God composed their *benedicite*, choosing for a theme of similar song the mountains and the seas, the birds and the fish, the cold and the heat, the fountains and the meadows, men and animals. All of these creatures were invited to bless, to praise, and to exalt the glory of the Creator. But the *benedicite* of Christians is Mary." *All For Jesus*, chap. 8.

Jesus is Mary's reason of being. Mary's reason for being is to give us Jesus. Thus Marian devotion ought to lead us to Jesus through Mary. We have seen how the Most Holy Rosary does this. How is this accomplished in the Cordimarian devotion? St. John Eudes made the object of this devotion not only the physical and spiritual Heart of Mary, but also her "divine Heart," that is, Jesus living in her, Who in being the Life of her life is the Heart of her Heart. In this way, Cordimarian veneration has reverted into homage to Jesus, according to the saint's formula appearing in the Invitatory of Matins of the liturgical Office of the Heart of Mary: *Jesum in Corde Mariae regnantem: venite adoremus.*

Although he may not express it so explicitly, the devout soul always finds the gem in its setting: The Divine Son in the Heart of the Virgin Mother. The Heart of the Blessed Virgin has and gives Jesus always. Moreover, there is the union, compenetration, and conformity between the Son and the Mother, between the Heart of Christ and the Heart of Mary, one intimate and indissoluble. Cordimarian veneration not only respects that intimate identification of the Heart of Mary with that of Christ, but it venerates it principally in respect to her, since it is her divine formation in Christ which makes her supremely venerable. And in this way, through the Immaculate Heart of Mary, souls penetrate into the Sacred Heart of Jesus, and the veneration of Mary's love grows into adoration of the infinite love of Jesus.

IV. GLORIFICATION OF MARY

The Most Holy Rosary is a most perfect practice for glorifying Mary in the mysteries and excellences which it recalls and in the praise which it directs to her.

The Most Holy Rosary glorifies Mary in its mysteries. By means of them it gives a perfect explanation of her excellence by presenting her as dependent upon and intimately united with Jesus, that is, in her condition as Mother of God and of men in her consequential office of Coredeptrix, Mediatrix,

Dispensatrix of grace, and Queen of all created beings.⁶⁰ That this is the greatest of Mary's sublimities is well known; that the Rosary contains it is evident. In the Rosary Mary is the Mother of Jesus, Whose motherhood she accepted, Whom she conceived of the Holy Ghost, Whom she brought forth while remaining a virgin, Whom she presented in the temple, Whom she nourished, and with Whom she lived and to Whom she gave her motherly care, not only during His hidden life, but during His entire life. At the same time, she is the Mother of men for whose divine regeneration she accepted and accomplished the office as Mother of the Saviour, and she offered the life of her Divine Son as the price of our Redemption. For that reason she is the Mediatrix through whom God comes to us and through whom we supplicate God, and she is the Coredeemptrix, especially in the sorrowful mysteries.⁶¹ Moreover, she is our Mother, full of grace, through whom we beseech it and through whom it comes to us from God; and she is the Queen who co-reigns with her Divine Son. Thus, the Rosary is a popular and unsurpassable Mariology, a most wise means of glorifying Mary.

At the same time the Rosary is a perennial commemoration and a perpetual homage to the most memorable and glorious accomplishments of Mary. The inspired prayers of the Rosary which refer to Mary marvellously rhyme with the ideas con-

⁶⁰ By means of the Holy Rosary we raise Mary to the place which she occupies in the divine plan. In the Rosary we are conducted to God by Mary, we do all for Mary and we hope for everything from Mary. This is, in effect, her role in the Incarnation. Without any doubt, she is a cause of our salvation. (Father Hugon, *El Rosario y la Santidad*, II, cap. I, page 79.)

⁶¹ According to Pope Leo XIII, perhaps no other manner of prayer expresses better the Marian mediation and coredemption than the Rosary. "Quod Mariae praesidium orando quaesumus, hoc sane, tamquam in fundamento, in munere nititur conciliandae nobis divinae gratiae, quae ipsa continenter fungitur apud Deum, dignitate et meritis acceptissima, longeque Caelestibus sanctis omnibus potentia antecellens. Hoc vero munus in nullo fortasse orandi modo tam patet expressum quam in Rosario; in quo partes quae fuerunt Virginis ad salutem hominum procurandam sic recurrunt, quasi praesenti effectui explicatae: id quod habet eximium pietatis emolumentum, sine sacris mysteriis, ad contemplandum succedentibus, sine precibus ore pio interandis." (*Jucunda Semper*.)

tained in the mysteries, and they echo and reëcho her loftiness, proclaiming her full of grace, united with God, blessed among women. Moreover, they beseech her as Mother of God and our Mother to bestow upon us grace for our present needs and the grace of final perseverance. The Rosary consists in mysteries and prayers divinely harmonized: That magnificent hymn of Mary, Mother of God and our Mother, which, repeated perpetually and universally by all Christian souls, is the perfect fulfillment of the prophecy of the *Magnificat*: "For behold from henceforth all generations shall call me blessed."⁶²

The Cordimarian devotion also is a most fitting way of glorifying Mary. In the perfection of her Heart is contained the whole excellence of her life. To honor her Heart is to glorify her in all her grandeur. The Cordimarian devotion glorifies the sanctity of Mary at its very source, which is her most perfect love. This love is the virtue of virtues; the cause, perfection, and merit of all her actions; the explanation of all her mysteries and titles; the substantial excellence of her most holy life. To glorify her Heart is to glorify Mary completely. The Cordimarian devotion by its universal extension is the devotion of devotions. "The excellence of the soul of Mary, the manifestations of her love, her diverse titles, and the intervention of her motherly solicitude in behalf of men . . . are all venerated together under the most expressive symbol in the devotion to her Immaculate Heart."⁶³ The acts connatural to this devotion which we mentioned above—love, consecration, reparation, invocation, and imitation—prove its efficacy in glorifying Mary in her most blessed Heart.

⁶² The Rosary is also called the "Psalter of Mary," and the Church in the liturgical Office for the feast of the Most Holy Rosary invites us to take this mystical Psalter and sing the glory of the Blessed Virgin, our helper: "Sumite Psalterium jucundum in insigni die solemnitatis vestrae, et exultate Virgini adjutrici nostrae. Cantate ei canticum novum: annunciate inter gentes gloriam eius." (Response at Vespers of the Feast of the Most Holy Rosary.) "Igitur cum sacra haec precandi formula tantopere Virgini grate esse dignoscatur. . . ." (Leo XIII, *Supremi Apostolatus*)

⁶³ Narcisco Garcia Garces, *Catecismo de la devocion al Corazon de Maria*, number 97.

V. SANCTIFYING EFFICACY OF THE DEVOTIONS

1. *Conformation of Souls to Jesus and Mary.*

The divine plan of reconciliation, sanctification, and glorification of souls reduces itself to Christianizing them or conforming them to Christ, *Conformes fieri imagini Filii sui*. The Christian life is begun with the incorporation in Christ by baptism; it grows with the growth of this incorporation; and it is perfect when it reproduces faithfully the life of Christ, that is, when it reaches a complete conformity and identification with Him. The perfect Christian life is, therefore, that which relives perfectly the life of Christ. *Christianus alter Christus*. This incorporation is accomplished in Mary and through Mary, Mother of Christians, the divine mould of the sons of God.

The Rosary is a most efficacious means of conforming the soul to Mary and to Christ. It presents them as models in the entire course of their lives, which have to be relived by the soul. "The whole intimate, loving, and familiar intercourse with God by means of prayer and contemplation is ordained to this, to go on copying and imitating as well as possible, and to let the Divine Spirit impress in us supernaturally, the adorable perfections of the Celestial Father, conforming us to His Only-begotten Son, splendor of His glory and our exemplar and model.

"In order to know, then, the grades which this divine life offers and the phenomena which it presents from the time we receive it in baptism until it fully unfolds itself in glory one must keep well in mind all the mysteries—the joyful, sorrowful, and glorious—of the life of Our Lord. For this reason it is so helpful to meditate upon them at the side of Mary, Mother of Divine Grace, in the holy Rosary. All of them, from the Incarnation itself *de Spiritu Sancto ex Maria Virgine* and the Nativity to the Passion, Death, Resurrection, and Ascension, and even to the sending of the Divine Spirit, which is where the wonders of the Christian life are consummated—have to

reproduce themselves in their own way in many other Christs, in all the perfect Christians.”⁶⁴

Further, the Rosary subjects souls to the forming influence of Jesus and Mary. “The Rosary becomes for him who recites it well a pouring forth of the knowledge and love of God over his soul and a sort of living and continual incarnation of the spirit of Jesus and Mary in our hearts.”⁶⁵ The supernatural efficacy of the Rosary stems from this that it is at the same time a prayer directed to Mary and an assiduous meditation on the Blessed Virgin and the humanity of Christ, the bond of reconciliation between God and man. The recitation of the Rosary makes us intimately familiar with Jesus and Mary; it envelops us in the rays of their sanctity and purity; it brings the soul and its powers close to Heaven, and it leaves impressed in our thoughts and affections the seal of God.”⁶⁶ By the Rosary also the soul appropriates the mysteries of Jesus and Mary making them his own through faith and love, and in a moral sense he relives them sharing with them their affections and sentiments. Later we will speak of the Rosary’s efficacy for obtaining grace and the virtues which reproduce the life of Jesus and Mary in the soul.

To show the sanctifying efficacy of devotion to the Heart of Mary, it is sufficient to say that it is the fruit and the con-natural effect of this devotion to conform our heart to that of Mary, the divine mould of Christian hearts, in order to conform them to the Heart of Christ. In the perfect conformity with the maternal Heart of Mary and that of her Son consists the perfect compenetration of our life with theirs.⁶⁷ And to this

⁶⁴ Arintero, *Grados de Oracion*, art. 1, pages 13-15.

⁶⁵ Norberto del Prado, O. P., *Enseñanzas del Rosario*, I, Introduction, page 35.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, III, page 64. “Jesus and Mary,” says Father Joret, O. P., “are not just beautiful dead models of Whom there remains only an edifying remembrance. They live more and better than ever. . . . They contribute as instruments to the divine action which alone is capable of penetrating to the most secret depths of the soul, and with it they enlighten the spirit, animate the heart, and transform our lives.” (Leo XIII, *Le Rosaire de Marie*, II, chap. 3, art. 2 & 3, p. 339.)

⁶⁷ The prayer of the liturgical Office of the Heart of Mary by St. John Eudes expresses it thus: “Deus, qui Unigenitum tuum in Corde Tuo ab aeterno viventem

conformation with the Heart of Mary and formation into it with that of Christ we are efficaciously led by the connatural acts of this Cordimarian devotion, that is, by love, consecration, and imitation.

2. *Means of Obtaining Grace.*

The true cause of our being conformed with Christ is grace, the participation of the divine life, which unites us to Christ and connaturalizes us with God, associating us in a vital manner with the mystery of the Trinity. Since only God is able to sanctify, grace proceeds from Him alone as from its Author. However, it flows in its plenitude from God into Christ, the Head or principal vivifier of souls, and from Christ it flows completely into Mary, inasmuch as she is the Mother of souls and universal co-principle of their lives. Grace, therefore, proceeds from God and is communicated to us through Jesus and Mary, as the fruit of the Redemption accomplished by their mysteries.

This communication is effected: (a) through the sacraments, of themselves efficacious in virtue of the Passion of Christ; (b) through a living faith in the Passion of Christ and in the mysteries of the Redemption. It is very important to be aware of this efficacy of faith informed by love in order to gain for oneself the value of the redemptive mysteries of Jesus and Mary and draw from them the divine water of grace. By faith and love we come into the possession of Jesus and Mary, and from this spiritual contact with them we derive for ourselves Their sanctifying virtue. This doctrine, taken from St. Thomas,⁶⁸ illustrates in a marvellous manner the efficacy of the Rosary and the devotion to the Heart of Mary in obtaining grace.

The Rosary *predisposes* for the acquisition of grace inasmuch as it leads us to abhor sins, which the redemptive life aims to

in Corde Virginis Matris vivere et regnare in aeternum voluisti: da nobis, quaesumus, hanc sanctissimum Jesu et Mariae in corde uno vitam jugiter celebrare, cor unum inter nos et cum ipsis habere, tuamque in omnibus voluntatem corde magno et animo volenti adimplere; ut secundum Cor tuum a te invenire mereamur."

⁶⁸ *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 49, a. 1, ad 5; a. 3, ad 1.

abolish. Moreover, it makes manifest the infinite value of grace which is recalled in the mysteries, and it incites us to reconcile ourselves with God, Who demands that we pray. For this same reason it is an efficacious means for conserving divine grace.

The Rosary is also very efficacious for obtaining growth of sanctifying grace and the aid of actual grace, for it places the soul in spiritual communion with Jesus and Mary, causes of grace. Moreover, by means of loving union and moral contact with their mysteries it captures with faith and love their divine influence. Meanwhile, this is repeated again and again in the prayers, which beseech from God the coming of His reign over us, and from the Blessed Virgin, full of grace, that she may obtain grace for us, her sinful children. "The mysteries," says Father Hugon, "are not only examples of heroism. They possess a special efficacy for making us practice what they teach. . . . Our union with the soul of the Word disposes us to receive graces which will make us like unto Him, and our pious contact with the heroism of the Saviour will merit for us actual aids for being heroic as He was."⁶⁹

This sanctifying virtue of the Rosary makes it commendable beyond measure. Moreover, it ought to be noted that the connection between the Eucharist and the Rosary is extremely intimate; they are two modes of revivifying Christ and the sanctifying efficacy of His mysteries, which wonderfully complete each other. The Rosary was inspired by Mary as an

⁶⁹ Father Hugon, *El Rosario y la santidad*, III, chap. 4, p. 161. In another place the same Father Hugon says: "The meditation of our beautiful prayer places us in contact with the source from which Mary has obtained her spiritual riches. As we have said speaking of the soul of Jesus, the Rosary makes us perceive in some way the soul and the grace of the Blessed Virgin. Brilliant rays of light, eternal fire, come forth from her soul to ours. When we recite the *Hail Mary*, when we say to our Mother *gratia plena*, we not only renew the perfume of her first joys, but also, and above all, we recall the role which she plays in the work of our salvation, in the obtaining of grace, and the claims which she, being near to God, makes efficacious in our favor. To meditate on the mysteries is to unite our soul to her, our heart with hers. It is to join our voice with that of time and eternity when we say: *Maria Mater gratiae*—Oh Mary, Mother Of Grace, be mindful of your children! And Mary answers by showering upon us new favors saying: "He that shall find me shall find life, and shall have salvation from the Lord." (*Ibid.*, II, chap. 2, pages 96-97.)

auxiliary of the Eucharist. By means of the revivification and moral possession of the mysteries of Jesus and Mary through the Rosary, she disposes souls so that they may perceive better and benefit more from the sanctifying efficacy of the Eucharistic gifts—the Mass and Holy Communion.

It is easy to discover this excellence also in the devotion to the Heart of Mary, if we remember that all divine graces come to us through the maternal Heart of Mary. We are children of her Heart inasmuch as we are children of God. Mary received grace in such abundance as to be able to communicate it to all souls. Her grace is maternal inasmuch as it prepared her to become Mother of God and because by communicating it to us she becomes our Mother. This she does by an affective movement of her maternal Heart, for every outpouring of divine grace is accompanied by a loving irradiation from the Heart of Mary. That most holy Heart, intimately united to that of Christ and inhabited by the Holy Ghost is, then, the throne and source of grace. The devotion to the Heart of Mary leads us to drink from the Fountain, enkindles us in the Fire, illuminates us in the Sun. The union which faith and love establish between her Heart and ours bestows on ours the sanctifying influence of her grace.

The conversion of sinners is a very natural effect of this devotion and is not extrinsic to it. For to lead the wayward children to the Heart of the Mother of Mercy is to assure them of pardon and to reenkindle in them the inextinguishable desire of the maternal intimacy. But the best is always for the best. And if the sinners recover lost grace in the maternal Heart of Mary, surely then it is the secure refuge for faithful souls. The love of Mary is solicitous in admitting them, most powerful in guarding them, and most efficacious in introducing them to the Heart of God.

“Through Mary,” says Father Hugon, “there is in the Church a supernatural current which alternately descends and ascends; there is between Heaven and earth a sort of perpetual flow and reflow. It is as a wave of the sea that sends back a wave, love that returns love. The merits and treasures of

Jesus are transmitted to us by the Heart of Mary; our merits and our love go to Jesus by the Heart of His Mother. Your Immaculate Heart, O Holy Virgin, is the sweet rendezvous where God and man meet, the mysterious river wherein come together the rivulets of time and eternity.”⁷⁰

3. *Increase of Faith.*

Through grace the soul has life from God, and through the theological virtues derived from grace the soul lives to things divine, participating in the divine activity. Those virtues are: faith, which is a participation of divine knowledge, the light of the Word of God in us; hope and charity, which are participations of the divine love, infusions of the Holy Ghost.

Faith is the divine virtue whereby man, moved by grace, voluntarily assents to the truths which the all wise God reveals. It is, then, the light of the Christian life, and therefore, its root and foundation, as the Apostle calls it. It discloses to us in substance the secret things of God. It opens up for our hope horizons of eternal glory by assuring us that God Himself through His infinite mercy will be our reward. Moreover, it places the love of the soul in contact with the infinite divine Good, with God Who is essentially good and infinitely lovable. It elevates our happy dependence upon God by making us certain that He is our Heavenly Father and we His children, whom Christ, the Incarnate Word, leads to Him. Faith, in giving a divine meaning to our lives, gives it also to all creatures. By means of faith, God, the August Trinity, is the Sun of life.

The Rosary increases faith because it is a marvellous compendium of the revealed dogmas which it constantly proposes for our devout consideration and firm adherence. Pope Leo XIII teaches that the Rosary affords a practical and easy means of introducing and fixing in our spirits the principal dogmas of the Christian faith.⁷¹ “The Marian Rosary,” says Pius XI,

⁷⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 95.

⁷¹ Encyclical *Magnae Dei Matris*. “Eo quidem summa Evangelicae doctrinae perapte continetur.” (Pope Leo XIII, *Apostolic Letter to the English*, April 14, 1895.)

"helps to excite, encourage, and make attractive the evangelical virtues. Above all, it nourishes faith which flourishes with timely meditation on the holy mysteries, and it elevates the spirit to the world of revealed truths, all of which are certainly wholesome, as it is obvious to all, especially now when there has come upon many in this century, even upon those who call themselves Christians a sort of dislike for spiritual things and the Christian doctrine."⁷²

Further, frequent meditation on the mysteries is efficacious in obtaining from Jesus and Mary the grace to penetrate them. Jesus and Mary in the Rosary are teachers and enlighteners of the soul who believes in them. "And in this series of divine lessons," says Father Del Prado, "which extend from the Incarnation of the Word of God to the Coronation of His most holy Mother, we never cease to hear the voice of Mary, a soft and sweet voice which speaks to the heart and impresses on it with characters of fair and holy love the entire pattern of the life of Jesus and her own. It is Mary who in the mysteries of the Rosary enlightens our understanding in a wonderful manner with the truths of faith, and who fills the soul with consolation and holy hope. There is nothing more efficacious nor more pleasant than the recitation of the Rosary for firmly establishing and conserving the Catholic faith in the heart of man."⁷³

The Rosary also benefits faith because the example of the most firm faith of Mary as presented in the Rosary is an incitement for our own, and the practice of the Rosary is a perfect exercise of faith.

From all this it may be inferred that the Rosary is a most efficacious means for the rechristianization of souls and for the conservation and growth of Christian doctrine in them. The Popes have recognized and repeatedly taught this.⁷⁴ The

⁷² Encyclical *Ingravescentibus Malis*, Sept., 1937. Cf. Torras y Bages, *El Rosario y su Mística Filosofía*, Barcelona, 1935, chap. I.

⁷³ *Enseñanzas del Rosario*, I, pp. 240-241. Cf. Leo XIII, Encyclical *Magnæ Dei Matris*, where he explains that the Rosary is "an instrument well adapted to preserve the Faith." Cf. also Joret, *op. cit.*, II, chap. III, art. 2, 32, no. 2.

⁷⁴ Cf. Leo XIII, Encyclical *Adjutricem Populi*.

Rosary from its very beginning was as much a catechetical method as a method of prayer, or even more so; or better, it was a happy way of uniting the two so that the people might pray and profess the Christian truths at the same time as they learned them. First, a mystery was explained to them, and afterwards, they converted it into a prayer, beseeching God through the mediation of Mary and Jesus while they recalled to mind the mystery. In this way the people benefited simultaneously in faith and piety.

The apostolic value of the Rosary is perennial. One must not forget that where the Rosary enters there enter also Jesus and Mary with all the consequential benefits. It has this result, above all, that it supernaturalizes our life, which is always so obstinate, and today more than ever, to the Christian interpretation of our existence. The Rosary is a tremendous force in supernaturalizing our lives because it gives a divine meaning to the unchangeable pattern of human life in its three invariable phrases of ideals or hopes, struggles and bitternesses, attainment or triumph, if not of final defeat. To humanity which hopes, suffers, and conquers, the Rosary teaches how to make divine its joys, to convert into merit its sorrows, to look to eternity for true glory, preparing oneself for the fruit of the Redemption which is precisely to make human life divine, uniting it in merits and glory with that of Jesus and Mary.⁷⁵

⁷⁵ In spite of the original apostolic purpose of the Rosary, little attention is given to its extraordinary efficacy as an instrument in the apostolate. Leo XIII had this uppermost in mind in proposing the Rosary as an unexcelled means of Christian restoration. This great Pontiff disclosed in the Rosary a three-fold Christianizing apostolate. *Ergo Rosarium Mariae Virginis in quo apte utiliterque habentur conjuncta:* a) *Eximia precandi formula:* (Apostolate of piety). b) *Et idoneum fidei conservandae instrumentum:* (Apostolate of faith or truth). c) *Et insigne specimen perfectae virtutis:* (Apostolate of morality or Christian virtue). (*Encyclical Magnae Dei Matris.*)

To gain souls for the Rosary, as we wrote elsewhere, is to gain them for Jesus and Mary, whose truth and faith, whose life and example, whose veneration and supplication the Rosary contains. It is a magnificent three-fold apostolate: of faith, morality, and piety. The apostolate of faith is to make known the mysteries of Jesus and Mary; the apostolate of Christian morality is to remind souls of the most holy life which these mysteries relive; and the apostolate of piety is to cause

The entire intimate life of the Heart of Mary is illuminated by faith. Love and faith mutually influence each other. Love determines the intellect to believe,⁷⁶ but faith discovers for love the infinite goodness of the Infinite Truth.⁷⁷ Thus, love informs faith, and faith guides love and illumines our life. Mary's faith made her adhere to the divine truth with all the force of her immense love. But, in its turn, Mary's love received its life through the divine motives of faith. She lived for love, but the pure and divine truth was the flame of that fire, the light of her life.

In the light of the Truth of God, not acquired by us but revealed by Him, things are divinely illuminated and are then seen as they are in the eyes of God. Thus, above that light which creatures reflect of God, He is known in the pure revealed light of faith, and creatures themselves are seen in the light of God. One's own feeble lights darken the soul, but the light of God, even through the veil of faith, enlightens it from above. Everything is seen in God, and God is seen in everything. In a parallel manner and for the same reason, the motives of love are deified. One loves only for the sake of God. God is loved in all and all in God. In the measure in which the Holy Ghost, Who is the Spirit of Truth, makes the soul more translucent by enlightening its faith, so much the more is its knowledge and love supernaturalized. It understands, loves, and lives more to divine things.

The Blessed Virgin lived this life in pure faith. God was her Light; God was her Love, The Reason of all reasons, the Goodness of all goodnesses. Her Heart lived for God. The

Jesus and the Mary to be venerated in their mysteries and to make supplication through their mediation.

Fathers Del Prado and Torras y Bages observe that Leo XIII discovered in the doctrine of St. Thomas and in the devotion to the Rosary the two infallible sources for the rechristianization of modern society. Rosarian organizations and other associations of piety and of the apostolate, above all Catholic Action, will find in the Rosary an easy and efficient instrument of the apostolate.

⁷⁶ Cf. Saint Thomas Aq., *op. cit.*, II-II, q. 1, a. 4, c.; q. 2 a. 1, ad 3; q. 2, a. 10, c.; q. 4, aa. 1 and 2.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 62, a. 4; II-II, q. 4, a. 7.

divine criterion was her motive in all things. Her own Divine Son was the Great Mystery which dazzled her, enlightened her, and divinely inflamed her. Enlightened by her faith, Mary's heart was centered and submerged in the divinity of her Son. Never for one moment did she cease to believe in Him, to adore Him, to love Him with all the energy of her soul. The eclipses to which the divinity of the Redeemer submitted itself gave her occasion for greater heroism in her faith.

The soul which through the Cordimarian devotion arrives at the Heart of Mary enters into the depths of divine light which envelops it, in which it loves, in which it lives. And that pure supernatural light of the Heart of Mary is not able to do less than to enlighten in a wonderful manner the hearts which unite themselves to hers. At the sight of the wonders of faith in this virginal Heart, the soul will proclaim Mary blessed for having believed and will find courage to live according to faith.

4. *Strengthening of Hope.*

Faith assures the Christian soul of the possibility of obtaining eternal happiness in the blessed vision of God. Hope, then, is born of faith, and it is the divine virtue by which we are confident of securing the possession of God with the help of His omnipotence. Without this virtue the heart of man would fail, lacking as he does the good which he anxiously desires and afflicted with the thousand adversities of this sorrowful life. But with it he glories in the midst of his tribulations, sure of the infinite compensation of future glory. "We glory," says St. Paul, "in the hope of the glory of the sons of God." Thus, hope is an incentive for sacrifice, a consolation for misfortune, a restraint for receptive illusions, a constant recourse for perseverance in good; it is, finally, as St. Paul says, as an anchor securely fastened in eternity against the tempests of life.

The Rosary strengthens hope because it proposes, promises and offers the soul the possession of God, the true happiness, which is the object of hope.⁷⁸ To this is added the friendly and

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 17, a. 2.

eternal intimacy with Jesus and Mary which the Rosary also presents. Further it guarantees hope with the intervention of the divine omnipotence through His saving mercy, and this is the true motive of hope.⁷⁹ The Rosary, too, promises the mediation of Jesus and Mary, Whose worth before God is infinite and Whose earnest desire to save us moved Them to the supreme sacrifice.⁸⁰ It forecasts the triumph already obtained by Jesus and Mary in the mysteries of their glorification,⁸¹ and ministers to hope through the contempt for earthly things which is taught in the Rosary.⁸² It stimulates the practice of hope through the exercise of this virtue in the mysteries and in the prayers which ask what ought to be hoped for and in the order in which they ought to be desired.⁸³

“In no less degree does the Rosary enliven hope in eternal things by opening widely the Heavens when, while meditating on the victories of Christ which are commemorated in its final mysteries, it invites us to take possession of that imperishable Fatherland. By this means, although we may breath in everywhere that anxious desire for earthly goods which has weakened the hearts of mortals and which tends to infect us with that fever for perishable riches and most vain delights which afflicts so many, we shall feel impelled anew by a holy inspiration to pursue that treasure of celestial and eternal goods which neither thieves can steal nor moths consume.”⁸⁴

The Blessed Virgin is the great model of a hopeful soul. Both on account of the object and the motive, as well as the intensity of the virtue and its exercise, the Heart of Mary was ineffably hopeful. She was ineffably hopeful on account of the object of her hope because God was her possession more so than of any other soul. Moreover, God was her hope as fruit of her divine maternity. She was ineffably hopeful because of the motive of

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 17, aa. 2 and 7, c.; q. 21, a. 1, c.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, III, qq. 46, 47, 48 and 49.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, III, qq. 53, 55, 56, and 57.

⁸² *Ibid.*, III, q. 1, a. 2, etc.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 17, a. 2, ad 2; q. 83 aa. 5 & 6.

⁸⁴ Pius XI, Encyclical *Ingravescentibus Malis*.

her hope, for "the Lord was with her"; the God of glory Who was to establish her glory was her Son. Moreover, no contrary motive hindered her, for happily she was impeccable.

Mary was ineffably hopeful by the intensity of this virtue since it was proportionate to her most firm faith and plentiful grace. By its exercise she was ineffably hopeful since she did not entertain desires of any good outside of God, and this earnest desire of her Heart to possess God was incessant and most vehement. The Cordimarian soul will learn from the Heart of the Blessed Virgin contempt for earthly things and aspiration for things divine, the infallibility of the divine promises, and the advantage of remaining hopeful in every trial, even when all human hope fails. Above all, the soul will find in the maternal Heart of Mary a most steadfast and loving help in strengthening his hope, for she has been given to us as Mother for our hope. *Salve Spes nostra!*

5. *Incentive of Charity.*

Charity, as we have said above, is a participation of divine love by which we love God because He is Infinite Goodness, this being the supreme motive of love. Because of the supreme excellence of its object, charity is the highest virtue. It is the virtue of virtues and their higher form, for it elevates them from the particular good of each to the sovereign divine Goodness, Who is the good of all good things. With this same virtue we love men inasmuch as they are sons of God, which is to love God in them and to love them for what they have of God. Since it informs all the virtues, to perfect oneself in charity is to perfect oneself in them all; and to be perfect love is to be wholly perfect.

The incentives of charity in the Rosary are so many that it is not easy to summarize them. But let us say that the Rosary fosters divine love: first, for God and especially for Jesus Christ; secondly, for the most Holy Virgin; thirdly, for men.

The Rosary incites love for God: (1) Because in the Rosary God is shown to be infinitely perfect and blessed in Himself. (2) Because in the Rosary God manifests His infinite goodness,

by predestining man for His same blessed happiness and by giving us His Only-begotten Son for our redemption, which is the supreme proof and gift of His love. Moreover, it sends to us the Holy Spirit, and gives us a Mother in the most holy Virgin, Mother of Jesus.

The Rosary leads to the love of Jesus Christ: (1) Because besides being God He is true man, full of grace and truth, and thus the Rosary presents Him to us. (2) Because He unites us with Himself in a brotherly union making us participants in His divine life and in the eternal life of His glory, and this the Rosary teaches. (3) Because He lives, dies, and rises again to save us as the mysteries of the Rosary recall. Each one is a manifestation of a new love on His part which moves us to correspond to it with our own.

The Rosary inspires love for the Blessed Virgin: (1) Because she is the Mother of God, full of grace, most perfect and most amiable. And thus she appears in the Rosary. (2) Because she is our Mother who gives us divine life in Jesus, and who loves us with maternal affection. And thus the Rosary represents her. (3) Because she is united with Jesus, who caused our redemption by offering the life of her Son and her maternal Heart in order to bring us forth in God. And this the Rosary considers. (4) Because from Heaven where she is Queen and Mother she continues to communicate life to souls and to fulfill toward them all the duties of a divine Mother. And this the Rosary recalls.

The Rosary moves us to the love of our neighbor: (1) Because it teaches us that all men are sons of God, united as brothers in Jesus Christ and in Mary, and predestined to the same blessed happiness. (2) By the example of heroic love for mankind which Jesus and Mary give us in their mysteries. (3) Because the prayers of the Rosary oblige us to recognize ourselves as brothers in God Our Father Who is in Heaven and to desire for all His Kingdom and to pardon our offenses so that He may forgive us as we forgive others.

The excellence of love is the supreme excellence of the life of Mary and the reason of being of the Cordimarian devotion.

Sanctity has its adequate expression in love. Grace is the essential form of the divine life of the soul; it is the super-soul of the soul. Charity, in its own actuation and as the form of the virtues comprehends the divine activity of grace. The sanctity of Mary, then, is contained in her, and her love, therefore, comprises her life. That love was proportionate to her fulness of grace, and like it, was full and immeasurable.

Intimate with the Trinity through ineffable relations, united to the divine Word with a mother's intimacy, inhabited lovingly by the Holy Ghost, the heart of Mary was so deeply immersed in the infinite divine fire that she burned with the same ardor and she was inflamed with the divine flames. She, better than the blessed soul, could have exclaimed: "O living flame of love, which wounds so tenderly my soul in its inmost depths!" (Canticle of the soul in the intimate communication of union of love of God by St. John of the Cross.) And the first flames gave rise to others. For, since the divine Goodness is infinite and inconsumable, Mary's love was not consumed on being united with It, but rather it was increased with greater ardor. The more she became united to It, the more she was inflamed, and the more she was inflamed, the closer she became united.

This love, progressively more ardent, was continuous in Mary, and thus her love continually increased. The interruption, even for an instant, of the divine love in Mary would be more unintelligible than the duration of the universe without the energy which sustains it. There was no sleep for her love, nor settings for the Sun of her Heart. The Heart of Mary is a Mother's Heart. From the love of her Heart all of us are born to grace and to charity, to life and to love. *Ego mater pulchrae dilectionis*. . . .

The veneration of the Immaculate Heart of Mary is, then, an incentive of love in souls: (1) For God, Whose infinite goodness is the object and the true excellence of Our Lady's love. In the Heart of Mary God alone is found. By approaching the Heart of Mary the soul is inflamed with divine love; (2) For Jesus Christ, Heart of the Heart of Mary; (3) For the Blessed

Virgin herself, whose maternal love inflames our filial love; (4)
For men, sons, like ourselves, of the Immaculate Heart.

6. *Moral Influence.*

The theological virtues animate and govern human life, but for complete Christianization man needs the moral virtues which subject him according to the demands of his supernatural end. Since the requirements of that supernatural end are superior to those of a purely human life, the virtues naturally acquirable are not sufficient to obtain it, even presupposing the theological virtues. Infused moral virtues are required, whose extension is much greater and more elevated than that of the natural virtues. The Christian virtues of prudence, justice, religion, obedience, fortitude, magnanimity, patience, temperance, sobriety, chastity, meekness, humility, etc. are very much superior to the natural virtues of the same names. A man humanly perfect would be a very imperfect Christian.⁸⁵

The Rosary has a strong moralizing power in the life of a Christian. It points out with precision and reminds one with lively insistence of the supernatural Christian end of man and his responsibility in being able to obtain it or lose it according to the way he lives. That end, whose fulfillment appears in the glorious mysteries, presides in all the mysteries beginning from the Incarnation itself, in which the Son of God comes from Heaven to open anew its gates to man. The moralization of man is the essential purpose of the Rosary, as it is also that of the work of the Redemption.

The whole drama of the Redemption, which the Rosary relives, has for its end to free man from sin and lift him from the degradation of guilt to the sanctity of the evangelical life which is proper to men redeemed and made sons of God. It is Jesus and Mary Who accomplish this sublime undertaking of regeneration and sanctification. Jesus immolates His life and Mary accepts and makes her own this offering of her Son in

⁸⁵ Cf. I-II, q. 65, a. 2 and q. 63, a. 4. See also Garrigou-Lagrange, *Les Trois ages de la vie interieure*, part III, chap. 8. (Vol. II, p. 101 and following.)

order to put to death sin and make it possible for men to live according to God.

The Rosary offers to souls a perfect program or moral evangelical life which is contained in the virtues of Jesus, Mary, and Joseph as manifested in the mysteries.⁸⁶ This program of life is the best guarantee of salvation. And I say that these virtues are manifest in the mysteries because they shine forth in them with divine splendor which makes them perceptible to all souls who consider them. To enumerate the virtues which each mystery contains and stimulates would be as if to enumerate the rays of the sun. There is no state or condition of life which does not find in the Rosary Christian orientation and example of evangelical virtue. By means of the Rosary, Jesus and Mary lead man in Their footsteps by sharing with him his daily anxieties, the sacrifices which his vocation entails, the glory of his triumph.⁸⁷ And just as there is no virtue which it does not teach, neither is there any precept which it does not contain, nor any vice which it does not correct.⁸⁸ The Rosary is, therefore, a wonderful synthesis of Christian morals.

The Rosary justifies the requirements which the Christian moral life imposes: (a) By means of the divine glory, the supreme end of the Redemption, which it teaches us to desire, ask, and seek to obtain; (b) By the incomparable compensation which it promises us in the possession of God, that is, in the participation of His glory; (c) By the heroic example of Jesus, Mary, and Joseph which it offers to us. They drank the bitter chalice while scarcely a few drops fall to our lot; They carried the Cross while only a sliver is placed upon us.

The Rosary makes the Christian life possible, easy, and even delightful: (a) By means of the grace which it obtains; (b) Through the influence and help of Jesus and Mary.

⁸⁶ Pope Leo XIII, says that the Rosary is "insigne specimen perfectae virtutis." (Encyclical *Magnae Dei Matris*.)

⁸⁷ Cf. Hugon, *El Rosario y la Santidad*, Part III, chap. II.

⁸⁸ "Est autem eadem materia circa quam et virtus recte operatur et vitia opposita a rectitudine recedunt. Sic ergo, tota materia moralis ad considerationem virtutum reducta. . . ." (*Summa Theol.*, II-II, Prologue.)

The propagation of the Rosary never fails to result in the betterment of public, family, and individual morals. For that reason the Popes in their efforts to rechristianize souls, apply the moral lessons of the Rosary to the social necessities of the times.⁸⁹

St. John Eudes delighted in calling the Heart of Mary "the throne of all the virtues." The perfect love of the Absolute Goodness imports a love for all true goods. Charity implies all the virtues. All are enthroned where it reigns. To say that the Heart of Mary was most virtuous is to say that it was most perfect in love. At the service of her love the Blessed Virgin possessed all the virtues in a grade proportional to this same charity. Her Heart was not only, most loving, but also most prudent, most just, most pious, most courageous, most humble, most pure, most meek, most clement, in a word, most virtuous. In the loftiness of Mary's love the Cordimarian devotion venerates the loftiness of all her virtues. Her most holy Heart is a perfect model of them all, and she irradiates them with her love to those souls who consecrate themselves to her Heart. . . . *Cor sanctitatis formula; Cordis fidelis regula.*⁹⁰

7. *Efficacy As A Prayer.*

By providential disposition prayer is the most powerful of recourses which man has at his disposal for cooperating in the beneficent designs of God. By asking he obtains his own welfare and the welfare of others. The good which he needs above all is salvation and for it, sanctification. Thus, he needs above,

⁸⁹ Cf. Leo XIII in his Encyclical *Laetitiae Sanctae*, where he proposes the Rosary as the remedy for social evils. Also confer Pius XI, in his Encyclical *Ingravescentibus malis*.

⁹⁰ St. Eudes in the Liturgical Office of the Heart of Mary, hymn for Matins. In the oration for the Litany of the Heart of Mary this same saint says: "Omnipotens Deus, qui Beatissimae Virginis Mariae cor amantissimum, sacrarium Divinitatis, thronum omnium virtutum, totiusque sanctitatis thesaurum esse voluisti: da nobis, quaesumus, eiusdem sanctissimi Cordis meritis et precibus, ipsius imaginem in corde nos jugiter portare; ut eius imitatione, quae tibi sunt placita semper facientes, secundum Cor tuum in aeternum effici mereamur; per Christum Dominum nostrum. Amen."

all grace and glory.⁹¹ Prayer in itself is an act of the virtue of religion; but religion acts in it as informed by the theological virtues, especially by charity, and with the concurrence of other virtues.⁹² Serving the theological virtues, prayer is a most efficacious means of union with God. By means of prayer the sons of God communicate with their Heavenly Father. "Our Father Who are in Heaven"—that communication is supremely exalted when the Spirit of adoption, Who rules souls with His gifts, supplies for our weakness and makes us love and pray for divine things. The devotions whose purpose is the glorification of God and the sanctification of the soul accomplish this especially inasmuch as they are practices of prayer.

Pope Leo XIII calls the Rosary an excellent form of prayer—*eximia precondi formula*.⁹³ We shall indicate summarily the excellences of the Rosarian prayer which make it so highly efficacious.

1. The Rosary strengthens the theological virtues and the other virtues which perfect prayer, as has been shown.

2. It is most apt for lifting up the soul to God and to divine things,⁹⁴ for it occupies the imagination with the Gospel scenes, the intellect with the divine truths, and the will with the infinite goodness and with the merciful love of God, of Jesus, and of Mary. Moreover, it contributes to this interior elevation with the vocal reiteration.

3. It comprehends all the acts of perfect worship, as has been pointed out above.

4. It is directed to God in union with and through the mediation of Jesus and Mary.⁹⁵

5. It offers the most efficacious claims for obtaining favor which are the merits of Jesus and Mary.⁹⁶

⁹¹ Cf., II-II, q. 83, a. 5.

⁹² *Ibid.*, aa. 3 and 15.

⁹³ Encyclical *Magnae Dei Matris*.

⁹⁴ Cf., II-II, q. 81, a. 7; q. 82, a. 3; q. 83, a. 1, ad 1; a. 3, ad 3; a. 17, c.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, III, qq. 22 and 26.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, q. 19, a. 4, and q. 48.

6. It proposes the mysteries most apt for exciting devotion. For, as St. Thomas teaches, although of itself the purely divine has greater power in moving the affections and exciting devotion, however, because of our human makeup we must go to the invisible by means of the visible. Thus the mysteries of the humanity of the Word make a greater impression on us and more easily enkindle in us the love of God.⁹⁷

7. It greatly facilitates the very necessary practice of meditation, arresting our attention with the variety and wealth of the recalled Gospel events.

8. It is connatural to our mode of spiritual and corporal being with its union of mental and vocal prayer.⁹⁸

9. The vocal prayer of the Rosary is at once sublime and simple, and it is subordinated to the consideration of the mysteries, the meaning of which it expresses.⁹⁹

10. It asks for that for which it ought to ask, and in the order in which it ought to be desired and asked.¹⁰⁰

11. It petitions for whom it ought to petition, that is, for ourselves and for our neighbor.¹⁰¹

12. It is of itself a pious and persevering supplication.¹⁰²

13. It is, therefore, of universal utility. No one is able to reject it as too difficult, for it is most simple, nor as too simple, for it is exceedingly sublime. The unlettered know how to recite

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 82, a. 3, ad 2, "Ea quae sunt divinitatis, sunt secundum se maxime excitantia dilectionem, et per consequens devotionem, quia Deus est super omnia diligendus; sed ex debilitate mentis humanae est quod sicut indiget manu-ductione ad cognitionem divinorum, ita ad dilectionem per aliqua sensibilia nobis nota; inter quae praecipuum est humanitas Christi, secundum quod in Praefatione dicitur: 'Ut, dum visibiliter Deum cognoscimus, per hunc in invisibilium amorem rapiamur.' Et ideo ea quae pertinent ad Christi humanitatem, per modum cuiusdam manu-ductionis, maxime devotionem excitant; cum tamen devotio principaliter circa ea quae sunt divinitatis consistat."

⁹⁸ II-II, q. 83, a. 12.

⁹⁹ II-II, q. 83, aa. 12 and 14.

¹⁰⁰ II-II, q. 83, a. 9, and a. 14, ad 3.

¹⁰¹ II-II, q. 83, aa. 7 and 8.

¹⁰² II-II, q. 83, a. 15, ad 2. Cf. also Del Prado, *Enseñanzas del Rosario*, II, chap. 11, 12, and 13.

it, and the learned will never recite it with sufficient wisdom. The sinner recites it as an entreaty for pardon, and the just as a hymn of love.

In conclusion, as Torras y Bages affirms, "He who penetrates the substance of the Rosary and recites it properly never needs another kind of prayer. He finds in it, to use the phrase of the Venerable Father Louis of Granada, the two wings with which the soul flies to Heaven; that is, mental and vocal prayer, an admirable synthesis of the mysteries of the Catholic faith, the most sublime prayers which God Himself deigned to teach man, the powerful intercession of the Virgin Mary, in a word, the entire rich essence of Christianity concentrated in a simple, easy, and agreeable formula."¹⁰⁸

In order to understand the excellence of the Cordimarian devotion as a practice of prayer it is sufficient to consider that in it one prays to the Heart and by means of the most holy Heart of Mary, Mother of God and our Mother. This may be seen more clearly by considering:

1. That the Cordimarian symbolism, so natural and expressive, aids the imagination, fixes the attention, and incites meditation;

2. The loftiness of the Heart of Mary makes the spirit soar to God and to divine things;

3. The veneration of the immense love of the Blessed Virgin excites the love and devotion of the soul which are the substance of prayer;

4. The soul unites its aspirations and its petitions with those of the Heart of Our Lady;

5. The Heart of Mary, whose mercy and favor are implored, guarantees a favorable response to our petitions.

This is in brief arguments (almost in theological terms) the value of the Rosary and of the devotion to the Heart of Mary. They are fountains of evangelical life which they efficaciously transfuse into our souls. And this is the reason of the Rosarian-

¹⁰⁸ *Op. cit.*, pages 13-14.

Cordimarian message of Fatima. The Blessed Virgin with maternal solicitude calls souls to the love and reparation of her Heart, and she exhorts them to persevere in the practice of the Rosary in order to restrain them in their turning away from God and to bring them back to Christ. They are not recourses advantageous only under certain circumstances, but they are perennially efficacious and so much the more urgent as the conditions of souls are worse.

The explanation of the revelation of the Rosary which Fray Louis of Granada gives is always valid. "Our Lady," he says, "revealed it to the glorious Spanish Patriarch Saint Dominic for the extirpation of heresy, the banishment of vices, the amendment of men, the reformation of the faithful, in order to enkindle in them the light of the knowledge of God and the mysteries of Faith, the fervor of charity, and the exercise of the Christian virtues. And these have been the admirable effects which always have been recognized whenever this holy devotion has been preached as it ought to be preached."¹⁰⁴

III. THEOLOGICAL CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE TWO DEVOTIONS

Both of these devotions have the common excellence of being most apt practices, according to theological requirements, for the ends which the Marian cult ought to accomplish, that is, for the glorification of God, the veneration of the Blessed Virgin, and the sanctification of souls. Both, therefore, are heartily recommended. However, we have attributed to each that common excellence because of particular reasons which are the particular causes of their recommendation. Although each is efficacious, nevertheless, since each is so in its own right, to combine them is to double their efficacy. It is, then, very useful to unite them. And if one argues that by force of this reason all Marian devotions ought to be united, since all are good and in their own way recommendable, I answer that all are recommendable for some reason, but the Rosary devotion

¹⁰⁴ *De la devoción del Santo Rosario*, number 5.

and that of the Heart of Mary are recommendable for every reason, as has been demonstrated.

If the union must consist in adding the one to the other while practicing them separately, then there is effected only a union of their common ends, inasmuch as their respective efficacy is combined to accomplish these ends. However, in this way they are not connected, nor do they mutually perfect each other. Is there not a more intimate connection between them? Is their common excellence the only reason the Blessed Virgin had in uniting them in her recommendation of them? Is it possible to discover a natural connection which permits the practical integration of them into a single devotion which would combine the efficacy of both?¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵ Statement of the problem. The relation of the two devotions may be considered in the theoretical order and in the practical order, and in both it ought to be determined. As for the theoretical order we are not aware of any study of the problem having been made. Each devotion is analyzed separately and its respective excellence is recognized. Consequently, both are earnestly recommended without bothering to show their relation to each other. Sometimes a passing remark is made concerning the affinity and coherence which exists between them. Cf. Father Hugon, O. P., *El Rosario y la Santidad*, part I, chap. I, p. 86; Chap. II, p. 96, etc.; Santiago Navarro, C. M. F., *Fundamentos dogmatico-historicos de la devoción al Immaculado Corazon de Maria* (in the official chronicle of the Sixth Diocesan Marian Assembly of Seville, 1944), p. 25; Narciso García Garces, C. M. F., *Titulos y excelencias de Maria* (Madrid, 1940), no. 222, and *Catecismo de la devoción al Immaculado Corazon de Maria* (Madrid, 1943), no. 101; Norbert Del Prado, O. P., *Enseñanzas del Rosario* (Vergara, 1913), Vol. II, chap. V.

In reviews and articles of an exhortatory or pious nature it is more common to see them interwoven, especially in these last few years as an effect of the revelations of Fatima and of the practice of the five first Saturdays. Cf., for example, Da Fonseca, S. J., *op. cit.*; Magni, S. J., *Mensaje de Fatima y nuestra respuesta* (Bilbao, 1943), part II; Luis de Fatima Luque, O. P., *Los cinco primeros sabados* (Vergara, 1944); Juan de Oliveiva, O. P., *O Rosario de Maria Cruzada Mundial do Rosario pela Paz* (Porto, 1944); Gonzalo Torres, C. M. F., *El Milagro de Fatima* (Madrid, 1943), chap. 6; Nazario Perez, S. J., *Lecciones de Fatima* (in the *Vida Sobfenatural*, no. 270, Dec. 1943.); M. Cuervo, O. P., *Fatima* (in *El Santisimo Rosario*, no. 706, Oct. 1944; Barbado, O. P., *Exhortacion Pastoral sobre la Consagracion al Immaculado Corazon de Maria* (Salamanca, 1943); Justo Fernandez Ruiz, *El Santo Rosario y el mensaje de Fatima* (Soria, 1944); Luis Pujol, C. M. F., *El Corozon de Maria en los Misterios del Rosario* (Madrid, 1945); Gregorio Martínez de Antóñana, C. M. F., *El Mensaje de Fatima y el Corozon de Maria* (Madrid, 1943).

I. NATURE OF THEIR CONNECTION

If the devotions were essentially connected, the Rosary devotion would be of itself a Cordimarian devotion, and *vice versa*. Therefore, to practice the one would be *ipso facto* to practice the other. Does there exist an essential connection between them? This has sometimes been insinuated. One might reason thus, saying that the object of the devotion to the Heart of Mary is to pay reverence to the excellence of the love of the Blessed Virgin as venerated in her physical Heart, while the object of the Rosary is to pay reverence to the excellence of Our Lady's love in its three phases of joy, sorrow, and glory, which are manifested in the three series of mysteries. And it might even be added, as does Father Garcés, that "the three crowns of joy, suffering, and glory or beatific love are beautifully symbolized in the fresh roses, piercing sword, and ardent flames of the Immaculate Heart."¹⁰⁶

This contains some truth, for it is true that the Rosary also honors the Blessed Virgin in this way. But its formal object is to honor the excellence of Mary as she is united with Jesus, concerned about Him, bringing Him forth, sharing with Him His life, the redemptive work, and His glory. In other words, it honors Mary in her excellence as Mother of God and hence as Mother of men, with all its consequences. Therefore, they are not identical, and to affirm this would be to denaturize them. However, in spite of the difference of their proximate formal objects, the wonderful conformity which is found between the two devotions is adequately preserved.

This marvellous conformity is preserved through their interdependence or causal connection which proceeds from the connection of their formal objects themselves. But, since this interdependence implies a coordination and a subordination between the two devotions and determines their precedence or respective excellence, in order to establish it precisely we must distinguish in Mary: (a) Her supreme ontological excellence which results from her state as Mother of God and from her

¹⁰⁶ *Titulos y Grandezas de Maria*, no. 22.

consequent spiritual motherhood of men; (b) Her supreme psychological and moral excellence which is established by her charity, inasmuch as her charity is an adequate fruit of her fulness of grace and includes in its perfection the perfection of her every action. It is this excellence which is principally symbolized by her Heart.

Mary's ontological excellence is the reason for her psychological excellence; for her two-fold motherhood motivates all in Mary. However, her psychological excellence is a copy and expression of her essential excellence. From this it may be deduced that: (a) The formal object of the Rosary is the cause of the formal object of the devotion to the Heart of Mary. Moreover, the formal object of the Rosary is the end for which honor is paid to the Heart of Mary. In this sense the excellence of the Rosary is supreme, and the Cordimarian devotion is subordinated to it as a means for obtaining its object. In a sense, the Heart of Mary was a cause of the divine motherhood. But, absolutely speaking, the excellence of the Heart of Mary depends on her motherhood, and not vice versa; (b) The principal formal object of the Cordimarian devotion is the reason for the objects of all other devotions which honor the excellence of the perfection or sanctity of Mary in its diverse manifestations, since the excellence of her love is the cause and reason for the excellence of her life.

In this sense, the Cordimarian devotion is of itself the most excellent, and all devotions inasmuch as they venerate the virtues and excellences of the Blessed Virgin are subordinated to it as to a formal cause and as to an end. Notwithstanding what we have already said, the Rosary itself, inasmuch as it venerates the love and virtues of the most Blessed Virgin as manifested in its mysteries, is subordinated to the object of the Cordimarian devotion. Thus, it is subordinated to the excellence of the Heart of Mary and ought to be a means of honoring it.

This subordination does not detract from the supreme excellence of the formal object of the Rosary. The Rosary venerates Mary in the full excellence of her position as Mother of God and of men. But to do this, the Rosary recalls her whole

life as Mother of Jesus and of us, and it ponders over the diverse excellences which are contained in the mysteries. These excellences declare the excellence of her most excellent Heart and must yield in paying homage to it. With the distinctive nature of the Rosary thus preserved, we may formulate the following propositions: (1) The most holy Heart of Mary ought to be the center or end of the Marian devotions; (2) The devotion to the Heart of Mary ought to inform all devotions to the Blessed Virgin; (3) The Rosary ought to be a Cordimarian devotion; (4) The Rosary is able to be the most excellent Cordimarian devotion.

II. THE HEART OF MARY AND MARIAN DEVOTIONS

We say that the Heart of Mary ought to be the center of Marian devotions inasmuch as the others ought to converge to it as to their common reason of being. We say that it ought to be the end insofar as of itself it deserves to be the object of the veneration of the other devotions to which they ought to tend. The Heart of Mary is the reason of being and, therefore, the center of Marian devotions because the excellence of each one of them proceeds from the excellence of Mary's Heart. Therefore, by means of the perfections which they venerate they ought to converge in the veneration of her most holy Heart. Moreover, this veneration ought to be intended, and thus the Heart of Mary ought to be the end of the other devotions, since it is in itself most excellent or most perfect, and a principle of every excellence or perfection.

If we consider the sanctifying purpose of Marian devotions we arrive at this same conclusion, since that sanctification is fulfilled in the intimate conformation of souls with the Blessed Virgin. To accomplish this it is exceedingly efficacious, as was demonstrated above, to unite them with her maternal Heart and identify them with her sentiments. Love for the Blessed Virgin, the soul of all Marian devotions, tends of itself to this assimilation to her most holy Heart.

Devotion to the Heart of Mary ought to give form to the other Marian devotions. This proposition is a consequence of the

preceding but it makes its meaning more precise and clear. The Cordimarian devotion accomplishes this formation by directing and elevating the other devotions to the Heart of Mary.

Moreover, this formation is proper to it, for the subordination of objects and ends subordinates some devotions to others just as it subordinates some potencies or virtues to others. Thus, the universality of the end or good of the will subordinates to the will and subjects to its formation all the potencies which the will moves and utilizes. Likewise, the universality of the object of general justice subordinates to the virtue of justice and subjects to its formation all the virtues which justice orders or moves for the welfare of society, while the supremacy of the good of charity subordinates and subjects them to a formation even more perfect which elevates them toward the Supreme Good.¹⁰⁷ Thus, the sublimity of the Cordimarian devotion by means of its object subjects to its formation the other Marian devotions, which through this formation become Cordimarian devotions also; ¹⁰⁸ that is, they are ordained and directed to the veneration of the Heart of Mary.

If all Marian devotions ought to be Cordimarian devotions, it might seem that there ought not to be a special devotion to the Heart of Mary, for it would lack a proper object. But, a devotion may be general and special from different points of view. A devotion, just as a virtue, may be general in two ways: inasmuch as its function is made the proper function of all the others; inasmuch as by its information all the others participate in its function. The virtue or devotion which is general in the first sense would not be a special virtue or devotion, for it would lack a proper act and object. But the devotion or virtue which is general in the second sense is a special devotion or virtue, for it has for its proper act that in which the others participate when by its information of them it makes this proper act

¹⁰⁷ Cf. II-II, q. 58, aa. 5 & 6; q. 23, a. 8.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. II-II, q. 58, a. 6, c.

general or common.¹⁰⁹ The devotion to the Heart of Mary is, then, a special devotion since it has for its proper object the veneration of the Heart of the Blessed Virgin on account of the reverence which is due to its loftiness. Moreover, it is a general devotion inasmuch as by its information it subordinates to its object the other Marian devotions and makes them Cordimarian.

III. THE ROSARY, A CORDIMARIAN DEVOTION

The statement that the Rosary ought to be a Cordimarian devotion means that the Rosary ought to be a Cordimarian devotion, not only because of the general reason that it is a Marian devotion, but also for reasons derived from its very nature, such as the following: (1) The Heart of Mary deserves to be venerated in the mysteries of the Rosary for they are the work and the glory of her Heart; (2) The Heart of Mary is an explanation of the mysteries of the Rosary while, at the same time, the mysteries reveal her Heart. To gaze upon them in her Heart is to see them at a source. Love animates and informs the entire life of Mary; (3) Mary lived the mysteries in her Heart. Her own physical Heart was the living mirror of them reproducing all their impressions. If the vividness with which some souls recall the sentiments of the redemptive mysteries conforms them in some cases even physically with Christ Crucified, without a doubt then the Heart of Mary is a stereotype of the mysteries which she shared with her Son.

In the Cordimarian liturgical Office St. John Eudes inspiringly wrote: "Your blessed Heart, O Mary, is a most luminous mirror of the life of Christ and a perfect image of His Passion and Death."¹¹⁰ And repeating the same thought in the Tract of the Mass he adds, "For she carried in her Heart the stigmata of Christ." In the Postcommunion he beseeches, "Lord Jesus Christ, Who wished that admirable mysteries of Your life, Passion, and Resurrection be conserved and glorified in the

¹⁰⁹ Cf. II-II, q. 58, a. 6, ad 4.

¹¹⁰ The fourth antiphon of second vespers.

most sacred Heart of Your admirable Mother. . . ."¹¹¹ It is, then, very fitting to relive the mysteries of Mary in intimate communion with her Heart, sharing her sentiments and those of Jesus. To contemplate the Rosary in the Heart of Mary is to admire and to enjoy the roses on the rosebush itself. For the rosebush is her Immaculate Heart, and the roses are the mysteries. The beauty and perfume of such divine roses dictate to the heart and place on the lips that celestial acclaim: *Ave Maria gratia plena*.

The distribution of the Rosarian mysteries into joyful, sorrowful, and glorious, according to the sentiment which is dominant in them, confirms the Cordimarian propensity of the Rosary. The excellence of the maternal Heart of Mary, which the Rosary discloses, reflects the supreme excellence of Mary as Mother of Jesus and our Mother, which the Rosary honors. The Rosary by its very make-up is a most apt means of Cordimarian devotion, as we shall immediately demonstrate.

The Rosary can be the most excellent Cordimarian devotion. The reasons given for the last proposition demonstrate that the Rosary ought to be a Cordimarian devotion. The Rosary devotion itself gains in efficacy from it. However, the ultimate reason alleged refers to a most special aptitude of the Rosary for the practice of the devotion to the Heart of Mary. Is the Rosary utilizable as a practice of Cordimarian devotion? Our proposition affirms that it is of itself most apt for it. Its Cordimarian extension will depend on the manner in which it is practiced. Thus the transcendence of this proposition becomes evident, for it solves satisfactorily the coordination and integration of the two devotions, uniting their practice and combining their efficacy without denaturizing them. That in-

¹¹¹ The hymn for second vespers of the Office of the Rosary expresses the same idea, and it is repeated in the hymn of lauds of the Office of the Heart of Mary:

In the hymn of the Rosary:

Ave dolens, et intimo
In CORDE agonem, verbera,
Spinas crucemque Filii
Perpressa, Princeps martyrum.

In the hymn of the Heart of Mary:

O COR dolore sancium
Dum nati agonem, verbera,
Spinas, crucem et lanceam,
Materna deflent lumina.

tegration might be expressed in this simple formula: To practice the Rosary with Cordimarian predilection.

The Rosary is a most excellent means of knowledge of the Heart of Mary. Knowledge of the Heart of Mary is absolutely necessary for the Cordimarian devotion. Every devotion is founded on the knowledge of the excellence which makes the subject of veneration capable of being honored. Without this knowledge the devotion lacks a reasonable fundament and is helplessly superficial. Hence, the devotions which are not founded on reason usually lean upon unreasoning sentiments; we have a choice, either doctrinal solidity, or pietism and sentimentalism. We have demonstrated that the devotion to the Heart of Mary is theologically solid, but it is so because of solid reasons. If these reasons were lacking, it would not be solid in theory and if sufficient knowledge of them is lacking it will not be solid in practice. "The permanent and substantial fundament of the devotion to the Heart of Mary," as Father Garcia Garcés wisely says, "consists in recognizing its sublime excellences and the duties which it performs with us. . . ." ¹¹² That recognition is not possible without knowledge.

Knowledge of the Heart of Mary and of the excellence which makes it worthy of veneration cannot be obtained *a priori*. I mean that it is not given to us to know the Heart of the Blessed Virgin in itself or to imitate its ineffable perfection. The personality and excellence of Mary is dependent in everything on that of Jesus, and it is in the light of Him that one must know her, that is, in the mysteries which intimately unite her with her Divine Son. Without the light of the Incarnation and Redemption it is impossible to perceive even faintly the ineffable perfection of the Heart of Mary, Mother of God and of men. It may not be said that the Heart of Mary explains the mysteries and not *vice versa* for, in the first place, some of the mysteries are the cause of Mary's entire perfection. Secondly this may not be said, because the mysteries in which her Heart is revealed to us are more easily understood than her Heart in itself and,

¹¹² *Catecismo de la devoción al Corazon de Maria*, no. 92.

therefore, they penetrate better into its sublime intimacies. Finally, if the perfection of Our Lady can well explain the perfection of the mysteries, the mysteries in turn explain the perfection of her Heart, since it was thus perfected to realize them and to live them. The Heart of Mary was capable of being perfected, and her life perfected it. Works of love perfected her love. Each mystery of Jesus and Mary is a chapter of the great epic of their love. They might have been able to redeem us by only loving us; but Their love dictated to Them the work of the Redemption which is the supreme accomplishment of Their Hearts. Through it Their Hearts must be made known to souls.

The Cordimarian symbolism is insufficient to make known the Heart of the Blessed Virgin. The symbolic Heart is an apt, suggestive, and tender means to fix the attention and the affections on the Heart of Mary, but of itself it does not reveal to us its contents. For a substantial and solid Cordimarian devotion, then, its precious symbolism is not sufficient. There is required a previous knowledge of the perfections and excellences of the most holy Heart of Mary, Mother of Jesus and of us.

The Rosary is a most excellent means of knowing the Heart of Mary, for it is at once its history and its theology. As its history, the Rosary reveals Mary's Heart to us; and as its theology, it explains it to us. History reveals hearts in the measure in which hearts influence life. In reality history is attributable to man only insofar as it proceeds from his will. The history of the life of the Blessed Virgin is the history of her Heart. The realizations of her life are the works of her Heart. The Rosary, by recalling the great events or mysteries of Mary's life, relives the history of her most holy Heart and reveals it to souls. "The Heart and the soul of Mary," says Father Hugon, "are manifested in their entirety in the mysteries with all their treasures and indescribable beauties."¹¹³

"In order to know the excellences of the spiritual Heart or of

¹¹³ *El Rosario y la Santidad*, part II, chap. I, p. 86.

the love and interior life of Mary, it is necessary to study the most principal part, which in the mysteries of the life of Mary corresponds to her Heart, and the efficacy and influence which it has had and still has in the salvation of men.”¹¹⁴ The Rosary makes it easy for souls to acquire this knowledge.

Moreover, the Rosary, at the same time that it is the history of the Heart of Mary, is also its theology. It does not limit itself merely to recalling the mysteries, but it also presents them in the divine light of their setting according to the designs of providence, that is, as shared and united with the Divine Son, informed by those same ends as motivated the hypostatic union. Thus the Rosary makes evident the divine excellence of the Heart of Mary identified with that of Christ in the supreme realization of divine love, which is the Redemption of man. “By reason of the duties which it performs for man,” says Father Garcia, “we must think of the Heart of Mary as it is in reality, that is, loving and compassionate as that of a Mother, sacrificing as that of a Coredemptrix, solicitous for our welfare as that of a Mediatrix and Advocate, generous and magnificent as that of a Queen.”¹¹⁵ In this manner the Heart of the Blessed Virgin appears in the mysteries of the Rosary. And, in this way, the Rosary, as Father Del Prado says, “manifests to us with heavenly light in its three series of mysteries what the most sweet heart of Mary is.”¹¹⁶

A complete demonstration of these affirmations could be achieved by studying the Heart of Mary in each of its mysteries. “What a lesson it would be,” writes Father Peinador, C. M. F., “to examine one by one all the mysteries of the life of Jesus, the intimacies and colloquies of the Mother and Son in Nazareth, and to perceive the palpitations of love of the Heart of Mary in unison with those of the Divine Heart of Jesus: joys and sorrows, forebodings and solitudes, tendernesses and abnegations, grief and bitterness, diverse modalities of her love for Jesus and for us, distinct throbbings of her maternal Heart

¹¹⁴ Garcia Garces, *op. cit.*, no. 45.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 76.

¹¹⁶ *Enseñanzas del Rosario*, Vol. II, chap. XI, p. 102.

all concurring to the very same end—human Redemption.”¹¹⁷ This is not an opportune time to make that pious study. However, the Rosary makes this easy for all, revealing the joys, sorrows, and glories of the Immaculate Heart in the three phases of the sacred mysteries.

“There is not in the Church,” writes His Excellency Bishop Barbado, O. P., “a devotion more apt for penetrating the secrets of Mary’s Heart, for knowing her sentiments, and for learning her virtues than the most Holy Rosary. The Christian while he fingers his beads follows step by step the Virgin Mary from the moment in which the Son of God becomes man in her most pure womb, as she visits her cousin St. Elizabeth, when in the stable of Bethlehem Jesus is born, when she carries Him to the temple and offers Him to God, and when later she finds Him there amidst the doctors.

“In all these steps, so outstanding in the life of the Blessed Virgin, he who is devoted to the Rosary penetrates the Heart of Mary, who, as St. Luke tells us, conserved in it all these mysteries, and he contemplates her sentiments and admires her virtues, joined with the sentiments and virtues of Jesus and St. Joseph. And in the school of the Holy Family, Whose life it lives spiritually during the recitation of the Holy Rosary, the Christian family assimilates the way of thinking, feeling, and working of the Holy Family, and it learns to imitate Them in Their purity, and humility, in Their patience and obedience, while at the same time it praises Them and beseeches Their protection and aid.

“And while accompanying Mary he follows in the footsteps of Jesus in His Passion; he contemplates also the sentiments of the Immaculate Heart of the Blessed Mother, and with her he compassionates Jesus in the Garden, when He is scourged and crowned with thorns, when He carries His Cross, and finally, when He expires nailed to the Cross. With Mary he learns to abhor sin because it offends God, to offer satisfaction to Our Lord for the sins of all men, to suffer with patience the trials

¹¹⁷ *Consagracion al Corazon de Maria* (In the Official Chronicle of the Sixth Marian Assembly of the Diocese of Seville, 1943, p. 79).

and labors of life, and to abandon himself with confidence to the hands of divine providence.

“Finally, he who is devoted to the Rosary is intimately united with the Heart of Mary in her joy at seeing Jesus Christ risen and upon contemplating Him ascending into Heaven full of glory and majesty. With her he prays that the Holy Ghost may fill the hearts of the disciples of Jesus, and he prepares his own heart to receive Him, as did Mary and the Apostles in the Cenacle. He ascends spiritually with her into Heaven and rejoices to see her crowned Queen of Heaven and Earth. With all the angels and saints he sings in her honor canticles of praise. United with them and with the Heart of the glorious Mary he renders worship and chants a hymn of thanksgiving to the Most Holy Trinity for granting so great a glory to the Mother of Heaven, near to whose Heart the Christian leaves his own with the firm hope of ascending one day to reign with her.

“This pious consideration of the mysteries of the holy Rosary, following the scenes of the Gospel, leads us by the hand into the interior recesses of the Heart of the Most Holy Virgin, there to contemplate the inexhaustible wealth of her love for God and for men and the perfection of her virtues. It cannot help but produce longings for sanctity and fruits of perfection.”¹¹⁸

The Rosary is a most excellent means of compenetration of souls with the Heart of Mary. That compenetration is accompanied by the soul reliving the intimate life of the Blessed Virgin, that is, the life of her Heart, letting the spirit of Mary inform our own lives. The Rosary is a most efficacious means for accomplishing this, since it brings to our mind and heart the history of Our Lady, which is the life of her Heart. Moreover, it makes us share her sentiments which give meaning and divine merit to those of our own lives by leading us to share them with her and with Jesus. “To meditate the Rosary,”

¹¹⁸ Pastoral letter concerning the Consecration to the Immaculate Heart of Mary, Salamanca, 1948, pages 23-25. Also cf. Del Prado, *Enseñanzas del Rosario*, Vol. II, chap. 5.

says Father Hugon, "is to unite our soul with her's, our heart with her's." ¹¹⁹

"There is no doubt that by means of the Rosary there is achieved a mutual approximation between our hearts and the most sweet Heart of Mary. By reciting the Most Holy Rosary and meditating its mysteries we speak with Mary; and Mary speaks with us, and she speaks to our hearts and places them in contact with her Heart. Moreover, she creates in us a right and clean heart in which are portrayed as in a mirror the virtues and holy affections of the Heart of our Mother." ¹²⁰ Of itself the loving and continuous commemoration of the mysteries of the Blessed Virgin leads one to a most intimate compenetration. There is impressed deeply in the soul that which is the habitual object of loving thought. And above all, by means of thought love penetrates into the Heart of the person loved and becomes identified with its feelings and shares its intimacies. The Rosary has been and always will be most efficacious for forming Christian hearts to those of Jesus and Mary.

The Rosary is a most excellent means for eliciting acts con-natural to the Cordimarian devotion. We have pointed out above as connatural acts of the devotion to the Heart of Mary (besides veneration which is general) love, consecration, reparation, imitation, and invocation. For reasons deduced from its very nature we attributed similar acts to the Rosary. Its efficacy for stirring up those acts toward the Heart of the Immaculate Virgin is readily seen. All of these acts spring forth spontaneously before the excellence of the most holy Heart of Mary which the Rosary reveals. And this happens so much the more when the Rosary is not merely a cold remembrance and a lifeless representation of the realizations of Mary's love, but a pious and loving reliving of them, which moves one to understand and reciprocate them.

The Most Holy Rosary stimulates: (1) Love for the Heart

¹¹⁹ *El Rosario y la Santidad*, Part II, chap. II, p. 97.

¹²⁰ Del Prado, *Enseñanzas del Rosario*, part II, p. 101.

¹²¹ Cf. I-II, q. 28, a. 2, "Rationis apprehensio praecedit affectum amoris; et ideo sicut ratio disquirat, ita affectus amoris subintrat in amatum."

of Mary by presenting it in its mysteries as most loving and most lovable;¹²² (2) Consecration, for it reveals Mary's Heart to us as the Heart of a Mother and of a Queen; (3) Reparation, for in the Rosary Mary's Heart appears as a coredemptive Heart which merits to be lived and imitated; (4) Imitation, for the Rosary reflects the life of the Heart of the Blessed Virgin, which ought to be reproduced in the soul. To accomplish this the soul is impelled by love and love's ability to conform the lover with the beloved; (5) Invocation, for in the Rosary the Heart of the Virgin is shown to be maternal and powerful. "The Holy Rosary is, therefore," as Bishop Barbado, O. P. says, "the pious practice which brings us closest to the Heart of Mary. It makes us know and love her more, and moves us more to imitate her. It is the golden key which opens wide the Heart of our Heavenly Mother."¹²³

IV. ATTESTATIONS TO THE CONNECTION OF THE DEVOTIONS

The bond between the Rosary and Cordimarian devotions is intimate and inseparable, as intimate and inseparable as the union between the Heart of the Blessed Virgin and the mysteries of our life. Our previous arguments merely point out that natural and indissoluble bond.

The historical connection of the two devotions has its explanation in that natural theological connection which harmonizes and compenetrates them. If the apostles of the Cordimarian devotion, above all the saintly Father Claret, present it as intimately bound to the Rosary devotion even to the point of integrating them into a single devotion, if the most Blessed Virgin herself unites and fuses them in her recommendations, if the Vicar of Christ invokes her as Queen of the Rosary

¹²² "The Rosary infuses in our spirit a filial affection for Mary, inasmuch as it reveals and discloses to us in the consideration of its mysteries the Heart of this Lady just as it is, with all the sanctity with which the Heart of the Mother of God is embellished and with all the tenderness which is possessed by the Heart of the Mother of men." (Del Prado, *op. cit.*, part II, chap. V, p. 96.)

¹²³ *Op. cit.*, p. 25.

while consecrating humanity to her Immaculate Heart, it is because neither her love can be separated from the mysteries, nor the mysteries from her love. The Rosary takes one to the Heart of Mary. Her Heart is revealed in the mysteries. In the Rosary the soul is compenetrated with the Heart of the Virgin Mother.

But if the arguments explain the facts, the facts attest to the arguments. We shall cite, then, in confirmation of our conclusions and reasoning the eminent example of the great Spanish apostle, Blessed Anthony M. Claret, and the most authentic interpretations of the wonderful message of Fatima, confirmed by the Blessed Virgin herself in her exhortation to practice the five first Saturdays and by the Pope in his consecration to the Immaculate Heart of Mary.

I. THE TEACHING OF BLESSED ANTHONY

In the apostolate Blessed Anthony Claret was at the same time a providential apostle of the Rosary and of the devotion to the Heart of Mary, as it is well known.¹²⁴ "Father Claret always associated the recitation of the Rosary with the devotion to the Heart of Mary. Moreover, according to him the image of the Heart of Mary ought to be the image of Our Lady of the Rosary with a Heart on her breast. Thus it was in that

¹²⁴ Cf. Mariano Aguilar, *Vida admirable del siervo de Dios P. Antonio M. Claret* (Madrid, 1894), part I, chap. XI. "Among the associations," says this writer, "which, favored by his untiring zeal, began to flourish again or budded forth for the first time with vigorous life, the Confraternity of the Most Holy Rosary and the Archconfraternity of the Heart of Mary deserve special mention." (p. 288); Jose Puigdesens, *Espiritu del Beato Antonio M. Claret* (Barcelona, 1928), part II, chap. II, p. 247; Father N. Garcia Garces in his article "El Beato Antonio M. Claret y el Santo Rosario" (in *Ecclesia*, 119, p. 427) summarizes thus his Rosarian apostolate: "The Blessed Virgin herself willed to consecrate him an apostle of her favorite devotion, and he had no less than nine divine conversations and revelations concerning the Rosary devotion. "On December 6, 1862, at 6:45 in the afternoon, the Blessed Virgin told me that I must propagate the devotion of the Most Holy Rosary, as the Venerable Alan de Rupe had done. Twice she told me this. Later Jesus Christ added, 'Yes, Anthony, do that which my Mother tells you.' Even before that, December 9, 1857, the Blessed Virgin had told him that he must be the Dominic of these times in the preaching of the Rosary. . . ."

memorable novena of Vich in August of 1847, during which, in such a small city, 12,000 persons were inscribed in the Archconfraternity of the Most Holy Rosary. The object of veneration was an image of Our Lady of the Rosary with a symbolic Heart of silver on her breast. The same also happened in Cuba. When his secretary Currius commissioned a firm in Paris to make some images and holy cards, reflecting the tastes and the criterion of His Excellency Archbishop Claret he said, "You will notice that the Virgin of the Rosary has a heart with a sword painted on her breast which you must not omit in any of your engravings, for this is the model which our most esteemed archbishop has designed for the altars of the Confraternity of the Most Holy Rosary and for those whom he has enrolled in the Archconfraternity of the Immaculate Heart of Mary."

"Please make as soon as possible," he wrote in another letter, "two carved images of Our Lady of the Rosary with the Heart and the Child Jesus, in conformity with the enclosed design that I am sending."

"Our Lady of the Rosary with the Child Jesus, Who is her greatest glory and best adornment, is the image preferred by Father Claret for the devotion to the Heart of Mary, the two devotions thus being joined and completing each other. This is exactly as the Heart of Mary of Fatima wishes it."¹²⁵

In practice the Rosary was always an essential practice of the Cordimarian devotion as propagated and directed by Father Claret. "The Rosary devotion has never been remote from that of the Immaculate Heart." History tells us how the former has been considered as "the most proper and essential practice

¹²⁵ *Iris de Paz* (Official organ of the Archconfraternity of the Immaculate Heart of Mary) no. 2,—108 (August 15, 1943), p. 259; "In 1853 Father Claret asked the painter Vallejo to paint a picture of Our Lady from a sketch which he himself had designed. In it she appears standing with her Heart visible on her breast and holding in her left arm the Child Jesus. With His beautiful little hand Christ presents the Rosary to St. Catherine, while Mary with her right hand gives it to St. Dominic. He ordered it to be painted in order to place it on the altars of the Confraternities of both the Most Holy Rosary and the Heart of Mary, which he established in the parishes of his Archdiocese of Cuba." Gonzalo Torres, C. M. F., *El Milagro de Fátima*, chap. VI, p. 85.

of the latter. For it invites us to consider the joys and sorrows, the happiness and glory of the maternal Heart of Mary in the principal mysteries of her life and in the mysteries of Our Lord Jesus Christ, just as she, during her life, meditated, pondered, conserved, and lived in her Heart the memory of the mysteries of the life of her Son, as the Holy Gospel tells us.”¹²⁶

As the Most Blessed Virgin was to do in Fatima, Father Claret integrated the two devotions in the Cordimarian Rosary. “Blessed Claret was an inspired prophet of the desires and designs of the Blessed Virgin in regard to the veneration of her Heart. For it is certain that Father Claret, seeing Our Lady, whom he loved, honored and acclaimed, seeing the whole world, cities and villages, consecrating themselves to her with holy ostentation and pomp, smiling in the depths of his soul would have exclaimed, ‘Very fine! Our Lady merits all that. That and much more is due to the goodness and grandeur of her Immaculate Heart.’

“Nevertheless, with his smile darkened with sadness, as was the smile of the white Lady of Fatima, he would add, ‘But that is not the way. That is not the veneration which the Blessed Virgin seeks for her Heart in the apparitions of Portugal, nor is it the veneration which traditionally the confraternities of the Heart of Mary have been developing.’ That is not what Father Claret taught and practiced, entirely in accord with that which decades later the Blessed Virgin deigned to reveal to the favored little shepherds of Aljustrel. According to the manifestations of the Blessed Virgin, the veneration which she asks for her Immaculate Heart, in order to achieve the peace of the world and to overcome the anger of God, is the Communion of reparation, the recitation of the Rosary, and the consecration. It is exactly the same as that which was practiced, recommended, and spread more than a century ago by Father Claret, inspired apostle of the Heart of Mary.”¹²⁷

¹²⁶ Gonzalo Torres, C. M. F., *op. cit.*, pages 85-85.

¹²⁷ *Iris de Paz*, no. 2-108 (August 15, 1943), p. 258.

II. THE TEACHING OF SPIRITUAL WRITERS

There have not been wanting poor and shortsighted writers who have all but eliminated the Rosarian aspect from the message of Fatima in order to make better known its Cordimarian purpose. For them, the devotion to the Heart of Mary could come to supplant advantageously that of the Rosary; the Heart would be substituted for the Blessed Virgin; the mysteries of Jesus and Mary would pass to a second place in piety. However, one thing still confounds these resolute interpreters, and that is the formal assurance of the apparition that she was *The Virgin of the Rosary*. To please them she would have had to say that she was the Heart of Mary. What a pity that theological sense is not possessed by all! Those who have it speak in a different manner, as it will appear in the following testimonies.

The Most Reverend Francis Barbado, O.P., Bishop of Salamanca: "This pious consideration of the mysteries of the holy Rosary, following the scenes of the Gospel, leads us by the hand into the interior recesses of the Heart of the Most Holy Virgin, there to contemplate the inexhaustible wealth of her love for God and for men and the perfection of her virtues. It can not help but produce longings for sanctity and fruits of perfection. It is not strange, then, that in Fatima these two devotions are intimately united and that to them is bound Our Lady's promises of protection."¹²⁸

Nazario Pérez, S.J.: "The Rosary is also the devotion of triumph over the enemies of the Church, and in this it is very similar to the Immaculate Mary. On the other hand, it is that which leads us to Jesus through Mary by means of the meditation on the mysteries of the life of Christ, which is done in the service of Our Lady. Without a doubt, for that reason it is preferred by the Mother of God, whose fondest desire for us is that we be united with her Son. 'Make reparation by means of the Rosary for the many offenses with which ungrateful sin-

¹²⁸ Pastoral *Sobre la Consagración al Inmaculado Corazón de Maria*, page 24.

ners affect my Heart,' Our Lord Jesus Christ said one day to a Spanish Dominican nun. And she replied, 'But, my Jesus, the Rosary is for honoring Your Most Blessed Mother!' The Divine Spouse, wishing to correct her misconception, said, 'You will find My Heart in each mystery of the Rosary.' And in fact, this holy nun from that day came to find Him, just as many other fervent souls will find Him there. And no less will they find there the Immaculate Heart of Mary. Mary, as St. Luke tells us, meditated all these words and works of Christ, pondering them in her Heart, thus teaching us the most substantial part of the Rosary.

"Thus it seems that all the ancient hopes of the Church in the Heart of Jesus, in the Immaculate Virgin, and in the Rosary are founded in the Heart of Mary, which the revelations of Fatima point out to us as the last hope. Thus it has been given us to understand by Pius XII, who made the consecration of the world to the Heart of Mary, invoking Our Lady of the Rosary on the last day of her month, and he repeated it more solemnly in the Vatican on the feast of the Immaculate Conception."¹²⁹

Narciso Garcia Garces, C. M. F.: "The Rosary is a devotion very closely related to the Cordimarian devotion. All who are devoted to the Heart of Mary ought to recite it; for in the fifteen mysteries we venerate all the love and virtues of Our Lady in the different steps of her life. The roses of this most popular Marian devotion remind us of the Heart which rejoices, the Heart which suffers, the Heart which triumphs."¹³⁰

German Puerto, C. M. F.: "Intimate are the relationship and union which exist between this popular Marian devotion (the Most Holy Rosary) and that of the Heart of Mary. If after examining their make-up we were to remain unconvinced of this conclusion, nevertheless we would unhesitatingly declare it, confronted as we are by the fact that the modern apostles of the Heart of Mary have been also champions of the Most

¹²⁹ "Lecciones de Fátima" in *La Vida Sobrenatural*, 279, page 459.

¹³⁰ *Catecismo de la devoción al Inmaculado Corazón de María*, number 101.

Holy Rosary. Among them is Father Claret, apostle and model of missionaries. . . . The Blessed Virgin herself, when she spoke of establishing in the world her maternal reign, joined it with the fervent recitation of the Most Holy Rosary. It is not necessary to insist upon these famous apparitions, especially those of Fatima. . . .”¹⁸¹

Fathers Magni, S.J., and Toni, S.J.: “The Blessed Virgin, speaking with the three little shepherds, often insisted upon the daily recitation of the Rosary: ‘Recite the Rosary every day with devotion in order to obtain world peace.’ Moreover, on October 13, 1917, she solemnly confirmed her invitation to recite the Rosary by revealing her name: ‘I am Our Lady of the Rosary.’ Often in the course of the history of the Church, and particularly in these recent apparitions, as also at Lourdes, Mary has manifested her predilection for this form of prayer which is the true compendium of all her joys and sorrows. In Fatima she added that the general intention in the recitation of the Rosary should be to make reparation for the offenses committed against her Heart.”¹⁸²

“Mary knows that the modern world delights exceedingly in probing the mysteries of nature, science, and history, but that it does not bother itself with far more important mysteries, such as those of God, grace, and eternity. Thus she invites us to meditate the mysteries of the holy Rosary, which are none other than those which the Gospel presents to us and which must be fully known in order that we might attain eternal salvation. In order to help us penetrate the full depth and divine beauty of these holy mysteries Mary with maternal solicitude, asks us to accompany her for a quarter of an hour, meditating upon them as she meditated and lived them in her life.

“Mary, in reality, associated herself with the mysteries of joy, sorrow, and glory of her Son not only externally, but above all, with an interior union, full and generous, of faith and

¹⁸¹ “Fundamentos dogmaticos de la devocion al Corazon de Maria” in *Estudios Marianos* III, p. 334.)

¹⁸² *Mensaje de Fatima y nuestra Correspondencia* (Bilbao, 1943), pages 63-64.

charity. Let us study her life. The words, examples, and works of Jesus form the object of her continuous meditation, the never failing fountain of her affections and desires, the model of her supernatural life, which elevate her to the most sublime summits of sanctity. She lives the mysteries which unfold themselves before her eyes, and she lives them so closely united with the mission of Jesus the Redeemer that she may justly be proclaimed the Coredemptrix of the human race. She asks us to contemplate them together with her, and to live them, so that the joys, sorrows, and glory of the most holy Hearts of Jesus and Mary may be ours.”¹³³

Gonzalo Torres, C. M. F.: “Although this Lady of Light, whose homeland is Heaven, has told us in definite and categorical terms, ‘I am Our Lady of the Rosary,’ nevertheless, her message cannot be understood if it be separated from her Heart.”¹³⁴ “The well-aimed character of the sacred message of the Cove of Iria is its alliance of two extraordinarily popular devotions, the Rosary devotion and the devotion to the Hearts of Jesus and Mary.”¹³⁵ “I bring this chapter to a close by inviting you, dear reader, to give yourself completely and devoutly to the love of these three great devotions: the devotions to the Heart of Jesus, to the Heart of Mary, and to the holy Rosary, all of which are so ingeniously united in the revelations of Fatima.”¹³⁶

Emmanuel Cuervo, O. P.: “The Blessed Virgin also manifests to the little shepherds her desire that the world be consecrated to her Immaculate Heart, a request which happily has already been fulfilled by the reigning Pontiff, Pope Pius XII. But this desire of the Blessed Virgin in no way contradicts her previous declarations that she is the Virgin of the Rosary, nor does she substitute the devotion to her Immaculate Heart in place of the Rosary, nor does she give preponderance to the devotion of her Immaculate Heart over the recitation of the Rosary. It would be a lamentable error to understand the

¹³³ *Ibid.*, pages 72-74.

¹³⁴ *El Milagro de Fátima*, chap. VI, pages 75-76.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, page 81.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, page 85.

apparitions of Fatima in this sense, which would debilitate in part its very purpose. When one studies the apparitions of Fatima he must consider them in all their original purity without any mixture of prejudices alien to the intentions of the Blessed Virgin.

"The Virgin of the Rosary is the integral Virgin of the Gospel, the Virgin of its mysteries and of those of Jesus Christ in which she cooperated. She is the Virgin who lived in indissoluble union with her most holy Son in this world and accomplished with Him, and dependant upon Him, our Redemption. The Virgin of the Rosary is the Mother of God and the spiritual Mother of men. The whole life of the Most Blessed Virgin in its double aspect of cooperation in the mysteries of Christ and in the mysteries of our Redemption was motivated by her most ardent love for the real Christ and for the mystical or total Christ, of which her Heart is a symbol. Thence it is that the Mother of God, manifested herself in Fatima as Our Lady of the Rosary, that is, as the Virgin. Cooperatrix in the mysteries of Christ and of our own, she asks the consecration of the world to her love, by means of which she cooperated in these mysteries, and by means of which she is with Christ and through Christ our Mediatrix and Coredemptrix. It is impossible to find in this a contradiction, or a substitution of one thing for another, or preponderance of one over the other but only the explanation of one and the same reality of the mysteries of the Rosary, that is, the reality of the mysteries of the Rosary which are the mysteries of Mary and Jesus Christ, and in a certain way ours also."¹³⁷

John De Oliveira, O.P.: "The Immaculate Heart appears in the message of Fatima to show men the love of their Mother who has deigned to appear to them from the crown of an azinheira tree. It is the Heart of Our Lady of the Rosary, giving us to understand what great power the Rosary has over her."¹³⁸

¹³⁷ "Fatima" in *El Santísimo Rosario* 706, pages 278-279.

¹³⁸ *O Rosario de Maria* (Cruzada Mundial do Rosario pela Paz, Oporto, 1944), page 12.

“The devotion to the Immaculate Heart would terminate in an exterior and sentimental cult before plastic images more or less pious. If at the base of this devotion there ever begins to be lacking penance and the Rosary, then it will be evident that we are very far from realizing the message of Fatima, and therefore, from obtaining the graces promised in recompense for the practice of the true devotion to the Immaculate Heart. However, this error will never produce two separate devotions. For the great devotion to her Immaculate Heart which Our Lady of the Rosary of Fatima asks of us is the Rosary entirely bathed in penance. The first to give us the example of this correct understanding of the message of Fatima was the Pope. This he did by consecrating the world to *Our Lady of the Rosary* and to her Immaculate Heart.”¹³⁹ “It would be a lamentable mistake if the recent and so sensational publication of this revelation would come to avert the attention from its two fundamental and evangelical parts: penance and prayer.”¹⁴⁰

G. Martinez De Antoñana, C.M.F.: “The revelations of Fatima, just as the apparitions of Lourdes, and perhaps even more so than they, are an exaltation of the devotion of the holy Rosary and a most earnest recommendation to recite it daily. . . . For that reason, Pope Pius XII, in alluding to the events of Fatima in his Encyclical of June 13, 1940, speaks especially of ‘The recitation of the holy Rosary, which was so earnestly recommended by Our Lady of Fatima.’

“But it ought to be noted what an intimate connection the apparitions themselves place between the devotion (or practice of the devotion) of the holy Rosary and the devotion to the Immaculate Heart of Mary. This is seen especially in the practice of reparation to her most pure Heart, one of the principal points of the message, which ought to be practiced by means of meditation or consideration of the mysteries of the Rosary together with its recitation. Indeed, the history of the devotion to the Heart of Mary shows us how the holy Rosary

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, page 18.

has been considered as its most proper and essential practice, since it invites us to consider and venerate the joys, sorrows, gladness, and glory of the maternal Heart of Mary in the principal mysteries of her life and in the mysteries of Our Lord Jesus Christ in the same way as she (as the Gospel tells us) during her life meditated, pondered, and preserved in her Heart the memory of the mysteries of the life of her Son.”¹⁴¹

III. FURTHER ATTESTATIONS

In the third apparition, the Blessed Virgin announced to the little shepherds, “I come to ask the consecration of the world to my Heart and the Communion of reparation on the first Saturdays of the month.” On Dec. 10, 1925 Our Blessed Lady with the Child Jesus appeared to Lucia and showed her her Heart surrounded with thorns. The Child Jesus, while pointing to Mary’s Heart, said to Lucia, “Have compassion on this most sweet Heart which suffers continual martyrdom because of human ingratitude.”

To this the Blessed Virgin added, “Look, my daughter, at my Heart surrounded with thorns with which ungrateful men wound it at every moment with their blasphemies and ingratitude. You at least attempt to console me and announce for me that I promise to assist at the hour of death with the graces necessary for salvation all those who on the first Saturday of five consecutive months confess, receive Holy Communion, recite a third part of the Rosary, and accompany me for fifteen minutes, meditating on the mysteries of the Rosary, with the intention of offering me reparation.”¹⁴²

The apparitions and message of Fatima have had their supreme certification in the allocation addressed to Portugal and to the world by Pope Pius XII on October 31, 1942, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the miraculous events. In his message the Pope recalls Our Lady’s special recommenda-

¹⁴¹ *El Mensaje de Fátima y el Culto al Corazón de María* (Madrid, 1943), pages 40-42.

¹⁴² Da Fonseca, *op. cit.*, Epilogue.

tion of the Rosary, and he fulfills her request that the world be consecrated to her Immaculate Heart.

In his consecration the Pope does not forget that it was Our Lady of the Rosary who besought it. To her, to the Queen of the Most Holy Rosary, to her Immaculate Heart, the Vicar of Christ consecrates the whole human race: "*Queen of the Most Holy Rosary! . . . To you, to your Immaculate Heart, We, as the common Father of the great Christian family, as Vicar of Him to Whom was given all power in Heaven and on earth, and from Whom we have received the care of so many souls, redeemed with His Blood, who inhabit the whole world, to you, to your Immaculate Heart, in this tragic hour of human history, we confide, we deliver, we consecrate, not only the Holy Church, the Mystical Body of your Jesus, which suffers and bleeds in so many places and is afflicted in so many ways, but also the whole world, torn by deadly strife, inflamed with fires of hate, victim of its own iniquities.*"¹⁴³ The august voice of the Pope seals the indissoluble alliance between the Most Holy Rosary and the devotion to the Heart of Mary.

The Apostleship of Prayer adopting the watchwords of Fatima, informed its propagandists and members in its *Circular* of September 12, 1942: "All our members in whatsoever part of the world are urged to have recourse to the divine mercy by means of the Most Pure Heart of Mary." "In our propaganda let the Christian doctrine concerning the veneration of the Most Pure Heart of Mary be clearly and repeatedly expounded and inculcated."

"Let the daily recitation of the Rosary be recommended to the faithful, along with pious meditation on the mysteries."

"Let the Communion of reparation on the first Saturdays of the month in honor of the Most Pure Heart of Mary be promoted in order to beseech the conversion of sinners and the divine mercy for the whole human race."

¹⁴³ Pope Leo XIII saw in the Rosary this great supplication to the Most Pure Heart of Mary: "Ad perpetuam recordationem implorati ubique gentium per mensem octobrem A PURISSIMO EIUS CORDE PRAESIDII ADDATUR PRAECONIUM: REGINA SACRATISSIMI ROSARII, ora pro nobis. (*Salutaris Ille*, December 24, 1883.)

V. CONSEQUENCES AND NORMS

The Most Holy Rosary and the devotion to the Immaculate Heart of Mary are recommendable beyond measure as most apt practices, according to theological exactions, for accomplishing the ends which Marian devotion ought to accomplish; namely, the glorification of God, the veneration of the Blessed Virgin, and the sanctification of souls. The Rosary venerates more directly the ontological excellence of the Blessed Virgin; that is, her position and realization of the Motherhood of God which are invoked in the mysteries. The Cordimarian devotion honors more directly her psychological excellence, which is summed up and symbolized in her Heart. However, the close relation of these two excellences intimately connect the two devotions. It is possible to practice the one without the other. However, it is connatural and very useful to unite them; connatural, because of their interdependence; very useful, because thereby their efficacy is doubled.

The Rosary ought to be Cordimarian, because the mysteries are Cordimarian. The Cordimarian devotion communicates to the Rosary a greater penetration and intimacy. The Rosary can be a most excellent Cordimarian devotion, because it is the history and theology of the Heart of Mary and completely fuses souls with it, and it incites acts of Cordimarian veneration. Since the true Cordimarian devotion requires a knowledge of the Heart of Mary and an intimate union with her sentiments, it would be difficult to separate it from the Rosary without weakening its solidity. The history of the Cordimarian devotion confirms the compenetration of the two devotions. The Message of Fatima is essentially Rosarian-Cordimarian. Of itself, the propagation of one of them aids the other. In conformity with theology and history and with the explicit desires of the Blessed Virgin they ought to be propagated together.

Both devotions ought to be spread so universally that they will be practiced assiduously by all souls. Their universal utility and the earnest recommendation which they have received from the Blessed Virgin and the Church demand it. The con-

nection or union of the two devotions is most fitting and proper, and it is easily accomplished by practicing the Rosary devotions with Cordimarian predilection. The formula of integration may be expressed thus: *Cordimarian Rosary*, that is, veneration of the Heart of Mary in the mysteries of the Rosary. In harmony with their nature and with the will of Our Lady they must be practiced in such a way that they may completely fuse souls with Jesus and Mary, that they may serve as reparation to Their most Sacred Hearts, that they may obtain the pardon of sinners and peace for the world.¹⁴⁴ Their practice will be efficacious for these intentions of Our Lady if it is performed by manifesting veneration, love, union, intimate communion, invocation, imitation, reparation, and consecration, all of which are connatural to it.

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¹⁴⁴ In the Watchwords of the Blessed Virgin and the Angel spoken to the little shepherds at Fatima these ends are evident. Consider those of the Blessed Virgin: "Sacrifice yourselves for sinners and say frequently especially when making some sacrifice: OH JESUS, IT IS FOR YOUR LOVE, FOR THE CONVERSION OF SINNERS, AND IN REPARATION FOR THE INJURIES COMMITTED AGAINST THE IMMACULATE HEART OF MARY." (Cf. Fonseca, *op. cit.*)

Consider those of the Angel: 1. "Recite with me: MY GOD, I BELIEVE, I ADORE, I HOPE, AND I LOVE YOU. I ASK YOUR PARDON FOR THOSE WHO DO NOT BELIEVE, DO NOT ADORE, DO NOT HOPE, AND DO NOT LOVE YOU." (Cf. *ibid.*) 2. "Recite, recite often. The most holy Hearts of Jesus and Mary have designs of mercy on us . . . ! Offer continually to Our Lord prayers and sacrifices in order to make reparation for the many sins with which He is offended and in order to obtain the conversion of sinners. Do this to bring peace to you." 3. "MOST HOLY TRINITY, FATHER, SON, AND HOLY GHOST, I ADORE YOU PROFOUNDLY, AND I OFFER YOU THE MOST PRECIOUS BODY AND BLOOD, SOUL AND DIVINITY OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST, PRESENT IN ALL THE TABERNACLES OF THE WORLD IN REPARATION FOR THE OFFENSES WITH WHICH HE IS OFFENDED, AND BY THE INFINITE MERITS OF HIS MOST HOLY HEART AND THROUGH THE INTERCESSION OF THE IMMACULATE HEART OF MARY, I ASK YOU FOR THE CONVERSION OF SINNERS." (Cf. *ibid.*)

THE DIALECTICS OF WAR AND PEACE

[CONCLUSION]



III. THE DIALECTICS OF WAR UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS' REGIME

The Pact of 1919 united to traditional principles certain new ideas inspired by a better understanding of the solidarity of states. The states implicitly recognize the indivisibility of peace, as seen in art. II: "All wars and all threats of war, whether they affect directly or not one of the members of the society, interest the entire society, which must take all measures proper to the safeguarding of the peace of nations." Peace, therefore, forms an indivisible whole; and society assumes in its regard responsibilities distinct from those of the particular states. The latter again manifest their solidarity in presenting a united front against whoever would undertake a war of aggression; they engage themselves "to respect and to maintain against all exterior aggression the present territorial integrity and political independence of all the members of the society" (art. 10). Moreover, they bind themselves not to have recourse to war without first having submitted their differences either to arbitration and judicial ruling, or to the mediation of the Council. They bind themselves, finally, to take certain measures of sanction against any state having recourse to war, in violation of the obligations of the Pact. By thus accepting "certain obligations not to have recourse to war," the states were introducing in modern international law, not so much the distinction between just wars and unjust wars as is sometimes claimed—this being a moral distinction—but at least its juridical projection, the distinction between legal and illegal wars, that is to say, wars in violation of the Pact. This was already an important innovation and filled with consequences.

But—and this is a characteristic trait of this transitory

regime—the new principles did not eliminate the old ones which they contradicted. Notably, far from repudiating the sovereignty of the states, the Covenant consecrated it, in its fashion. It left the Assembly and the Council of the League the character of diplomatic conferences, subject as they were to the ruling of unanimity which paralyzed their action, but safeguarded the sovereignty of its members. It introduced in art. 15 the famous “reserve of sovereignty,” which confirms the existence of “a domain reserved to the exclusive competency of the state” and excludes all control by the international community in this domain. Neither did it institute a true collective action against the state which had recourse to war in violation of the obligations of the Pact. In effect, if this covenant-breaking state was supposed to be committing an act of war against all the other members of the society, each member state decided for itself the measures by which it would acquit itself of the obligations of international solidarity which flowed from art. 16. The sanctions resulted less from an action of the society than from a conglomeration of individual measures. Again, it is in the meaning most favorable to the sovereignty of the states that art. 10 was interpreted: the states bound themselves to respect and defend against all exterior aggression the territorial integrity and political independence of other members, but these dispositions were the object of an interpretive resolution leaving each member the care of “judging . . . in which measure (it) is held to assure the execution of (its) obligation by the use of its military forces.” Mutual assistance, promised in case of aggression, left intact the sovereignty of the states, and this, as always, entailed the “divisibility” of war.

The Pact, in effect—and this is what we wish to note—preserved and consecrated in its fashion the classical notion of war. The authors of the Pact place themselves in the traditional dialectical framework of war and peace. Their aim being “to assure international peace and security,” the means to which they have recourse is “the acceptance of certain obligations not to have recourse to war.” The method is clear: the states’ right to war is not more contested, at bottom, than their

sovereignty. To assure peace, the problem is to make the states voluntarily accept certain renunciations of the use of their right, with the hope of progressively expanding their commitments, until they cover all possible cases, and to surround the execution of these commitments with all the guarantees that treaties and international law can procure.

Thus the states bind themselves (art. 12 to art. 15) to avoid war without first having submitted their dispute to arbitration, to judicial settlement, or to consideration by the Council of the League of Nations. They bind themselves also to avoid taking action against a state carrying out a unanimous recommendation of the Council, or a judicial sentence. In promising to respect the territorial integrity and the political independence of other states, they bind themselves to avoid aggressive war. Thus, all the doors through which war could enter are bolted; the bolts are the obligations which the states have assumed to refrain from using these doors.

During three periods, the application of this method was pursued with perseverance, and it was the cause of a real progress in international law. The efforts were oriented in three principal directions. Firstly, toward the organization of mutual assistance to the states that are the victims of aggression, and in a subsidiary way, toward a definition of aggression. Secondly, toward the prevention of war, thanks to the re-enforcing of the powers granted the Council to safeguard peace when it is threatened.¹² Finally toward the development of peaceful means of solving conflicts—inquest-mediation, arbitration, judicial settlement—so that in all cases this procedure should lead to an obligatory solution. In this way, recourse to war lost its justification or its excuse.

As for what concerns war itself, a unanimous resolution

¹² It led notably to the Convention of October 2, 1930, to bring financial assistance to those states that are the victims of aggression. (O. J. of the L. of N. special supp. No. 83, Oct. 1930, p. 24), and to the General Convention held to develop the means to prevent war (O. J. special supp. No. 93, Oct. 1931, p. 2), which convention never realized any effectiveness due to the decline of international institutions.

adopted by the Assembly on September 26, 1927, outlawed wars of aggression and qualified them as international crimes. The sixth Pan-American Conference, meeting at Havana, February 18, 1928, also declared such wars to be international crimes, and considered as illicit and prohibited all aggression between American states. Finally, the Pact of Paris (August 27, 1928), or the Briand-Kellogg Pact, which united the signatures of nearly all of the states, stipulated that these states "condemn recourse to war for the solution of international differences and renounce its use as an instrument of national politics."

What lessons can we draw from this experience and from the progress of law accomplished during this period? The fact that the states, in joining the League, accepted certain obligations to avoid recourse to war, has been hailed as a progress toward peace. But one may ask if in banning recourse to war "in certain cases," the Pact did not consecrate the principle of war. To regulate the conditions of usage of a right, even in a restrictive manner, is this not recognizing and fortifying this right?

With this question, that of the value of the method employed by the Pact is also brought up. To lock the doors through which war is introduced, by the voluntary renunciation of the use of this right, may be the only possible method in an international regime founded on the idea of state-sovereignty. Since the right of war is an attribute of sovereignty, what other course is there than to get each power to voluntarily renounce the exercise of its right and, by multiplying these renunciations, practically eliminate recourse to war? But it is certainly an inefficacious method. Not only because the possible cases of war are unlimited and unforeseeable and that it is impossible to obtain beforehand a renunciation which contains them all in their individual circumstances, but also because the principle upon which the method is based is false. In reality, it tolerates a contradiction which ruins the system of preventing war all the while it believes to be building it up. An international community which considers the right of war as an attribute of the

sovereignty of the state, admits by this very fact that an institution doubly *asocial* (because it flows from the sovereignty of the state on the one hand, and because it substitutes violence for the rational elaboration of law on the other) is nevertheless a *social* procedure fit to produce a societal result.

One may also say without paradox that the problem of the prevention of war, which since 1919 has been the occasion of so many efforts and so many negotiations, notably on the base of Article II of the Pact of 1919, presented itself under the regime of the League of Nations as a problem at once necessary and false. Necessary because in the face of it, humanity can not remain disinterested, and because it can effectively, through appropriate measures, prevent one, two, three, or an indeterminate number of wars. False because one cannot prevent war—all wars—in a society whose structure is such that it gives birth to the *right of war* for the benefit of the *individual* state. All of the renunciations to the use of the right are accidental relative to the right itself, and the barriers opposed to the exercise of the right will fall some day before the necessity of using this right, or before the interest one may have in using the right. As for abolishing the right itself by voluntarily renouncing its existence, this is a Utopia, a sort of metaphysical impossibility, when this right results from the very structure of society.

Those who worked that law might progress during the regime of the League of Nations, had to struggle amidst contradictions rendered all the more irritating for the mind as they became more difficult to perceive. The prohibition of the "war of aggression" is an example. The first task of a society organizing itself is to eliminate aggression, that is, recourse to physical violence contrary to law. But, it is not so much with aggression as with the "war of aggression" that international law concerned itself during the process of its historical development. It is the latter that the Assembly prohibited in 1927; it is the "aggressor state" that the 1924 Protocol of Geneva has in mind when it qualifies by this name "whosoever has recourse to war in violation of the agreements covered in the Pact or in the

present Protocol" (art. 10). Thus, it is not war that is prohibited, but a certain war—the war of aggression. Aggression is a circumstance which qualifies war and makes it criminal, without in any way taking away from it its character of a legitimate institution, and without abolishing the right of war of the state.

One need but reflect on this expression—war of aggression—to note the contradiction which we denounce. A state becomes an aggressor when it has recourse to war in violation of pledges taken in an international convention. In other words, that state is an aggressor when, by having recourse to war, it crosses a "juridical frontier" traced by the international agreements to which it is a party.

There is a hierarchy in obligations, and this hierarchy forms part of the very structure of the juridical order. Anterior to the conventional obligations, such as those which trace the "juridical frontiers" opposed to war, there is the very power of contracting these obligations, a power founded on the nature of the state, which nature, it is contended, makes it a sovereign. The conventional restrictions of its sovereignty are logically posterior to this sovereignty itself; they presuppose it. If some day the state breaks its conventional pledges not to have recourse to war, it will justify its decision by an appeal to the right which permitted it to contract the pledges themselves. It will place itself on a superior plane, that of its sovereignty, from which flows the right of war even before the right to limit this right voluntarily. The conventional obligations which limit the usage of its right to war are the contingent determinations of an anterior right which manifests anew its superiority when new circumstances, political or historical, supercede those which led to the acceptance for a time of certain conventional restrictions. Thus, there is in the very heart of the notion of "war of aggression" an irreconcilable opposition. The notion of war evokes the sovereign right of the state, the notion of aggression appeals to a juridical order unquestionably respected by all the members of the social

group. The two notions may be coupled, but their opposition cannot be suppressed.

Moreover, this becomes more obvious if we consider the consequences. To say that war becomes "aggression" in certain cases—when it is waged in violation of the law which forbids having recourse to it—is to admit that a social control can be exercised on the act by which the state has decided to have recourse to war. One must, in fact, verify its conformity or non-conformity with law. But it is evident that this control will operate only if the state upon which it is exercised remains on the terrain of its conventional obligations, if it refuses to place itself, as it can, on the superior level of its sovereignty, which sovereignty is left intact by its conventional obligations. In other words, if it freely accepts controls and sanctions at the very moment when these apply to itself. If, in short, it is more to its interest to submit to them than to challenge them, as it could.

In reality, if a control can be exercised on a state to judge if it is engaging in a war of aggression, it is because there exists a social power superior to that of the state. But a war whose legitimacy is verified by a social control is no longer an act which emanates from sovereignty. Is it not equivocal to still call it war, if one keeps in mind the meaning this word has had in the modern period?

IV. THE DIALECTICS OF WAR AND THE UNITED NATIONS.

Is the dialectic of war and peace affected by the new regime of the United Nations? Perhaps the moment to answer that question has not yet come. Only experience will show the respective importance of the various provisions of the Charter. One can not forget the precedent of the League. Just as fundamental articles of the Covenant were promptly deprived of their original force by a timid interpretation, so today no one can say which stipulations of the new Charter will be weakened or reinforced by the usage the states will make of them. The future alone will reveal the efficaciousness of the new organs, such as the Security Council and the Social and

Economic Committee, to which the Charter attributes powers that are extensive, but formulated in very general terms.

Judging from the text of the Charter, it is clear that the new society betrays an organic character which was lacking in the old League and, therefore, the problem of war and peace is put in a different context. Of course, one cannot say that, from the League to the United Nations, there has been an abrupt jump. Certain functions which devolved to the Assembly or the Council through the Pact of 1919 already manifested the organic character of the international community. But we know that they were eclipsed by the other provisions: such as the maintenance of the principle of the sovereignty of states and of the rule of unanimity, the equality of the powers of the Assembly and the Council, the fact that concerted action by the states with a view to the maintenance of peace (on the basis of articles 10, 11, or even 16, for example), was not true societal action, but a concentration of simultaneous individual enterprises. All this took away from the society created by the Pact its truly organic character.

Does the new Charter have the same respect for the sovereignty of the states? It strives assuredly not to alarm their susceptibilities, sensitive as they are always on this point, but neither does it say anything in favor of a principle which from all evidence is not in accord with its essential institutions. Thus art. 2, par. 1, speaks of the "sovereign equality of states," where it was expected that their sovereignty would be mentioned. The new expression, while it may not be too clear, can only signify the equality of the states before law. The same article (par. 7) recognizes that there are "matters which essentially pertain to the national competence of a state." The Pact of 1919, on the other hand, considered that certain questions were "left to the exclusive competence" of the state. Can one infer, without reading too much into the texts, that in attributing to the states an essential competence in certain matters, the actual Charter admits that secondary competences may at the same time be exercised on these same matters, and that therefore, these matters pertain to the simultaneous com-

petence of the national state and of the international society? Under the regime of the League, on the contrary, the "reservation of sovereignty" totally removed the acts of the state from international control and permitted it to commit certain "asocial" acts in conformity with law.¹³ But, regardless of these considerations—and the study of the Charter would furnish many more—they remain accessory, if we compare them to the three essential innovations of the Charter: the attachment of the International Court of Justice to the U. N., for whom it becomes the "principal" judicial organ (art. 92); the creation of the Security Council, which has the principal responsibility for the maintenance of the peace and of international security (art. 34); finally, the creation of the Economic and Social Committee, whose creation marks a probably decisive stage—in any case a very important one—in the development of an international society. The text of the Charter has a perfect clarity about it when it underlines the organic character of these institutions. Read, for example, the articles 62 to 67 which define the functions and the powers of the Social and Economic Council, or art. 24 which specifies those of the Security Council. "To assure the rapid and efficient action of the organization," reads art. 24, "its members confer on the Security Council the principal responsibility for

¹³ We could also note that the Pact of the League of Nations presented as an end to attain and as a source of obligation certain rules in which the new Charter sees rather certain fundamental elements of the initial social pact—"principles to which the members of the U. N. conform their conduct," because without them there can be no common life. This is the case with the territorial integrity or the political independence of all the states. The members of the League of Nations promised to respect them and to maintain them against all exterior aggression; and the mutual guarantee contained in article 10 was in its origin meant to be a "construed right," which however, was never completed. The Charter of 1945 declares that the members of the U. N. "refrain in their international relations from the recourse to the menace or use of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of all states" (art. 2, par. iv), and this is less a conventional obligation which new agreements will determine, than it is one of the bases of the social life of the states and of the Pact upon which rests their community. The respect for the integrity and the political independence of states passes from the plane of conventional obligations to that of principles or of facts presupposed by judicial obligations.

the maintenance of peace and of international security, and recognize that in discharging the duties imposed by this responsibility, the Security Council acts in their name." "In accomplishing its duties, the Security Council acts in conformity with the aims and principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted the Security Council to permit it to accomplish the said duties are defined in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and IX" (art. 24). Thus, the role of the Security Council is very much that of an organ; it exercises the will of the social body, it acts in virtue of the responsibilities which weigh upon the collectivity itself, said collectivity acquitting itself of them through the instrumentality of the Council.

In this new context, how is the dialectic of war and peace manifested? We are not in the least surprised to find that the Charter does not speak of war. The very name of war does not appear, except in the preamble, where it is cited as one of the "scourges" from which future generations must be spared, and in article 53 where it designates a past historical fact, the second World War.

Nothing better illustrates the difference between the two charters and the two societies, that of 1919 and that of 1945. The end is the same: "guarantee peace and safety," says the Covenant; "maintain peace and international security," says the Charter of 1945. But this end the Pact of 1919 seeks to attain by imposing "certain obligations not to have recourse to war," that is, certain renunciations of the use of a right whose existence it acknowledges by the very fact that it forbids its exercise in certain cases; and we have shown that it could not suppress the right of war, because the very structure of society created it to the profit of the state, supreme warrantor of order and justice. This structure changes with the new Charter, and the problem of war is thereby profoundly affected. It begins to appear in its true light; it is neither an independent problem, nor a particular problem, but the historical aspect of a more general question, that of the use of force in political societies.

The main characteristic of these societies—so essential that

this characteristic alone could define the societies—is that a social power, which is a juridical power, assumes a monopoly over the use of force. Or again, it is that law has the right and the power to make itself served by force, by making exclusive use of the organs of the collectivity to realize this end. A society which recognizes in its members a right to war is a society where the use of force and the application of law are not socialized, but remain asocial. These functions are not assumed by public organs; they are, rather, in the hands of particulars. That is why it is contradictory in such a society to seek to prevent war. In truth, the task to accomplish does not consist in preventing war, but in changing the structure of the community and organizing it according to the nature of political societies. The progress being made in this direction implies the socialization of the use of force. This use then passes into the hands of societal organs, and with this transformation the name of war automatically disappears, henceforth deprived of its true significance. This is what is happening today in the Charter of the United Nations.

The notion of “private war” corresponded to the structure of feudal society. It was the characteristic sign, as it were, of a situation where, public power having dissolved, its rights devolved to the private domain. The network of the bonds through which the state manifested its authority and exercised its functions came apart, and gave way to a network of feudal pacts, to a regime of free association in which individuals, bound by their oath, promised mutual aid and service. Since societal organization falters on the superior plane, which is that of the state, war appears on the inferior plane, that is, in the hands of lords and their vassals. It is a *war* because it partakes, even in the feudal regime, of the nature of an institution of public law; the feudal system is not pure anarchy, it also sets up a public order which gives to Europe a solid frame, and announces in her the future mistress of the world. But war here is *private* war, because it is no longer exclusively in the hands of the public power; it is decided and pursued by the associates of the feudal pact, involved as they are by

their contract in a network of reciprocal obligations, of a personal and a patrimonial order.

If we apply, analogically, to the medieval period notions elaborated for a later period, we would say that in this time of private wars "the unjust private war" would generally be plain brigandage accomplished in force. Conversely, the "just war" is for the feudal barons, and for their subjects, a real and supreme guarantee of respect for their rights and for the reign of justice. Such a war, the medieval institutions (like those of the modern period) strive to humanize and to prevent: the "peace of God" is designed to protect non-combatants, clerics, peasants and their goods; the "truce of God" forbids hostilities on certain days or during certain periods.—These are necessary and benevolent measures, as are all those measures which have as their end the prevention of war, but, like the others, they were impotent, for they did not modify the structure of feudal society but accommodated themselves to it. It was the modern state which suppressed private war, by rendering useless the function which it fulfilled. It established a superior social order, which did not perfect the feudal system, but destroyed it while replacing it and while introducing new ideas, such as that of the sovereignty of the state or of public order, upon which rests the modern organization of society.

Acts which would have furnished "just cause" for a private war between barons undergo a change. They become misdemeanors or crimes against particulars or against public order and against the state. They give rise to judicial trials and prosecutions. They no longer engender war, but rather set off social procedures. Thus, one of the first forms of the dialectics of war and peace disappears, that which opposed private war to peace. But this dialectic disappears on one plane, only to reappear on a higher one, in the relationships between the states. It passed from the level of the society of feudal princes to that of the modern society of sovereign states. The peace which the law, the judge, and the executive power establish in the interior of the state, war is supposed to establish and

defend in the community of states. Today, the dialectics of war and peace established by the modern regime of the sovereign state is disappearing in its turn with the socialization of the use of force on the international level.

Where in fact has the Charter of the United Nations made use of the term "war"? It wishes to oppose every "menace to the peace," "every rupture of the peace," "every act of aggression"; but in the present state of international society, war and peace are no longer considered as two contraries. Their dialectical opposition is *passed by*; there is no longer an exact correspondence between "rupture of the peace" and "entrance into war." The acts which bring about this rupture are henceforth of another kind; they are differently qualified and are expressed by a new name—international crime—(criminal aggression against the peace or against humanity); they are even, if one so desires, a revolution or an unnamed catastrophe, but no longer war. If some day, in executing the decisions of the Security Council and applying the plans of its Committee of Major Powers, atomic bombs destroy cities or an entire country, this will be a work of justice or of social injustice, a police measure or a governmental measure, or on the contrary, an act of international tyranny, but it will not be war. This is a widespread error, but one which undoubtedly evidences an imagination far removed from reality, that of believing that the suppression of wars between states will permit the realization of the old dream of humanity and of transforming into ploughshares the swords and shields, and tanks into tractors, for if this suppression entails individual disarmament of the states, it demands collective armament constantly maintained on a level with the progress of science and technique. It must be even more efficacious since the mass of the civilized community in which order is to be maintained will be more considerable. The evolution which we are now undergoing does not tend to eliminate the use of force from international society. This it can not do; this it must not do. But it does tend to socialize the use of force, to elevate it into the anarchical hands of the sovereign states in order to

make of it the monopoly of the international society and the auxiliary of the public order.

Does this mean that the present stage must be *passed over* and that we must leave the intermediary period in which we have found ourselves during the past 25 years? War, being an all-useful procedure which is exercised in the three branches, legislative, judicial, and executive, will be radically destroyed only if these three functions are assumed by a super state. The power of asocial, anarchical, or arbitrary action, which is called the state's right of war, will be automatically destroyed. But this state of international organization is far from being attained, and in this regard the Charter of the U.N. is deceptive.

Clearly, in the judiciary order, we must not underestimate the progress realized. Article ninety-two declares that the International Court of Justice constitutes "the principal judiciary organ of the U.N.," although the pact of 1919 was content to charge the Council of the League of Nations to prepare a project and to submit it to the member states. The Security Council could find in the arsenal of its powers the means of making the decisions of the Court respected. These are important manifestations of the organic character of the international community and of the progress of its institutions. The creation of an international tribunal charged with judging war crimes, crimes against the peace and against humanity, and the crime of aggression, shows that the time has passed when recourse to war was a sovereign act socially uncontrolled and uncontrollable; it marks even more clearly the rejection of the conception according to which the will of the states would be the only foundation of international law. These notions indicate a progress of considerable importance, but at the same time the San Francisco charter does not propose new means of regulating differences, and those which already existed did not receive any notable development. Undoubtedly the movement towards the organization of conciliatory arbitration and judiciary ruling, whose results the general act of Geneva codified in 1928, received a new force after the estab-

lishment of the U. N. and the signing of the peace treaties, but the charter by itself does not give it any further power.

Moreover, if it does favour the progress of legislative order, it does so only in an indirect fashion. The Security Council, for example, could elaborate a system of regulations and control of armaments (art. 26, 47). The activity of the Economics and Social council (art. 61, ss,) aided by the specialized institutions whose creation the charter foresaw and *which have competence* in the economic and social domains, in intellectual culture and education, of public health and its allied fields, probably will be the occasion for a large number of laws. Finally the method adopted for the elaboration of peace treaties, in the complexity of its operational procedures, undoubtedly constitutes an instructive precedent, but, at the same time, in the charter we shall seek in vain for institutional progress endowing the community with true legislative organs. The Charter does not even make an allusion to the procedure of revision of no longer applicable treaties, as did article 19 of the pact of 1919. In the same way as in the former system which was based on the sovereignty of states, the present system slothfully entrusts the manifestation of social needs, and the maturing of new laws for the international order to *conflict*.

There is a difference, however, and it is a great one: formerly, international conflict—since its solution arose from the judicial or the legislative function—could be legitimately solved by war, and a new juridic order arose therefrom; war was an element of this procedure whose results the treaty of peace declared. Henceforth, recourse to this later *ratio* is impossible, and if any state presumes to break the peace, all society by the organ of the Security Council must prevent it and chastise its anti-social action. Herein is the most characteristic trait of a regime instituted by the charter. Peace results from the functioning of international institutions capable of assuring the three essential social functions, legislative, judicial, executive. War is a polyvalent procedure which supplies for their insufficiencies. But it must be noted that if, today, the lacunae of the international organization still call war

a replacement procedure, as the final means of making law or applying it, this social inclination towards war must henceforth strike against a bulwark. This bulwark is the Security Council in which the collectivity has placed its hope of preventing future wars and which the social state still demands as the supreme means of law.

It is the column of peace of whose solidity we can boast, for juridically the council is provided with all the powers necessary for its task. And in fact, who would dare to risk a war if the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, China, or other member powers of the Council forbade it and bent all their strength to prevent it.

It is a column however whose resistance appears to us very precarious for two principal reasons. Perhaps a capable doctor or surgeon could make another organ take over the function of an atrophied organ and thus restore health to the entire organism. Perhaps a clever architect could shift to another column the stresses which should have been supported by a support which he wishes to remove. But in the life of a society, functions of some importance are not capable of being channelled to an organ which is not made to replace them. A society in which the judge would be charged with making the law would be a society in which there would be neither good judge nor good legislator. And it is probable that the society in which the policeman supplied at the same time for the judge and the lawmaker would no longer have a good police force. In the present International Society, the Security Council receives a universal pacifying task. It must, even by force, stop menaces against the peace. It must prohibit the rupture of the peace and outlaw aggression. Perhaps it would succeed, if all the menaces against the peace sprang from disturbers of order or from ambitious men thirsty for conquest and power, in a word, if the prevention of war were only the concern of an international police. But reality is more complex. There are aspirations towards justice which incite nations to prefer war to peace. They must be satisfied if an individual course to force is to be prevented,

and they can be satisfied only if the international society possesses organs specialized to this end and adapted to their task.

The Security Council is not instituted to fulfill these functions and the tendency of society toward law will nullify it, leaving a negative resistance which it will oppose to a desire for war nourished by a revindication of justice. With far stronger reason it would be incapable if one of its members should attempt to utilize for its own profit this aspiration of other peoples towards justice or the reform of law. The task of pacification entrusted to the Security Council is too general to be always efficacious. It begets the idea of an omniscient, omnipotent paternalism that the eleven united patriarchs wise and strong must exercise in favor of peace, but which in international society as in every other society, only masks the poverty of the social organization.

The second weakness is too well known for us to insist on and is set down in the constitution itself. Article twenty-seven determines that the decisions of the Security Council on all questions other than those of procedure will be taken by the affirmative vote of seven of its members in which are comprised the voices of all its permanent members.¹⁴ From this it follows that each one of the five Great Powers, permanent members of the council, can raise obstacles to the decision, even if that decision has attained seven or more votes. Each power can at any moment prevent the council from acting; the announcement of its intention to vote negatively suffices to paralyze the council. This power is known as the "right of veto."

This is not the place to discuss the above mentioned

¹⁴ "Being understood"—adds the text—"only in the decisions taken at the conclusion of chapter the sixth (specific regulation of disputes) and of paragraph 3 of article 52 (specific regulation of disputes by means of accords or regional organisms), one party to the dispute abstains from voting."

The veto thus can not interrupt the procedures which the Council undertakes in view of the pacific regulations of conflicts but these procedures are limited only to inquiries, mediations, recommendations. The conciliatory function is never paralyzed by article 27 but only the executive function, the power of action properly so called, which, however, is the most important and the newest of those which are confided to the council, the keystone of the system.

disposition of the Charter. The dangers are foreseen; they are evident. It has been noticed also that in establishing the veto for the exclusive benefit of the five Great Powers, the Charter is clearly anti-democratic because it does not give representation to the middle-sized or small powers. It is possible to reply to the critics of this procedure by pointing out that the right of veto does not exist because it is written into the charter, but that it is written into it because it exists in fact, whether one like it or not. It is impossible to conceive that the organization of the U.N. would institute an action if one of the super Powers, the United States or the U.S.S.R. for example, were opposed to it or would not support it. It is just, they add, that the "Great Powers who actually ought to support wholeheartedly the decisions of the Security Council, should have more to say than the others and should be able to refuse to engage in, for example, an action against such or such, since it is they who, eventually, must furnish the majority of the troops, the material, and the necessary funds for this action."¹⁵ The bad effect of this is evident: in the case where four of the Great Powers would be obliged against their will collectively to accept a decision because a majority in the council, formed by the vote of one Great Power and six middle sized or small nations, would have decided it thus.

For ourselves, who are neither criticizing nor defending the dispositions of the Charter, but are simply attempting to determine the present stage of an historical evolution, it is clear that the right of veto permits a state, accepted by the international community as its permanent member, to substitute self-interest for a tendency to common interest in the very exercise of its activity as a member. In the same way the soldier or functionary in time of action, would be authorized to direct himself according to his private interest, to substitute it for the common interest, yet without losing the rights and advantages which their *function* confers upon these individuals.

Moreover, the right of veto equally permits a Great Power

¹⁵ Jacques Gascuel, *Ce qui est La Charte des Nations Unies*, Paris, Fazard, p. 28.

to withdraw from international control the actions of a friendly or allied power. It is sufficient for the Great Power to shield its ally before the council and thus paralyze any action which the council would like to take against it. A power placed in the top level of the international organization and entrusted with the most important member functions, thus receives the license to commit an asocial act, since it evades all international recourse, and to make asocial every act of a friendly or allied power which it chooses. The rights which classical sovereignty conferred on each state become thus the peculiar property of only five of them, but with this aggravating circumstance, that these states are the five pillars of society. The present edifice of peace has a keystone, the Security Council. But is it truly a keystone or simply a void left at the top of the edifice by the survival of absolute sovereignty for the benefit of the five powers?

Yet it is not a taste for paradox which forces us to add that if by this overt breach at the peak of the edifice of peace, the same calamity as in 1914 and in 1939 falls once more upon humanity it will only have the appearance of war. A conflict will be above all the bloody manifestation of a need for political unity towards which the international community is in irresistible travail. Formerly the aspiration toward unity and toward political order caused the feudal stage to disappear and grouped men into the framework of the state and under the aegis of its sovereign power. As a result sixty to eighty independent and sovereign societies exist side by side in the world. At the present time only five truly sovereign rulers remain within the framework of the Charter. And if a struggle arises which throws them into opposition to one another it would no longer simply be a case of decrying their imperialism or their hegemonic ambitions, whatever may be the part that these sentiments might play in setting the scene for the catastrophe. It would be necessary to understand that beside these passions, and at times even stronger than them, there was being manifested the aspiration of the international

community towards unity and towards a certain form of political government.

Would this movement be in the hands of one single power? If that should be the case, the days of this new order would be numbered, for it does not appear that any power today is able by itself, to administer the interests of civilized society. Will this new order be pluralist and organic, and in this case what forms will it take? The future alone can tell.

V. THE IDEA OF JUSTICE AND THE PACIFIC ORDER

We have arrived at the conclusion that the dialectics of war and peace corresponds to no fundamental or natural law of political life. It is tied in with the structure of the international community and its origin is at once sociological and historical. War, however, is accompanied by a series of moral problems. The idea of justice especially is one of the principal focal points of its dialectic, for justice has fixed in the conscience of states the attitude of counting war among the number of their rights. As a consequence the speculations of the moralists are concerned with the subject of war. Hence we will attempt to examine rapidly the changes which war undergoes in the minds of men in the measure in which the structure of international society is modified.

1. *The Idea of Justice and its Shortcomings in the Theory of a Just War.*

"Is it permitted to wage a war?" "Yes, provided that the war is just." From this brief dialogue of theologians with their consciences, from the time of St. Augustine to our own days, the theories of war have issued. But of what justice are they speaking? Tradition is constant on this point; they speak of that justice which the public power has the responsibility of maintaining on earth. For this reason the moralists place two conditions essential for war. The first is a formal condition;¹⁶

¹⁶ From the point of view of the philosophy of law, as from that of juridical sociology, we understand by form the element which gives to an act or a norm, etc.,

the war must be decided by public authority. The other envisions the object or matter of war: ¹⁷ an injustice must have been committed for which war alone can make reparation.

Here is the point of departure for their speculation, an initial position which could be called both static and subjective. On the one hand we have noted, in accord with Regout,¹⁸ that the traditional doctrine considers the conduct of only one of the antagonists and inquires about the justice of his undertaking. On the other hand it is concerned with the state; it

social determination, which manifests it as known, agreed upon, considered, desired, executed by society. The matter is, in this same act, the element which receives such determination. This matter is raised to the order moral economics, to the physical order, etc. For example, the moral rule: "Thou shalt not steal," is a matter which society accepts and, by considering it and expressing it according to its own fashion, gives to it the form of law. Starting from this moment, the rule no longer exists only as a moral or national precept which speaks to the conscience, but also as a social rule or juridic precept which has application under this new form to the citizens and to the jurists, etc.

¹⁷ The Moralists, regardless of what development each one of them gives to the doctrine, all take for their basis the common principles which are found already posed in a concise but definitive manner by St. Thomas. In citing this author we shall reproduce these principles in order to clarify the pages which follow. "For a war to be just," he says, "three conditions must be present: (1) the authority of the prince on whose command the war is waged; (2) a just cause, that is, those against whom one fights merit to be fought by reason of a fault; (3) the right intention of the belligerents to favor good and to put down evil." (*Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 40, a. 1) Leaving aside this third condition which is entirely foreign to war and concerns only the belligerents and their psychological attitude, if we consider war in itself we see that it is constituted by two elements even in the doctrine which morals inspire and not that which sociology does: the formal element of the authority of the prince and the just cause.

This latter is an objective element, one distinct from the intention of the belligerents, extrinsic to the authority of the prince and independent of it. It is an element of fact; an injustice, a fault has been committed, the order has been troubled; a *casus belli* exists. In the social phenomenon of war it is the material element, the state of fact whose restoration is desired. On the contrary, the intervention of the prince, of the social authority, is the formal element. The problem thus caused is that of authority, of competence, of the titles which the power can claim in order to act as a rightful power.

The first condition never needed much explanation in the eyes of the Medieval authors. It is evident for them that the prince has the task of protecting his subjects against disorder and injustice, against the danger arising from within and from without the state.

¹⁸ Regout, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

considers it in its relations with its subjects their happiness and their security, in its rights and duties in their regard. War is not at all a solution, an outlet for an international problem. It is imposed upon the state by the fulfillment of its duties towards its nationals in seeking to become a guarantee of the rights of the state. If it is alleged that the state alone can decide upon recourse to arms, this is done by denying this right to the private individuals who are its subjects, rather than by attempting to justify the right of the state or to examine thoroughly the foundations of this right. With regard to war, the state is in a sort of formal "original justice." But it seems that the Scholastic authors did not pay as much attention as would have been expected to the fact that their conception of authority and public power exceeded the exclusively static and subjective point of view. They did not realize, apparently, that the formal condition which they set down for the justice of a war was open to a far wider interpretation.

According to them the authority of the state is founded on the necessity of the common good, and they do not hesitate to invoke this necessity in the case of war; it is the modern view of the common safety, and instigated by the one in charge of the common good. For them, however, the common good has a universal scope. It is not circumscribed by the territorial limits of a state. The area of application of the authority charged with procuring the common good extends as far as the social needs of man, his economic relationship and the ties which they create. Hence if this authority is exercised by a determined state within the limits of its territorial frontiers, the political power, of itself overflows this framework. The state is called upon by its very nature to regulate the relations born of the most extensive human sociability. It can thus be said, without paradox, that once the premise of the common good is admitted, it is no longer a question of justifying a world-wide or supra-national and superstate authority; it flows from the premise. This individual state is the one which must render account of the appropriation of authority by its hands and of the historical or local determinations which that authority

receives. If it has been long dispensed from the need to furnish this justification, it is because the common good has for a long time remained practically enclosed within the limits of the state; the system of juridic protection which it instituted sufficed for the individual.

But, by the very force of logic, the universalism included in the doctrine was perfectly clear to the theoreticians of a just war in spite of the fact that they never drew an argument from it. It is not absent from the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas; it was present in his incomplete and overly concise theory of the universal common good as the ultimate norm of a just war.¹⁹ In the 16th century, Vitoria made it perfectly clear: the ultimate norm for him is the common good of the universe, both from the formal and from the objective or material point of view. We must rise to the authority of the *orbis* to find there the formal foundation of the state's power to declare war.

The universe (*orbis*) has the fundamental authority in view of assuring its own common good, an authority which can be exercised only by the princes for the act of coercion, which is war. "If the state," he adds, "has over its nationals this power (of inflicting death upon them or of punishing them, when they have injured the community) we can not doubt but that the universe possesses it over every pernicious and evil man; but this power can be exercised only by the princes."²⁰ Hence the state which makes war does not act in virtue of a peculiar power which it possesses, as an attribute of sovereignty or by reason of being a state, but as an organ which must have in view the good of one greater community of which it is a part. "Since a state is a part of the ensemble, and even

¹⁹ Undoubtedly, in the first place, St. Thomas has in view the necessity of defending and developing the national well-being, but this immediate goal of its very nature is extended to include the obligation of causing justice and prosperity to rule in the whole human community. St. Thomas insists that the justification of war for him rests in: "the defence and safeguarding of the common good," "of the common good" such as St. Thomas understands it, encompassing the order, the true peace, the good, the "virtuous" life of the citizens. This *bonum commune* is the goal of the state; to protect it and increase it is the task of authority.

²⁰ Cf. de Solages, *La Theologie de la guerre juste*, Desclee de Brouwer 1947, p. 65.

more profoundly a Christian province, a part of the whole of Christendom, if a war is useful to a province or to a state but to the detriment of one universe or of Christendom, I believe that by this act the war is unjust."²¹

Thus Vitoria, in studying the problem of public authority and the foundation of public power, realized that he must look toward the *orbis*, toward one human community superior to the state. But this conception, after the time of Vitoria, will escape, almost entirely, the thought of the moralists. The formal justice of war will have its principle in sovereignty or rather in the character of a perfect society which the theologians recognized in the state.

Actually this orientation is already manifest in the contemporaries of Vitoria, and notably his Italian confrere, Thomas de Vio, Cardinal Cajetan. Cajetan was usually absorbed in his work as a commentator, to which he brought a supple intelligence and an indefatigable logic. For him, except in the case of defensive war, which raises no problem, war is essentially an act of vindictive justice. In his mind, that is why it falls within the province of the state; it is the state's right to restrain and to chastise. He did not teach, as Vitoria did, that the state exercises, as an organ, a power which belongs to the universe, to human society, and for this reason can influence and punish, in addition to its own subjects, all the members of a world-wide community; rather he saw the power of the state rise from the fact that it is a perfect society and should be self-sufficient. Therefore, he reasoned, it must be able, of itself and by its own means, to deal with those who disturb the peace of its subjects. Without the right of punishing its own people and foreign princes, the state would be very imperfect and would lack what is essential to its nature: *valde esset imperfecta et deficeret*.²²

The state's right, Regout justly notes, is conferred on it "by its own authority in view of the number of rights and duties that a 'perfect state' enjoys in order to protect its own well-

²¹ *De Potestate Civili*, no. 13.

²² In II-II, q. 40, a. 1.

being and to maintain public order—which would be wrecked if crime were not punished.”²³ The right to punish, he observes again, “is not conferred on the prince by a common temporal authority, but it comes to him from his own power, from the very nature of the ‘perfect state.’”²⁴ Doubtless the sovereign state must obey a superior law; it acknowledges the moral and rational order decreed by natural law, but it is not caught up in the network of obligations associated with that community on which it would naturally be dependent.

Cajetan died in 1534 and so he never knew the works of Vitoria; the *De Potestate Civili* dates from 1534-35, the *Relectiones* from 1539. What would the tireless commentator on the text of the *Summa* have thought of an orientation so different from his own, yet proceeding with more fidelity to the principles of the common Master?

Suarez did know the thought of Vitoria, and takes a place with him among the founders of international law. But it is undeniable that the international community which he conceived has lost its organic character; the world (*orbis*) no longer possesses any proper authority, as in the time of the Master of Salamanca. International law, which for Vitoria was a law decreed by the international community, for Suarez partakes of the nature of a contract, and there is room left for theory of the sovereign state, for the terrible *tete-a-tete* of aggressor and victim, offender and offended, which, is the doctrine of sovereignty, is a “right” for the aggressor. Let one apply to the relations of states a text like this one and it will be found to be very close to some of the terrible applications of the theory of sovereignty. “A wrong done to someone else does not give me the right to avenge the victim unless he himself can defend himself justly and in point of fact does so, for then my help is a collaboration in a good and a just act. But outside of this disposition of the victim, it does not matter who can not interest himself in the victim’s affairs. For the offender is accountable to no one, except the one offended. As a result,

²³ Regout, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 125.

the opinion of certain men that sovereigns have the power of redressing injustice all over the world, is absolutely false; it confuses all order and every distinction of jurisdiction. Such a power has never been bestowed by God, and reason can not demonstrate it.”²⁵

It is evident how the field of research in the formal justice of war has progressively narrowed. It is just that war be decided by the public authority, but this authority is that of a particular state. Its power is not at all a derivation or determination of that of the human community; rather it flows from the character of perfect society that the state recognizes; it is a form of its jurisdictional power. Only the state that is a victim of aggression possesses this jurisdiction over the aggressor. Surely, this chain of deductions should not obliterate from notice that beautiful page of the *De Legibus* where Suarez speaks of the universal society of men. Nevertheless, if the logic of his system is understood it leads to a remarkable divisibility of peace and war. It would make ineluctable the conclusion that the day after the invasion of Belgium and Holland by Germany, the latter was accountable only to these two countries, that she had to answer only to them, that she fell under the direct jurisdiction of the two victims only, so that to intervene in their business, even now compromised, in the name of universal justice, would have been to disrupt every order of jurisdiction. Even Suarez himself doubtless would never have conceded this; he would have found in his consciousness of universal solidarity reason to proclaim, this time, the utter indivisibility of justice, peace, and war. But it must be noted that his doctrine, so logical in appearance, is strangely divided against itself on this point. Of the two voices with which it invites thought, one leading to absolute sovereignty of the state, the other heading towards solidarity, the stronger is the former. It leads to the admission—and here the greatest moral theologians leave his company—that all war is formally just when it is declared by the sovereign state, and the con-

²⁵ *De Caritate*, Disp. XIII, sec. IV. No. 3.

science of the subject who obeys it can find appeasement in this formal argument.

To return to Suarez, it is clear, as he said, that no one is bound to correct injustices all over the world. The king of England has nothing to do with French territory: the king of France is supreme there. There has been a division of responsibility among the states, and they are bound by it in their mutual dealings. This does not preclude a general order in the community of nations; such a community has its own proper authority, intended to establish order and have it respected, whether it acts through its proper organs, or whether the states assume a more or less conscious support of it. This much, and the indivisible order of peace and war, reason can demonstrate.

Once having adopted the point of view which, for lack of a better term, we have called the "state point of view," and the subjective point of view of the belligerent, Cajetan and Suarez were led on to complete their theory of the justice of war by a paradoxical fiction. None of the medieval or modern writers—not even Vitoria—avoided the temptation to connect war with the judiciary function. War, in their writings, seems always to be the result of a litigation which could have been determined through the application of law and through the offices of a judge. This is because they had too static a conception of international relations; and how could it have been otherwise since they took the state and not international society for the point of departure of their speculation? The state screened their view and prevented them from seeing the whole juridical order.

The state is an arrested formation; it is conscious of its personality and of its rights. Its relations with others are defined juridical relations. The judge will be the supreme regulator. But who will be judge? The state itself, judge and party in its own case, since there is actually no superior authority who can decide the quarrel. We know that in the last analysis Vitoria gives this power to the "authority of the whole of the universe."²⁶ But with Cajetan and Suarez the idea of the perfect

²⁶ De Solages, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

state society has progressed too far for them to refer to the universe, and so they encounter the difficulty which every doctrine based on the organic idea of the universe avoids.

For them, the authority of the state which becomes the judge of others, has its formal source in the character of the perfect society that they themselves recognize, but the same principle that establishes its right likewise establishes the independence of the others. Sovereign and "perfect" states are all equal; how can it be arranged that one should submit to another as to his judge? (Let us note in passing that this question provides the transition from the formal point of view of authority and sovereignty to the objective or material point of view of an international community.) By what right have the other members of the society of states been made to submit to the authority of one of their equals, momentarily superior? *Ratione delicti* is the answer. Cajetan had already calculated that if "before war two nations were on an equal footing, by the very fact that an injury has been inflicted, and because vengeance is demanded, the independent prince becomes the superior of his adversary."²⁷ Suarez elaborated on and refined this theory, which for long remained the classic theory. And so, for having refused to recognize the existence of an organic community of nations, one is forced to admit the existence of some fictional community, whose band is morality, and whose existence the misdemeanor reveals. In brief, where one would see neither society nor law, but instead the individual and the contract, one is forced to appeal to morality to replace the organic public law that is no longer possible. This can be done only by reverting to a fiction.

Ingenious as it may have been, the theory was otherwise useless, particularly since another explanation, in conformity with sociological and juridical reality, was ready at hand. If there were disorder and injustice present in international society, it was up to international society to punish and remedy it. But it is a standing phenomenon of the life of societies, that if the

²⁷ Regout, *op. cit.*, p. 127,

organs necessary to the accomplishment of some function are defective, those members most affected by the defect are impelled to make up for it. They dilute themselves, one might say; under the spur of necessity they substitute for the weak organ, which would have acted in their favor. Society, implicitly or explicitly, recognizes this substitution, showing thereby that in its eyes there has been no usurpation of power, but a functional replacement. When Vitoria wrote that the universe possesses the right to punish those who disturb international order but that it makes use of particular states for this end, he recognized the organic character of the international community and also established the basis of functional substitution: the belligerent state acts by substitution, and the foundation of the power it uses is not to be sought in its own sovereignty or in the nature of perfect society, but in the organic function it is filling and, in the last analysis, in the principle of international authority.

To the formal justice of war there corresponds a material justice; once the one who has had recourse to force has shown his title to do so, it remains to consider the objects on which he will use his power. Under the first aspect, war is deemed just if the power that sanctions it is one of law; under the second, war is considered just if it pursues a legitimate end. The first question establishes the right to war, the latter limits the range of application of such a right. This is what is called in the terminology of the traditional doctrine, the just cause: war must have for its end the reparation of wrong or the protection of right; justice is the only object permitted to belligerents. The question comes up again: what is justice? We have no wish to undertake here a textual study that would be irksome because so often attempted. Let us merely note the two divergent positions that are found in the moral tradition, one determined by the role given to the notion of the common good, and to the organic conception that flows from it, the other by the accentuation given to state sovereignty.

We know already the role of the idea of the common good in St. Thomas' doctrine on war. The necessities of the common

good confer on the prince the right of making war, and the common good is equally the end he has in view; the formal and material justice of war both have their principle in the common good.²⁸ The same is true of Vitoria; the end of war, in his system, overrides the precise reparation which unleashes it. Behind one injustice, he sees the order of all justice that has been violated; the end of war is "the peace and security" of the commonwealth, the "defense of the public welfare," not only of the state injured, but of the whole universe.²⁹ To the degree that an improper interpretation of state sovereignty has obtained, justice and law are restrained. Since it is by reason of an injustice suffered that one state becomes the judge of its adversary, it follows that only the individual laws of the state in question provide it with reason for a just war and only they are protected by this international institution.

Since its character of "the perfect society" establishes the sphere of authority of the state which has become the judge of its attacker, that authority does not extend, materially, beyond the circle of its own laws. Here again, the international community is despoiled to the benefit of the sovereign state. Just as the authority required to place force at the service of order by means of a just war passes from the universal community to the individual state and ends by becoming confused with sovereignty of the latter, so the matter of just war becomes restricted to the defense of the right of the particular state.

What place will social justice, which is concerned with the common good of the society of peoples and states, have in this conception of justice? What will be the place of distributive justice, which the community in its decrees, its political, economic, social, and cultural systems will assure to the state some participation in civilized life, in proportion to its needs, services,

²⁸ Regout, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

²⁹ "Very explicitly and in a manner that agrees with his conception of the whole social order of the world, he concludes that a war, which would be just if only the injustice that occasions it be considered, may be actually unjust when the grievous repercussions that it will have on the common good of the state, or of Christianity in general, or of the world in general are considered." "All these terms he explicitly distinguishes: *De Potestate Civili*, q. 13, p. 112," de Solages, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

and the possibilities presented by international society? Actually, the idea of justice seems to be destroyed.

Moreover it even becomes impossible to define the rights of the states. Consequently, the application of justice in the relations of the individual states, the narrow base on which it was hoped to at least establish peace, is compromised; peace, already crippled by the absence of the two complementary forms of justice, loses even the prop that has been left it. If peace rests on the respect of the rights of sovereign states, it is necessary that these rights admit of definition. But they can only be defined as the function of the human community because its rights pertain to jurisdiction over powers bound up with its own functions, and those of the state refer to a juridical order which exceeds the state. To make of the right of a state an absolute, as the doctrine of sovereignty tries to, is to transform into absolute rights which are relative and which, united to the functions of the state, are conferred on it.

This is the paradox illustrated by so many examples from political and diplomatic history; that within the framework of public law based on the sovereignty of state, the rigorous search for justice leads to war, but peace results from compromise on the law. It may be useful to take an example. Suppose two states are disputing about a certain territory. On one hand, the sovereignty of one is equal to that of the other, the right of each, if recognized, is absolute, and one State must expel the other. On the other hand, the theory of sovereignty furnishes no criterion by which to settle the assignment of the disputed land. A less general argument, foreign to the nature of the state, must be invoked, borrowed either from some historic circumstance or from some expedient of the moment. Today the ethnic criterion is invoked, or a criterion of economic need, or military security, or historic right, criteria altogether contingent, lacking all character of necessity. In times past there was a state of rights resulting from succession, or from marriage, or from a free gift, or from a promise of exchange; borrowed from private right, these arguments owe their apparent precision to private right. Assuredly, discussion between the sover-

eign states affords no principle that affects both parties equally, none that brings about their reconciliation under a common obedience to its law.

In point of fact, the controversy is distorted beginning from its point of departure. Not the rights of the state, but rather its functions should be the first consideration. What is first is not the right of the state to possess a territory in which its language is spoken, nor even the right of populations of the same ethnic character to form a political unity; what is first is the human right, superseding any state, to live as men and to insist that their government, whatever it may be, give them leave to do so.

The rights that the state exercises over any determined territory are not for the support of the state and its attributes, but for the good of men. Not only those who happen to live in the territory are involved, but also all those who, thanks to international exchange, can claim to benefit from the contribution made to international life by this particular population. To award a territory to a certain state is not essentially a question of deciding between the rights of two states. It is a matter of effecting a distribution of state authority within the international community, of assigning a local seat for the exercise of power. This power has its principle not in the territorial state but in a superior social being wherein must be sought the source for the justice of this distribution of power.

2. *Justice and the New International Order.*

In order to fulfill the demands of justice and of peace, today we must look outside the states themselves for the ultimate foundations of the juridical order. It is this necessity that, consciously or unconsciously, contemporary international organization obeys.

The change manifests itself in war before it is imposed in peace. We have heard it repeated, as a commonplace, that the last world conflict was a revolution more than a war. This seems to be so but, in speaking thus, we are thinking not only of the social disturbances which it brought about within each

state, nor of the changes it provoked in the relations between classes, ruining some, favoring the advance of others to positions of control. There is another and perhaps more important phenomenon; in many countries, certain social groups participated in the war, less out of obedience to their governments than to follow the currents in which their states were moving, in order to favor the social and ideological interests which were properly international. From this point of view, one can say that the forces necessary to states to carry on war, were not entirely in their hands, and this because they were essentially revolutionary, even though the state knew how to seize and utilize them for victory. War has ceased also to be a political and military conflict between states and has become a specific phenomenon of human society, which has served the states, inasmuch as the latter have made use of it.

It goes without saying that this state of affairs is accentuated in peace. Will anyone say that in the international organization which is operating today the state loses its power, that its force disappears? One would think quite the contrary; the more social human life becomes, the more necessary it will be to confine the social mass within the boundaries set by some coordinating power. Thus it is not the power of the state which is being diminished, but the independence which made it believe in its sovereignty.

In the measure in which its functions increase, its organic character reveals itself at the heart of the international commonwealth. The workings of federalism, which are multiplying today, do not dismantle the state, but they do dull the point of its sovereignty. More even than the League of Nations, the United Nations encompass as states in a network of juridical relations and constitutes a system of departments entrusted to appropriate bodies. Also, the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Council of Safety look after the united interests of the member states and exercise the social functions of the new political collectivity. At the same time, in increasing solidarity of the states forces them to accept a hierarchy which not only corresponds to their

degree of power, but also to the inequality of their responsibilities and the diversity of their functions.

Besides, another effect of the phenomenon of socialization is becoming apparent; the greatest mass of international relations is not constituted by the mutual relations of states, but by those which multiply themselves between their members. They spin the political, economic, social, and cultural web of an international society which is developed without the intervention of states, or at least without their exclusive initiative or complete benefit. They seem on the contrary pressed down, overpowered, commanded by the "necessities," the "interests," the economic or ideological "currents," the source of which is not in themselves, which surpass them in extension, which maneuver them from within as well as orientate their free decisions. They submit to the sociological law which applies to every organic body; members of a common civilization, they do not lose their power of decision and their moral personality, but like every organ, they live the life of the whole at the same time as they live their own life.

The international law and the charter of the United Nations reflect these changes. That their relations may be peaceful the states undertake to found them on the rights of the peoples, and to this effect they propose to favor universal and "effective respect for the rights of man and basic freedoms for all, without distinction of race, sex, language, or religion," as well as "the raising of the standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress." Like the "Special Institutes" (art. 57), they are called upon to represent the common interests which make their way into the economic and social domain, into that of public health, of intellectual culture, and education; they will embody them and will speak for them; they will insert them into the juridical order, referring them in particular to the Economic and Social Council and to the General Assembly of the United Nations. These rights and these interests do not have their source in the state, but in man and in civilization; they are not realized merely within the

framework of the state, but in that of a properly human society.

It is in order to protect these rights that the states set themselves to co-operate, both conjointly and separately, with the organization (art. 56), and that those which are not members of the United Nations accept, e. g., the Treaties of Peace signed in 1947 in which the signatories assumed the obligation of "taking all the necessary measures to assure to all persons under their jurisdiction, without distinction of race, sex, nationality, or religion, the enjoyment of the rights of man and the basic liberties, which include freedom of expression of thought, freedom of the press and of publication, freedom of worship, freedom of opinion and of reunion." In a similar vein, the Commission on the Rights of Man, in its opening session, was assigned as its field of labor the elaboration of recommendations concerning an international declaration on rights, of international declarations or covenants relative to civic liberties, to the condition of woman, to free information, to the protection of minorities, and to the prevention of distinctions based on race, sex, nationality, or creed.

And so, it is in the human commonwealth, and no longer merely in the states that international juridical order seeks to lay its foundations. It is on man and on the institutions of civilization, and no longer on the states alone, that peace is attempting to build its edifice. Certain states continue to play an important role in this construction, that of organs and agents. We mean those, for example, which give juridical form to the institutions of which we have just spoken, and which guarantee their functioning; these are the agents which execute all the international obligations, which remain a dead-letter without their good-will. But in all this, they are the organs and the interpreters of the human commonwealth in the course of organization; they are the functionaries of peace and this peace is no longer realized only in their limited sphere.

We must take account of this evolution in order to define the task of justice. It is easy to envisage it on an abstract and theoretical plane and to say, as we have already said, that the

whole juridical order rests on the foundation of a tripartite justice: that which subordinates the members of the international community to the demands of the common good, that which assures to each of these members in the ranks of the community a written law and the possibilities of life proportioned to its particular condition and the conditions of the group, and finally that form of justice that we readily call inter-individual (reserving for the first two the name of societal) because it assures respect for those rights which the state, in its relations with its equals, derives from its own nature. However this view, while it is fundamental, is still theoretical. The difficulty in the practical order comes from the necessity one finds of defining these rights so as to make them claimable and to give society its concrete juridical order.

The spirit of justice is a spirit of rigor. At one time, with the moral personification of the state and with the theory of sovereignty—or with that of the state as a perfect society—political thought and juridical doctrine could believe that it was in the presence of a subject whose rights could be deduced logically from an invariable and unquestionable premiss, the very nature of the sovereign state. We know today what was the part of illusion in this belief; states exercise functions and functions flow from rights, but the functions themselves vary with the development of international society. Furthermore, the total juridical order, necessary for peace, also has for a fundament the rights of individuals, and of groups and communities which are not states, but belong more to the economic, social, or cultural order than to the political. These are the fruits of the development of international solidarities; they reflect the historical and contingent conditions of civilization. If one speaks of rights in regard to these—and the organization of international society demands it—one must, in order to define them, rise to some more general principle, for example, to that of human sociability and the common good.

There will be no difficulty, in these conditions, in recognizing that, while peace is, today as always, the fruit of a triple justice at a time when the frames of the modern world are cracking

under the pressure of a more universal social life, the first and principal fundament of peace is social justice. This, moreover, is the will to submit to the demands of the common good and to recognize the hierarchy of social aims, subordinating the inferior collectivities—and here we mean the states—to the more general and more universal. The particular aspirations of individuals, groups, nations, and peoples must be conformed to the necessities of the common good, and not only because altruism invites us to this course, but because social justice imposes it upon us. This justice develops the significance of international solidarities, and binds their constraints, which are sometimes heavy, to the most lofty ideal, that of the general welfare of a humanity living in peace. The unification towards which humanity visibly tends is not only a material fact, the result of the multiplication of the bonds of interdependence among people, but it also shows itself in the domain of conscience. This unity is taking shape under our eyes, in spite of the appearances afforded by a world torn to pieces. But it must have a moral element, and this is furnished by the idea of the common good, which unites men and groups in the pursuit of a single goal that is more and more lofty and finally embraces the whole of humanity organized in society.

Social justice is not alone in unifying the world conscience. Love or charity works with it. But of these two it is justice that fills the more specific role. For love attaches itself to persons, and under that aspect is not formally the cause of international peace. This is the tranquillity of social order, and social order is a state of justice objectively realized in the ranks of the community. It is again through the intermediary of the common good that love contributes most directly to peace. In order to love all men at one time one need only love them in the well-being of a civilization which conditions the life, happiness, and spiritual progress of each of them. Peaceful nations are those that find in themselves the will to submit to the demands of social justice and enough generosity to practice love for humanity.

It is thanks to social justice and the love of the common good

that the individual conscience reaffirms its supremacy, and the worth of the single individual definitively prevails over that of the collectivity, in which one might have believed it drowned. To the degree that civilization extends the dimensions of the collectivity in which man is placed, it seems that he must stifle under the weights of impersonal social interests. To tell the truth, the danger of suffocation and ruin is inseparable from civilization and the social and juridical order. This last is a work of technicalities; it uses a ponderous apparatus, whose inner workings function slowly and with many imperfections. On the other hand, the zone in which the human person can effectively defend his liberty is confined, it seems, in a closed shop, a municipality, a province, a state, but the individual today is not only in conflict with a local society, on frontiers close to home and well-defined, nor merely with the state, the Leviathan which he became accustomed to resent and to vanquish in the course of the 19th century. He is come to grips with a world, the organization of which is all the more unwieldy as it contains more elements still undecided and shrouded in mist. The individual feels himself powerless, when he is being pressed down by international forces or interests, and he is ready to believe himself carried away by a social determinism which does not exist, but to which his avowal of statism has given birth.

Meanwhile, the individual retains his supremacy. He does not manifest it by opposing himself successfully to this world society but, if one may so put it, by going beyond it because he understands and appreciates the justice of it. It would serve no purpose to take up again here a liberal theme, and equate the individual with society, that is, with universal society; the pretention of establishing such an equilibrium is vain and false in principle. But each of us can understand and love the welfare of humanity, and for this reason, one who ventures to overrun it lifts himself above the historical collectivity. He oversteps it, but without separating himself from it nor failing to understand it; he remains present to it by his knowledge of its laws and by the personal approbation which he gives to the justice

which underlies its demands. He surpasses it because he knows and understands it, refers it to an ideal on which he judges it, not as one revolting against it, but as a good artisan who renders his services according to the plan of the architect, even though he himself did not conceive this plan.

The unity of the world conscience is veritably manifest simultaneously on two planes: outside of ourselves, in civilized society, thanks to the social standing which justice and love of the common good give to the international collectivity; in each one of us, because the understanding of the total common good and the love which we bear it carries over into our own beings the order and the peace of the universe.

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THOMISM AND THE NEW THEOLOGY*

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THAT World War II would bring with it, not merely great changes in the material fortunes of many nations, but also radical changes in the world of thought, was something which could have been foreseen by a glance at the history of human thought throughout the ages. Even before the outbreak of hostilities it was evident that the great civil universities of Europe were in the grip of philosophies which were anti-Christian in character, derived as they were from Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Engels. Once the frontiers of Europe were opened for inspection after the liberation it soon became clear that a new factor had arrived on the scene. This was a new philosophy, difficult to define, even by those who taught it, but nevertheless of great influence, especially in France. This new philosophy was given the name of Existentialism. Now, it is also a fact of history that few philosophies come into being without having an influence, sooner or later, on the science of Theology, and so it was natural that the theologian should wait, with a certain degree of apprehension, the result of the impact of these philosophies, especially Existentialism, on Catholic thought. This was even more important in the present case, since a flourishing school of Catholic existentialists already existed in France and in some other countries.

By the year 1946 controversies in several ecclesiastical reviews made it quite clear that the apprehensions were more than justified.¹ In that same year, in the course of two Allocutions, one to the General Chapter of the Friars Preachers and the other to the Jesuits, the Pope himself made some references to

* This article was written and accepted for publication prior to the appearance of the recent papal encyclical, *Humani Generis*. Hence, the author makes no reference to that important document but his article gains significance in the light of the Holy Father's words.—Ed.

¹ Cf. M. Labourdette, O. P. "La Théologie et ses sources," *Revue Thomiste*, 56 (1946), 353-371, and J. Daniélou, "Les orientations présentes de la pensée religieuse," *Etudes*, 249 (April, 1946).

what he called a "new theology."² He pointed out that, while questions hitherto in dispute among Catholic theologians were still important and by no means to be neglected, nevertheless, the modern problem which confronts all theologians, no matter to what "school" they belong, is the defense of the very foundations of the perennial philosophy and theology, foundations which every intellect calling itself Catholic both recognizes and venerates. The very centre of the problem touches upon the intimate relations between the human intellect and that faith which has been revealed to man by God. How far is the intellect capable of penetrating into those truths in order to deduce from them, by a process of reasoning, other truths which are connected with them? Above all, what is the value of such conclusion? In his Allocution to the Jesuits the Pope mentioned the new theology by name: "There is a good deal of talk (but without the necessary clarity of concept), about a 'new theology,' which must be in constant transformation, following the example of all other things in the world, which are in a constant state of flux and movement, without ever reaching their term. If we were to accept such an opinion what would become of the unchangeable dogmas of the Catholic Faith; and what would become of the unity and stability of that Faith?"

In spite of these words of warning so solemnly delivered by the Vicar of Christ, discussion and controversy still continued, and on the twenty-third of November, 1949, the spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset, speaking to a packed audience in the Barceló cinema, Madrid, declared that European Idealism as a philosophical system had been overcome and superseded by another and a more modern system, so too had Aristotelianism. He then continued: "I am able to announce to you that the Roman, Catholic, Apostolic Church is about to relinquish both Aristotelianism and Thomism; and that a new theology is being forged which is in close relationship with that of the Greek Fathers."³

² Cf. *Act. Apost. Sed.*, 38 (1946), 384-388.

³ Reported in *YA*, 24th Nov. 1949.

In spite of all that has been said and written about this new theology there is still no very clear idea of its basic doctrines, even though several of its chief proponents are now well known to us all.⁴ The historical centre of the movement is in France, with some repercussions in other countries, such as England and Spain, where the movement has been hailed as *the* contribution of this century to modern thought. However, the partisans of this new theology make it very difficult for us to detect their basic doctrines, for the simple reason that they do not seem to be very interested in constructing a definite system or method of theology. Rather they spend most of their time and energies in attacking the old traditional system, their basic argument being that it is to the advantage of the Church in modern times to adopt more modern methods of approach, and especially modern philosophies, in order to present the truths of the faith in a way which will appeal to ordinary people. In order to make their position clearer we shall endeavour, in the course of this article, to study some at least of the main doctrines put forward by these new theologians, especially those which seem to have some connection with the warning given by the Holy Father in his two Allocutions already mentioned.

The term "new theology" has, as we shall see, no very fixed content. The phrase can mean something which all Catholic theologians worthy of the name must reject, or it can be applied to certain tendencies which, although they may be dangerous if carried too far, may occupy a legitimate place in Catholic theology. One thing however is quite certain, namely that this new movement can not be separated from what M. Maritain has called the "New Christianity,"⁵ which according to him is bound to make itself felt in the present age, and which will be characterized by an attempt to bring the doctrines of the Church into line with the times in which we live. We might

⁴ Cf. Br. de Solages, "Pour l'honneur de la Théologie," in *Bulletin de Littérature Ecclesiastique*, 48 (1947), 65-84, in which the names of the principal supporters of the new theology are given.

⁵ Cf. J. Maritain, *Humanisme Intégral*, pp. 139 and 146.

say of the new theology that it attempts to form one of the integral elements in the new christianity. The partisans of this movement are preoccupied with the "man in the street" as we know him today. He has to be won over to Christ and to the true Church, and yet he has been brought up on the basis of a rationalistic and idealistic philosophy which has effectively sealed his mind against any approach along the old traditional lines. Scholastic philosophy will never make any impression upon him for the simple reason that he does not understand the terms and the concepts which it uses. The same must therefore be said of a theology which makes use of the traditional Scholasticism for its presentation or development. That is the real problem which confronts the theologian of today, and the whole question at issue between the new theologians and the traditional Thomist is how it can best be solved. Confronted with this problem the partisans of the new theology have attempted a solution, but that solution is proposed in two very different ways which can not, by any means, receive the same criticism, as we shall see.

Both solutions imply, even if they do not state it in so many words, the rejection of the Aristotelio-Thomistic philosophy as a fitting instrument for use in theology and its substitution by other more modern forms of philosophical thought. One solution has, however, gone too far, and has denied the scientific value of those deductions made from the revealed principles of the faith with the aid of reason as an instrument. The earlier writings of Fr. Chénu and Fr. Charlier contain a summary of this extreme solution. According to Chénu, the source of all theology is the vital life of the Church in its members, which can not be separated from history, the deciding factor in all theology. Thus, strictly speaking, theology is the life of the members of the Church, rather than a series of conclusions drawn from revealed data with the aid of reason. Charlier added to this statement the conclusion that the strict theological deduction as the result of a scientific use of human reason is therefore impossible, since it would suppose that reason could attain to a true understanding of the truths of

faith. Theology, as such, is therefore reduced to a simple explanation of revealed truth in terms which need not necessarily have a permanent value, but which can, and indeed should, change with time and according to the demands of circumstances. This doctrine was far too dangerous to pass unchecked, and in 1942 the Holy Office banned the writings in which it appeared.⁶

In spite of this condemnation and the strong warning of the Holy Father in the Allocutions already mentioned, the same type of solution was proposed in a slightly more benign form in articles in Reviews and especially in some of the publications in the series, *Sources Chrétiennes* as well as in the Collection *Théologie* and *Unam Sanctam*. Once again the subtle attack on Scholasticism was evident, and it would be as well to point out at once that the focal point of this attack was not merely Thomism as such. There are different theories on certain matters pertaining to theology inside the Church and many things are open to free discussion, but up to the present all systems have attempted to base their solutions and conclusions on the solid rock of the perennial truth. It is that very foundation, wherever it may be found, which is under attack from the new theology. At the same time, the main enemy is, as always, Thomism, partly because it is the one system which has a completely coherent philosophical basis, and also because many other systems existing in the Church today are not entirely free from the taint of humanism and even of nominalism. This fact becomes very clear if we compare two articles written on the subject of the new theology, one by Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange in *Angelicum* and the other by Fr. Perego in *Ciencia y Fe*.⁷ The former sees the new theology as a dangerous innovation which strikes at the very roots of the faith itself, and which is, therefore, to be condemned. The latter, while by no means agreeing entirely with this new system, tries to lay much more emphasis on the reasons for its appearance at this point in the

⁶ M. D. Chénu, *Une Ecole de Théologie*, Le Saulchoir, 1937; L. Charlier, *Essai sur le problème théologique*, 1938.

⁷ *Angelicum*, 1946, pp. 126-145, and *Ciencia y Fe*, 1949, pp. 7-30.

history of civilization. The aim of the new theologians is primarily apologetic, i. e., an attempt to approach the modern mind by a direct use of modern methods, adapting for that purpose philosophical terms and concepts which are in more common use among present-day philosophers in an endeavour to break down the prejudice against Scholasticism and all that it implies. This divergence in the criticism of the new theology shows us more plainly than anything else the difficulty of obtaining any clear notion of what is really implied by this movement, a difficulty which is increased by the fact that many of those theologians who do attempt to criticise this new movement are themselves followers of systems which have departed from the clear lines of true Thomistic thought.

Thus it is clear that the main contention of the partisans of this new movement is that theology, to remain alive, must move with the times. At the same time, they are very careful to repeat all the fundamental propositions of traditional theology almost as if there was no intention of making any attack against it. This is very true of such writers as Frs. de Lubac, Daniélou, Rahner and Br. de Solages, all of whom are undoubtedly at the very centre of this movement.

Their main accusation seems to be that traditional theology is out of touch with reality because it takes little or no account of modern methods and philosophical systems, and thus fails in its main object, i. e., to present to the modern world a reasonable explanation of the doctrine of Christ. This is especially true, in their opinion, of neo-Thomism, which is a sterile movement, destined to have little or no effect on the modern world. As one of these theologians expresses it, "*Quand l'esprit évolue, une vérité immuable ne se maintient que grâce à une évolution simultanée et corrélative de toutes les notions, maintenant entre elles un même rapport. Une théologie qui ne serait pas actuelle serait une théologie fausse.*"⁸ According to such teachers traditional theology, with its foundations in Aristotelianism, has lost during the centuries which followed St. Thomas, a mass of notions, ideas, and even methods of expounding the faith

⁸ H. Bouillard, *Conversion et Grace chez S. Thomas D'Aquin*, pp. 219, sq.

which were well known to the Fathers of the Church, some of which have been taken over by the leaders of contemporary non-Catholic thought. Such ideas and methods must be recovered if any approach is to be made to the modern world, and they must be incorporated into theology, even if that means rejecting Aristotelianism or even Thomism as we understand it today.

The partisans of the new theology accuse the defenders of the traditional methods of being ignorant of that dramatic world, the human individual with all his anxieties and experiences, while they wander about in a world of the abstract and the speculative. St. Thomas himself—so they assert—were he alive today, would be the first to recognize the importance of a new method of approach, and so would do all that he could to find one which would bring Catholic teaching into the foreground once more. Small wonder then that the traditional theologians have made a counter-accusation against the new theology that it has its philosophical basis in idealism and in voluntarism, being descended in a direct line through Plotinus, Bruno, Kant, Schelling, and Hegel in the remote past, and from Von Humbolt, Nietzsche, Weber and Heidegger in more recent years. Perhaps such a statement takes the criticism of the philosophical angle of the new theology a little too far, but certainly it would be quite true to say that the partisans of the new movement are seeking their metaphysics outside Thomism, and with bad results up to the present.

It is perfectly true to say that St. Thomas himself was the author of a "new theology"; one glance at the history of Thomism from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries is enough to justify this remark. It is also true that Thomism, far from being a dead thing, is necessarily vital, in the sense that much progress is made and new light is continually being thrown on the mysteries of the faith by means of the theological conclusion strictly so called, that is to say, from one premise containing a revealed truth and another which contains a truth known for certain by human reason. St. Thomas would have been the last to assert that Thomism had reached its term with

the last of his writings. On the contrary, he himself was always on the lookout for new angles of approach to the many questions which needed solution in his own day. However, the position taken up by the adherents of this new theology is far different from that which St. Thomas adopted. Perhaps we shall be able to see this a little more clearly if we consider for a moment the position they adopt with regard to revelation.

When God speaks to man and communicates to him divine mysteries it is the fact which is revealed, and not the logical proposition in which that fact is presented to us. Consequently, very different philosophical systems can and indeed should be used to express that divine revelation and to explain it to the people for whom it is intended, who are not all theologians by any means. The supernatural virtue of faith which is given to us by God in order that we may believe the truths which He has revealed is essentially a vital thing, part, that is to say, of our lives, and as such it can not be separated from the age in which we live. Only in a very secondary way is it concerned with those formal propositions under whose form the faith is presented to us. Faith will thus give birth to theology, because the truths of faith are expressed in words and concepts taken from philosophical systems, but since those philosophies will naturally tend to evolve according to the needs of the times it follows that theology too will be in a state of constant evolution. However, the real progress in the development of revealed truth is to be found, not in the use of philosophical terms or logical propositions and reasonings, but in an ever growing penetration into the truths of faith by a deeper and more vital Christian life.⁹ Since the life of the individual as a Christian and a member of the Mystical Body can not be separated from the age in which he lives, it will be natural and even necessary to adopt the terms and the concepts familiar to modern thought in order to express the truths of faith in such a way that they will be intelligible and attractive to those outside the true Church who are groping their way towards the knowledge and the love of God.

⁹ Clearly, this is very closely allied to Blondel's definition of truth as *adaequatio realis mentis et vitae*.

Such, very briefly, is the position taken up by the new theologians with regard to the relation between revelation and theology as a science; and to our way of thinking it outlines a problem which will have to be faced by all theologians, and especially by Thomists. Needless to say, such a position, like most errors, contains a germ of truth, which makes it all the more dangerous. That divine revelation is, above all, a communication of certain divine facts can have a perfectly legitimate meaning for the orthodox theologian, and above all for the Thomist, but to make such a statement the basis of a theological system which derides (there is no other word) the theological conclusion, is a very great mistake. However, it is not, by any means the only mistake made by the partisans of the new theology, because their root error goes ever so much deeper, consisting as it does in a false interpretation of the relationship between faith and reason. To go too deeply into this question would lead us further afield than the purpose of this article warrants, but at the same time a brief statement of the Thomist position in this matter will help to bring out even more clearly the implications and the dangers of these new theories.

St. Thomas' view of this problem of the relation between faith and reason which gives rise to the science of theology was both deep and clear and is admirably set out and defended by John of St. Thomas.¹⁰ Theology is a true science, indeed it is the most noble of the sciences, worthy in every way of the name of *sapientia*. The principles upon which it relies in its evolution and in its investigations are those divine facts which have been revealed by God. However, as a science, those divinely revealed principles do not form its proper object, that is the rôle of the conclusions which are drawn from them with the help of human reason. Such a statement, which seems so clear to us now, was a real revolution when it was first made. The object of the *science* of theology is the theological conclusion strictly so called. Now, in order to deduce these conclusions

¹⁰ *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 1; cf. John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Theologicus*, in loco.

from revealed truth there is need of a fitting instrument with which to work. Sometimes this instrument takes the form of another revealed truth, while at other times it is a truth which is known to human reason by its own unaided efforts. Now, obviously, the minor premise which contains another revealed truth will have far greater influence on the conclusion than one which contains a truth known to human reason alone. But, and here is the crux of the whole question, even though the human truth occupies an inferior position, that of a mere instrument, the revealed truth in the major premise does exercise a great influence on that human instrument. That is why St. Thomas speaks of these natural truths which are so used in theology as the "handmaidens" of that science, in the sense that theology, as a true science, makes use of these human truths for its major purpose, which is to explain revealed truth in human language, so far as that is possible.

The position of the new theologians is very different from that of Aquinas. Their idea is that the theological reasoning consists in using the revealed truth in order to draw out the full latent content contained in the human truths, the contrary, in fact, of the Thomist position. This is a logical conclusion which follows from their vitalistic attitude towards truth and especially from their statements that the theological conclusion strictly so called has little or no value.¹¹ It also follows from their teaching with regard to the evolution, necessarily connected with contemporary history, through which theology must pass if it is to remain alive and to play an effective part in the modern world. As one of the partisans of the new theology expresses it, "*L'histoire manifeste donc à la fois la relativité des notions, des schèmes où la théologie prends corps, et l'affirmation permanente qui les domine. Elle fait connaître la condition temporelle de la théologie et, en même temps, offre aux regards de la foi l'affirmation absolue, la Parole divine qui s'y est incarnée.*"¹² Thus the human reasoning which changes according to the dictates of its historical evolution and the

¹¹ Cf. the two works by M. Chénu and L. Charlier already quoted in note 6.

¹² *Conversion et grâce chez S. Thomas D'Aquin*, by Henri Bouillard, p. 221.

necessities of the times, uses the permanent element, which is the divine truth, as an instrument to develop and present its latent content.

Thus the central problem which confronts us here is quite simply one of two contrary ways of considering the relation between revelation and reason. Either reason is the instrument in the development of revealed truth or the revealed truth is the instrument of reason. It is our opinion that, unless the fact which we have mentioned before of the great influence of the revealed truths on the natural truth which is used as an instrument in their full development is understood and clearly brought to light, then this fundamental error in the new theology will never be completely overcome. For that reason it is useful to notice that the same conclusion could have been reached by a consideration of the rôle of the middle term in the theological syllogism, which in one case—that of the major premise—is a revealed truth, and in the other minor premise, a truth of human reason. In order that this middle term in the minor premise may have exactly the same sense as that which it has in the major premise, thus avoiding four terms in the syllogism, it must of necessity have the “approval,” as it were, of the revealed truth. If we examine it carefully we shall see that it is just this approval which gives to the theological conclusion its full force as an element in the expression of divine revelation and which also brings to light the rôle of human truth as an instrument in theology.

We know that, according to St. Thomas, the instrument has a double activity, i. e., its own, which is attributed to its personal activity in the forming of the effect, and also another power which it receives from that cause which uses it as an instrument. Thus, in the theological conclusion we are not dealing with a series of probabilities, but with strict conclusions in the form of judgments which correspond to the ontological truth virtually contained in the revealed principles. This doctrine has been very clearly expressed by John of St. Thomas, when he said: “*Praemissa naturalis consideratur dupliciter. Primo secundum quod praecise naturalis est, et sic ex hac parte*

*non concurrat nisi ministerialiter. . . . Alio modo consideratur praemissa naturalis ut conjuncta praemissae supernaturali de fide, scilicet ut ab ea elevatur quia approbatur et corrigitur ab ipsa, et eius certitudinem participat: et hoc modo etiam praemissa naturalis concurrat non principaliter, et per se, sed sub altiori lumine.”*¹³

From all these various angles we reach one and the same conclusion, namely that it is the truth of faith which plays the active part in the theological process of reasoning, using the natural truth to develop the latent content in revelation, and using it as a strict instrument in the Thomist sense of that word. For this reason those theological conclusions are more certain than any merely natural truth could ever be, because they are reduced, in their final analysis, to a higher principle than natural reason, one which is supernatural and divine, which colours all that is human in the theological process, giving it a new and a supernatural value. It is this divine element in theology which unifies everything, even the speculative and the practical aspects of it.¹⁴ Because the new theology has failed to appreciate this truth with regard to the theological conclusion it has also failed to realize the rôle of the merely human truth as an instrument of faith.

Clearly, these principles have a very great importance when we come to consider the attacks delivered against Thomism by the partisans of the new theology. Far from being a mere development of rationalism, as they assert, Thomism is, at one and the same time, realistic and objective in its outlook. For this reason the present Holy Father, in an address to the assembled students of the seminaries, institutes, and colleges of Rome, both seculars and regulars, stressed once again the teaching of the *Deus Scientiarum Dominus*, as well as that of the *Code of Canon Law*, and then added: “Be full of devotion, therefore, blessed sons, and of enthusiasm for St. Thomas: bend all your efforts to grasp his lucid doctrine, embrace wholeheartedly whatever clearly belongs to it and is safely regarded

¹³ John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Theologicus*, I, q. 1, a. 6.

¹⁴ Cf. John of St. Thomas, in I, *Disp.* 2, a. 10.

as essential to it.”¹⁵ In the light of such clear direction from the Holy See what are we to think of the action of these new theologians who wish to substitute for Thomism the terms, concepts, and principles of a new and fluid philosophy which, as they themselves confess, will pass in the course of time as others have done before it? To quote once more the words of one of the new theologians, “*Quand l'esprit évolue, une vérité immuable ne se maintient que grâce à une évolution simultanée et corrélative de toutes les notions, maintenant entres elles un même rapport. Une théologie qui ne serait actuelle serait une théologie fausse.*”¹⁶

Does it not also follow from what we have said above about the theological conclusion and the place in it of the human element that, when the Church uses certain philosophical terms in her dogmatic definitions, she is really exercising her infallible judgment with regard to the value of such terms to express the inner meaning of divinely revealed truth? She is in no way subordinating herself to those terms, as some seem inclined to think; on the contrary, she is using them to express her meaning, and so they no longer belong to the purely human or natural order, but receive a supernatural approval from those very same divine truths which they serve to express. That is the main reason why we, as Thomists, insist on the perennial aspect of the philosophy of Aquinas, something which will remain and be a vital element in the world long after other systems have faded into history. Speaking of this aspect of Thomism, M. Maritain says: “It can, therefore, claim to be abiding and permanent in the sense that, before Aristotle and St. Thomas had given it scientific formulation as a systematic philosophy, it existed from the dawn of history in germ, and in the pre-philosophic state, as an instinct of the understanding and a natural knowledge of the first principles of reason, and ever since its foundation as a system has remained firm and progressive, a powerful and living tradition, while all other philosophies have been born and have died in their turn.”¹⁷

¹⁵ *Act. Apost. Sed.*, 31-245.

¹⁶ Henri Bouillard, *Conversion et grâce chez S. Thomas D'Aquin*, p. 219.

¹⁷ *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 100.

We are now asked to accept, in exchange for this solid foundation, the fluid concepts of a new philosophy, destined to change with time—we are told—like everything else in this fluid world. This, to our way of thinking, is not merely unreasonable but also very dangerous.

There are certain basic philosophical concepts which cannot be abandoned without danger to our faith. St. Thomas saw this very clearly in connection with certain notions such as that of subsistence as included in Conciliar decrees and definitions, in particular those of the Second Council of Constantinople. It is absolutely necessary to retain this metaphysical concept in exactly the same sense in which it is understood by the Thomist, as the foundation of the psychological and moral personality if we are to hope to avoid falling into the heresies of Nestorius and Eutyches. We are not told what is to happen to these ontological notions and concepts were Thomism to be abandoned in favour of a new theology and philosophy, but we can guess! For that reason we can not accept the statement of the new theology that such metaphysical notions included in Conciliar decrees have no permanent value, and can be substituted by others without any danger to the abiding principles of the faith itself. Thus, speaking of the notion of formal cause as introduced into the decrees on Justification in the Council of Trent, Bouillard says: "*On se demandera peut-être s'il est encore possible de considérer comme contingentes les notions impliquées dans les définitions conciliaires? Ne serait-ce pas compromettre le caractère irréformable de ces définitions? Le Concile de Trente, par exemple, a employé, dans son enseignement sur la justification, la notion de cause formelle. N'a-t-il pas, par le fait même, consacré cet emploi et conféré à la notion de grace-forme un caractère définitif? — Nullement. Il n'était certainement pas dans l'intention du Concile de canoniser une notion aristotélicienne, ni même une notion théologique conçue sous l'influence d'Aristote. . . . Il a utilisé à cette fin des notions communes dans la théologie du temps. Mais on peut leur substituer d'autres sans modifier le sens de son enseignement.*"¹⁸

¹⁸ H. Bouillard, *Conversion et grâce chez S. Thomas D'Aquin*, pp. 221-222.

This doctrine alone would be sufficient to justify scepticism with regard to the new theology and its fundamental tenets, because we should not forget that we are being asked to substitute for the clear metaphysical notions of Aquinas the fluid concepts of modern philosophies, and it is very difficult indeed for us to see how that can be done without harm to the unchangeable doctrines of the faith. A simple application of what has been quoted above about the notion of the formal cause to other concepts such as those of relation, person, nature, and substance as they are to be found in the writings of modern philosophers only serves to increase our sense of apprehension. However, we shall leave this point for more detailed and positive criticism on another occasion, but before doing so a word must be said about the connection between the revealed truth as such and the formal proposition of that truth, i. e. the dogma of faith.

That there is an intimate relation between the revealed truth and the dogma as proposed by the Church for our belief is something which is perfectly clear to everyone. However, it is evident that the new theologians have misunderstood that relationship, or at least have fixed their attention on one aspect of it to the neglect of others. The logical proposition is related to the mystery of faith which it expresses just as the logical assertion is related to the thing which is stated in it. In other words, so far as the Church is concerned the dogma is only the external expression in words of her intimate judgment of revealed truth. It is a proposition expressing a truth and formulated by a Teacher who is infallible in things which pertain to faith or morals. Therefore the logical expression in words of any truth of faith is something more than a mere external expression of Christian experience (that is the modernist view); it is the act of the official teaching Church. It is very important not to forget this fact.

Insofar, then, as the dogma is contained in a logical proposition, it is something complex; whereas the mystery itself which is proposed for our belief is something simple. This means, in actual practice, that we do, in fact, believe the

mystery which is proposed to us, not the logical proposition, but at the same time, that proposition is the medium through which we believe the mystery, and therefore it must express that mystery adequately, especially when it is proposed to us by the infallible Church. This doctrine is nothing more than an application, not of logical formulae which have no real meaning, but of common sense. The formal, logical proposition has no value except as an expression of the inward thought. Simple examples of this fact could be given in abundance, but one will suffice. The phrase, "man is a rational animal" is a logical proposition which is expected to express in words the nature of man. If one agrees with that proposition he can do so from various aspects. To any Christian that phrase should imply that man is a composite being, made up of two parts, the body and the soul. But the proposition could also be subscribed to by a rationalist who does not believe in the soul at all, as a spiritual entity. Are we, therefore, to say that both the Christian and the rationalist believe in the same basic reality behind the words of this logical proposition? By no means. In other words, the phrase "rational animal" must have a very definite philosophical content which in one case is agreed to and in the other is denied. It is our contention that the same thing is true with regard to those basic philosophical concepts which are connected with certain Conciliar decrees and definitions, and which must be retained in their full metaphysical meaning if the faith is not to have, as its basis, shifting sand instead of firm rock!

We have already observed that it is very difficult to give a systematic outline of the doctrines of the new theology, and that for several reasons. In the first place, the partisans of this movement are far too occupied with their revolt against traditional Thomism to spend much time in the building up of a system. Moreover, they are very shy and elusive, so much so that it is often difficult to diagnose this tendency in any particular author. Anyone who has read the works of Fr. Ives de Montcheuil, especially chapters nine and ten of his *Leçons sur le Christ*, will be able to appreciate something at least of

this difficulty. For that reason it is neither possible nor indeed quite fair to attempt to give a complete list of authors who may be regarded as partisans of this new movement. Rather we have to be on the watch for tendencies, hints, obscurities, many of which are admirably hidden behind a smoke-screen of statements which seem, at first sight, to reflect the pure traditional theology, but which in fact do nothing of the kind. This is very noticeable in such writers as Frs. de Lubac and Daniélou. From even a brief glance at their principal works it is at once clear that they are at pains to hide anything which might be regarded as new or startling in their expositions under the outward appearance of complete agreement with all the traditional formulae of theology. They claim to be among the most faithful disciples of St. Thomas whose main task is to set his doctrines in the framework of history. Their works abound in quotations from the writings of Aquinas, although some of his principal commentators are conspicuous by their absence! They recognize, without exception, the full Catholic doctrine with regard to the supernatural nature of such elements in the spiritual life as grace, the beatific vision, the gifts of the Holy Ghost, and the infused virtues, but they differ very much from the Thomist position in their exposition of the whole relationship between the natural and the supernatural. This difference can be clearly seen in their treatment of that very difficult question of the natural desire for supernatural beatitude, especially as it is outlined in Fr. de Lubac's now-famous book *Surnaturel*. We are not concerned here with a complete criticism of that work because that has already been done by authors far more competent to judge of its merits and de-merits than we are.¹⁹ Our task is somewhat simpler in its scope, because it is concerned with the foundation which lies behind the doctrine expressed in that book.

As a preliminary observation it should be noted that it is not correct to say that St. Thomas makes only rare use of the word "supernatural," a statement, by the way, which is by no

¹⁹ Cf. the admirable article by C. Boyer, S. J., "Nature pure et Surnaturel dans le Surnaturel de P. de Lubac," *Gregorianum*, 18 (1947), pp. 379, sq.

means exclusive to Fr. de Lubac. The truth of the matter is that both the word itself in its full meaning and also the synonyms for it occur frequently in the writings of Aquinas, especially in the *Summa*, the *Quaestiones Disputatae* and in the single question *De virtutibus in Communi*.²⁰

Far more dangerous and false, however, is the interpretation which de Lubac gives to this term "supernatural" and which he attributes to St. Thomas, i. e., that it is not used in direct contrast to "natural," but rather to signify anything which lies over and beyond the merely natural powers of any creature. This definition, apart from the fact that it is not even etymologically correct, lies at the root of all the teaching contained in this book. Obviously, with the aid of such a definition, in which "supernatural" really means "superhuman," the author is able to find in St. Thomas' teaching justification for his theory that there is, in the natural order, an inefficacious but *absolute* desire for the beatific vision of God face to face and as He is in Himself, since man has no other ultimate end but this vision, in the present order. Since this desire is natural, and therefore something which is placed by God Himself in man's human nature, it does not have the effect of making God depend on man (for it is His free gift), nor can it produce in us any right to the beatific vision, to grace, or the infused virtues. Thus the gratuitous nature of these gifts is saved, but at the cost of not a little effort on the part of the author.

There can be little doubt that a theory such as this, especially if it is carried to its logical conclusions, does tend to destroy the complete distinction between the natural and the supernatural, in spite of all the author may say to the contrary. It also seems clear that, even if this explanation of the meaning of the terms "natural" and "supernatural" preserves what we may call, for want of a better term, the "juridical" gratuitousness of grace, the infused virtues, and the beatific vision, it is very difficult to see how it can preserve at the same time their theological and ontological gratuitousness. In order to

²⁰ Cf. for example, Art. 10 of this Question, also the articles by R. W. Meagher in the *Clergy Review*, Jan. 1948.

appreciate this point, which is all-important in this controversy about the nature of the new theology, it is necessary to see clearly what is implied in the *absolute* desire of which de Lubac speaks.

Since he has given us the usual traditional meaning for the inefficacious desire, i. e., one in which the means to attain it are lacking in nature, we may presume that, when he speaks of such a desire as being absolute, as opposed to conditional, he is also using that term in its traditional sense. An absolute desire, then, is one which is concerned with some good which is in proportion to the nature, such as the desire which the soul has after death for reunion with the body, or the desire which a blind man can have for the sense of sight. Even though *per accidens* such a desire may be incapable of realization in fact, it is not therefore a vain desire, nor does it cease to be natural. Bañez, with his usual penetration and clarity of thought, explains this, and defends the doctrine that such a desire is natural in spite of the fact that it either can not be, or may never be, realized at all.²¹ The reason he gives is both simple and conclusive. Since such desires have been realized *de facto* in certain individuals of the species, they can be lawfully desired by others of the same species. Some persons have, in fact, the gift of sight, and so it is natural for a man born blind to desire that gift, even though there may be no power in nature which is capable of giving him that gift. Such is the usual explanation given to this term "absolute desire," and it is the one which Fr. de Lubac seems to accept. In that case, there is only one conclusion which can be drawn from his opinion, namely, that, although juridically the supernatural under all its aspects is a free gift of God, nevertheless, man can still have a desire for the face to face vision of God which although inefficacious, is still in proportion to his nature.

Now, it should be kept in mind that Fr. de Lubac in thinking about a desire which has for its object not God, as the Author of Nature, but as He is in Himself, something which is of its nature supernatural. Nor are we able to defend this

²¹ Cf. Bañez, in I, q. 76, a. 1.

opinion on the grounds that he is speaking of the natural power which is in all creatures to correspond with the activity of the First Cause, either in the natural or in the supernatural order, because such a *potentia obedientialis* is entirely passive, and thus on the part of the nature of the creature there does not and can not correspond to it any intention, tendency, inclination, or natural desire; it is a mere passivity under the Almighty Hand of God. If then this natural desire is to mean anything at all in the sense in which it is proposed by the author of *Surnaturel* it must surely imply that the end in view—the beatific vision—is, in some way or other, in proportion to human nature. It would appear that such an opinion does not, and can not, preserve effectively the complete distinction between the natural and the supernatural orders, and that consequently, it can not preserve intact the gratuitousness of grace, at least metaphysically. We can see Fr. de Lubac's point when he insists that, since this natural desire is in itself something which God has implanted in man's nature, it is a free gift and so does not force God to give man grace, at least juridically. But surely that is not enough to justify an absolute desire which may never be fulfilled? Also what are we to think of the state of pure nature? Are we to deny all possibility to such a state—a solution which would seem the only logical conclusion to be drawn from Fr. de Lubac's views? If so then we shall have to condemn not only such theologians as Bañez, John of St. Thomas, and Cajetan, but also Aquinas himself.

This is not the place for a detailed discussion of the true meaning which must be given to this natural desire for beatitude as expressed in the writings of St. Thomas. There is an admirable study of this question by Fr. Manuel Cuervo, O. P. which, to our way of thinking, expounds the only explanation of it which will answer all difficulties and objections. Our purpose is somewhat easier to accomplish than that, because we are only concerned with this matter insofar as it provides a medium for some of the basic teachings of the new theologians. The more one reads of their writings the more clear it becomes that they have little positive to offer, and that their main

objects are to discredit the Scholastic tradition and to replace it with modern systems. For that reason their writings are directed towards demonstrating that, even in Aquinas, we can find the same basic evolution in doctrine, together with the fact that he, too, is tied hand and foot to the problems, methods, and lines of thought of his time. For that reason, their main points of attack against Thomism deal with such things as the exact nature of Theology as a science, with special emphasis on its practical aspect in relation to modern philosophical systems, especially the existential philosophy of Heidegger, Jaspers, and Gabriel Marcel, nature and super-nature in all its aspects, and finally—perhaps the most discussed question of all, and one which is full of traps for the unwary—the evolution of theology in the light of history. Thus, for example, in his book on *The Drama of Atheistic Humanism*, Fr. de Lubac seems to imply that, as against the attacks of Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche, and Comte, the true prophets of a genuine return to Christianity are to be found among such writers as Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky, who alone are capable of understanding the contemporary world in which they lived. I suppose that, in our own day, he would claim that role for a Barth or a Berdyaev rather than for any Catholic philosopher, tinged with the Scholastic tradition! Speaking of Péguy's writings and influence he says: "May that be primarily the endeavour of those among us who are believers; may they show themselves more at pains to live by the mystery than eager to defend its formulas or impose the hard outer crust of it; and the world, impelled by its instinct to live, will follow in their footsteps."²²

However, it must not be supposed that the only ones the new theologians have any respect for are the modern philosophers; they are also very fond of the Greek Fathers, and in this they have done a great service by making simple translations of their main works available in French. However, the purpose behind that action was not quite as innocent as it may seem at first sight, as we can see from the introduction to the *Collection* written by Fr. Daniélou. There it is plain that the idea first

²² *The Drama of Atheistic Humanism*, by Henri de Lubac.

mooted a century ago is still active, i.e., that there are two different currents in tradition, that of the Latins and that of the Greeks. The view of the new theologians is that the Church will have to get back to the methods of the Greek Fathers, especially to those notions which have been taken over by the modern non-Catholic philosophers, notions and terms which, so they maintain, the Church has lost through being tied excessively to Thomism in all its forms.

First of all, the doctrine of the "two currents" in tradition is gradually losing favour, owing to the serious criticism directed against it by Froget and Galtier. Also it is not very obvious that the modern world really has adopted anything from the Greeks with the possible exception of the "eclecticism" of Clement of Alexandria. Nor is it at all certain that the Church would gain by a return to either the methods or the terminology of the Greeks at the expense of Thomism. In some cases, the method of approach adopted by the Greek Fathers led them into difficulties which were not solved satisfactorily until the time of Aquinas. We have a typical example of this in their approach to the whole question of the Blessed Trinity. Their method was that of the earlier *Symbola Fidei*, the order of which they followed exactly in their catechetical instructions, being more concerned with proving the divinity of each Person rather than with questions affecting the unity of Nature. This naturally led to the difficulty of explaining in any satisfactory way how it is that, while the Father is called the Creator in the Creeds, still the Gospel of St. John, speaking of the Son, says, *Omnia per Ipsum facta sunt*.

Also, since the doctrine of appropriation was little known to them, it followed naturally that they had great difficulty in explaining the common action of the three divine Persons in all the *ad extra* operations. It is interesting to notice that some of these very same difficulties have already reappeared in the writings of the new theologians, especially in certain questions related to the indwelling of the Blessed Trinity in the soul. Really desperate attempts are being made to establish some personal relationship of each divine Person to the individual

soul in the state of grace, based on some peculiar operation of each Person. Some have not hesitated to speak of a "hypostatic union" between the Holy Ghost and the soul in grace, a statement which, apart from its theological absurdity, has already been refuted by Aquinas and by John of St. Thomas! Who dares to suggest that a general return to these methods would be to the advantage of the Church in modern times?

Everything points to the fact that the most desperate battles between the new theology and traditional Thomism will be waged in the fields of apologetics and mystical theology. Our generation has already witnessed great changes of method in the field of apologetics. Where before it was necessary to engage in active controversy on different points of Catholic dogma, nowadays the essential need is to bring home to the man in the street those fundamental truths which theologians call the *preambula fidei*, as well as the social teaching of the Church. This is particularly true in France at the present time, and undoubtedly accounts for the preoccupation of the ecclesiastical authorities there with new methods of approach to all those souls under their care, many of whom have no active religion, even though they may have been baptized in the Catholic faith. In England the same basic problem exists, but viewed from a slightly different aspect, namely, that of the possibility of some kind of cooperation between the various protestant sects and the Catholic body. A glance at the recent correspondence in the *Times* on the subject of "Catholicism Today" shows that there is a growing realization of the power of the Catholic Church, together with a vague feeling that something should be done about it. As one leader-writer in the *Times* puts it, "There is a widespread demand from Protestants and from some Catholics for a renewal of exploratory discussions on dogma and worship, though there certainly does not seem to be sufficient agreement between the Churches' views on their rights and jurisdiction to justify formal negotiation."²³

The Holy See has recently issued a directive on this matter

²³ Cf. *Catholicism Today*, a collection of the correspondence mentioned above (Times Pub. Co., London, 1949).

which serves to make certain essential points quite clear. We shall have to wait some time before we see any definite results. However, all these problems have brought to the front rank of controversy the arguments put forward by the new theologians for a change in the apologetic method which will serve to bring it into line with the needs of the moment. Some theologians have sought to use this argument as a justification for the adoption of terms and concepts taken from contemporary philosophies, not all of them existential in character. Others have shown their sympathy for the movement by a reaction against what they term "too much Scholasticism" in the normal method of approach, not seeming to understand that any attempt to find a common basis for discussion between Catholics and their opponents must have, as its starting point, certain clear-cut notions and definitions. Any other method is bound to lead to confusion sooner or later, and will thus only serve to widen the gap between us instead of bridging it. The notions of modern philosophies other than the Neo-scholastic are anything but clear and well-defined; it is for that very reason that they have found their way into the modern systems, being left vague deliberately. The real difficulty behind all this lies in the fact that most people outside the Church suffer from an almost complete incapacity for logical thought. Their basis for argument is sentiment rather than reason. What is not so generally recognized, however, is the fact that this incapacity is a direct result of those modern philosophies which we are now asked to adopt and to baptize—an impossible task. How can we ever expect to reconcile a materialistic philosophy, with its theories of the dependence of the spiritual on the material with Catholic thought in all its branches? Or, to take a more modern example still, how are we to bring together the extreme voluntarism of the existential theories and that basic intellectualism which is part of our Catholic spiritual formation and our Thomist tradition?

We are perfectly willing to grant that new methods must be developed which will meet the needs of our time, but we are not prepared to admit that there is any need to go outside the

traditional Thomism to discover those methods. Just as the true Scholastic tradition is much more easily understood if it is related to the general history of thought, so modern philosophies must be studied in relation to modern history. Although metaphysical thought and truth is, as such, independent of time, the accidents of thought, such as methods of presentation and the particular difficulties which have to be solved, are certainly affected by history. The Catholic philosopher and theologian must be conversant with this "personal coefficient" of modern thought. He must be ready to prove that Thomism is fully capable of dealing with such modern questions, and also he must be able to combat the idea that Thomism is just an ingenious dialectic, manufactured in order to bolster up a particular brand of truth or an individual faith. If that were all that the new theology demanded then we would have no difficulty in agreeing with it. But that is not the question at issue as they who support this new movement see it. They wish to adapt modern philosophies in order to make them an instrument of theology for the expression of Christian thought, and it is this idea which has led them into a very dangerous position so far as the traditional theologian is concerned.

The Thomist position is simple. There are certain basic lines within which we must work, and those lines will be found in the traditional doctrines of Thomism, which is no mere speculative theology and philosophy, but one which is deeply rooted in all that is best and most lasting in human experience. One excellent result of the new theology has been an increase in the study of traditional Thomism from the historical as well as the theological point of view, with rather startling results as far as the new theologians are concerned, because they have occasionally found themselves defeated, and indeed at times utterly routed, on this, their chosen battle ground.

In the realm of mystical theology and spirituality there are vast possibilities for the development of the doctrines of the new theology and its method, and we can only conclude that such opportunities have not been grasped fully up to now because the attention of its partisans has been directed else-

where.²⁴ Mysticism tends to regard itself as essentially an experimental and a *posteriori* science, rather than an *a priori* one, and thus separates itself as much as possible from the supervision of dogmatic theology as such. We can expect to see this tendency increase rather than decrease, and there lies a very real danger which the traditional theologian must be fully prepared to meet.

Once spirituality is effectively separated from dogma, then any aberration is possible, as we know only too well from bitter experience. Every attempt must be made to bring to the fore those great mystical principles of Aquinas, fully in harmony with dogmatic theology and a logical consequence of it, in such a way that any attack along the lines we have just mentioned will be defeated before it has time to develop. Mysticism has always proved to be a fertile breeding ground for new ideas and modes of expression, simply because the mystic finds great difficulty in confining his experiences within the bounds of human language, especially the cold, hard terminology of dogmatic theology. Sometimes, indeed, these human expressions of mystical experience do not seem to fit into the framework of Scholastic theology, and when the theologian objects to them on those grounds he is told that the mystic *lives* these vital experiences, and consequently, is the person best qualified to express their theological content, a statement which is often far from the truth.

Sooner or later, then, we may expect repercussions of the new theology in mysticism and in writings on spirituality in general. Just as there have been new definitions of truth proposed from the vitalistic point of view, so we shall see new descriptions of grace, the infused virtues, and the gifts of the Holy Ghost. This applies especially to the virtue of faith and to its act, because of the intimate connection between them and the whole question of conversion to the true faith and with revealed truth as such. The traditional view which describes

²⁴ This does not mean to say that no attempt has been made to introduce these new theories into spirituality. Cf. for example, J. Daniélou, *Platonisme et Théologie Mystique*, also H. de Lubac, *Corpus Mysticum* (F. Aubier, Paris).

grace as a spiritual accident operating like a new nature which not only lifts man up to a supernatural level but which also forms the remote principle of all his supernatural activity is already being decried as too rationalistic, anthropomorphic, and unintelligible. Such attacks will continue, unless we, as Thomists, are prepared to bring out the real value of such concepts as applied to theology and show the permanent truth which lies behind them.

From the point of view of the Thomist, then, there can be only one valid method of defence against the inroads of the new theology, and that will have to come through a revival of all that is best in the Thomist tradition. If this new movement serves as a stimulus to bring about that renaissance—and there are already obvious signs of this—then we shall have no cause to lament its appearance at this period in the history of the Church.

Undoubtedly, this movement contains an element of truth, since *nulla porro falsa doctrina est quae non aliqua vera intermisceat*, and in that sense we must be prepared to learn from it. In the first place, every effort should be made to bring even the most sublime doctrines of the faith down to the intellectual level of all men, no matter of what creed, race, or state of life. This has been the great preoccupation of theologians throughout the ages, as witness the efforts of Justin, the Alexandrian school, Augustine, and Aquinas. Secondly, we have something to learn from contemporary philosophies, because all that they contain of truth is but a reflection of the one, supreme divine truth, and so can help us to penetrate more deeply into the secrets of revelation. They can also help us, especially if studied in relation to contemporary history, to understand the wounds from which the modern mind is suffering, and so provide the remedies more quickly and more easily. We must, as the Holy Father has told us, hold up a friendly hand to all, which does not mean that we must accept blindly all that these modern philosophies teach us, even less that we should reject in their favour the traditional Thomism; quite the reverse. We must learn to judge the findings and the postulates of the

moderns in the light of those perennial principles which come down to us as our greatest inheritance from the days of Aquinas. Obviously, the problem is one which needs a prompt solution if Thomism is to regain its place in the world of thought.

Both as a philosophy and as a theology Thomism is essentially a vital system which develops within certain well-defined lines. St. Thomas would be the first to support any such development, but not at the cost of the fundamentals on which the whole system rests. New methods of approach and new applications of the perennial principles can certainly be found within the framework of Thomism which, because of their basis in eternal truth, will stand the test of time. Thus, for example, it could be stated and proved that St. Thomas is the greatest of the existentialists, a fact which can not be denied and which becomes all the more clear once we destroy for ever the false notion that all he achieved was the "baptism" of Aristotle. He transformed the whole system of Aristotelian philosophy by giving to it the one unifying principle which alone could bring it to its full perfection as the instrument of theology. This unifying principle was that of existence, having its source in revelation, which shows us a God who is the transcendent, self-existing Being, who gives to all creatures everything that they have and are. Thus, there is no need to go outside Thomism to find a truly existential philosophy; on the contrary, the intellectual realism of Aquinas is the best antidote for the excessive voluntarism of the non-Catholic existentialists such as Kierkegaard and Sartre. Above all we need to bring to the fore the great principles of Thomistic metaphysics, with special attention to the question of the metaphysical method as opposed to the methods and the limitations of the natural sciences. In this way we shall be in a position to make it clear that Thomism is always in intimate contact with experience, since its principles are based on a rational interpretation of that experience, which means that it is tied to facts just as much as the natural sciences, but on a different level.

The picture of natural science as an exact demonstration based on observation, and of metaphysics as an affair of mere

words and abstractions, with little or no real meaning, a picture which has influenced the new theologians not a little, is altogether false. A glance at the proofs which St. Thomas offers for the existence of God is sufficient to show us how closely metaphysics is connected with the every-day facts of experience. Natural science, which is also concerned with these same facts, deals with them insofar as they are governed by certain stable laws, while metaphysics seeks to attain to some knowledge of their ultimate causes. Consequently, there will always be a constant element in the findings of metaphysics which will be true in all ages of the world's history. To state, as the new theologians do, that metaphysical systems must, of necessity, change with the times is to assert that this constant element in all human experience is really in a state of flux, a statement which is not only self-contradictory but also contrary to the facts as we know them.

We can all agree, I think, that the major problem of our day is not one of mere politics, or even of sociology. It lies in the field of the metaphysical, and ultimately in theology. However, we can not agree with the new theologians when they state that the only solution to this problem is the adaptation of the modern philosophies to a theological end, even though that might mean the rejection of Thomism. The vast majority of these modern systems seek a foundation in an exaggerated view of the importance of the individual and of the scope of natural science, together with a vain attempt to by-pass philosophical thought by the use of methods which, however useful they might be in natural science, are quite useless in the realms of the metaphysical. The struggle at the present time is one of the re-assertion of the rights of man in relation to the family, to society, and to God, and that struggle will only be won by a return to the clear synthesis of all that is best in man's thought which we call Thomism. It will certainly not be achieved by any hotch-potch adaptation of those modern systems which are the real cause of the whole crisis.

Our duty, vis-à-vis the new theology, is then quite clear. Not only have we to defend the basic principles of Thomism

wherever and whenever they are attacked, but also we have to present those principles in such a way that we re-educate our generation in the art of metaphysical and theological reasoning along those lines. These principles must not be allowed to stagnate, but should be brought up to date in their modern applications. If, to a certain degree, we have been careless about this in the past, there is still time for us to remedy the error, and if this task is faced with courage and determination, then we shall see Thomism make its full contribution both to the modern needs and also to those of God's Church.

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BOOK REVIEWS

An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy. By A. H. ARMSTRONG. Westminster: Newman, 1949. Pp. 222, with index. \$3.25.

With an easy style, indicative of the origin of the book in a series of lectures at the London Headquarters of the Newman Association, Mr. Armstrong writes a competent introduction to the ancient Western philosophies from Ionian Thales, traditionally the first, to St. Augustine on the threshold of the Middle Ages. It is well to note at the beginning that he is dealing primarily with philosophies, with philosophers only subordinated and to the degree that their personalities reflect some light on their thought; this is not a series of anecdotes but a preface to the history of early thinking. The development measures up to its expressed purpose, which is to trace out the core of philosophical evolution in European culture; philosophical and not theological, European and not Asiatic. Since these distinctions are sometimes non-existent in fact, especially after the proclamation of the New Law, a rational division must be imposed on the matter at certain stages. This is, however, indicated in the text and causes no difficulties. Within its boundaries the account is clear, complete and well unified.

To span the births and growths and decays of more than one thousand years in a subject as diverse in content and as diversely elaborated as philosophy immediately forces a major problem on the author who seeks a unified effect without misrepresentation. This author resolves the problem by a fine articulation of progressive influence and historical context, introducing each stage of the evolution with a brief, instructive analysis of the cultural milieu, the particular limitations and advantages of the period, the direction of practical and speculative activity at the time, and the peculiar aptitude or approach of the philosopher in question, wherever these factors make a suggestive frame for the thought itself. He concludes his stages by drawing off, as interpretive summary, the significant influences, the growth in concept, method and approach that will shape the subsequent extensions of intellectual progress, to make a well-woven texture of remote and proximate, direct and indirect causality. He supplements this emphasis on internal cohesion with one external point of reference, the conclusions of the Catholic Faith and the *Philosophia Perennis*, which are the common possession of the group he is addressing. This single, widely understood standard provides a convenient principle for a number of simple and illuminating comparisons.

The intent of the book is to give more than a sketch of the basic principles and conclusions comprising ancient philosophies. The book is an intro-

duction, and consequently designed to attract the reader to more intimate knowledge of the thought introduced. With Plato and St. Augustine, the author persuades the reader in the warmth of his own enthusiasm to turn to the great, classic, stirring texts. Aristotle he introduces less winningly, as necessary, indeed essential, but as though he does not expect cordial relations to develop. It is probably true that men are by nature either Platonic or Aristotelian and no strength or subtlety of argument or persuasion can alter these basic configurations. Yet since the genius of one flowers as the complement of the other, as the author notes, the interaction should achieve an enriching and mellowing of human thought more than sterile opposition.

It is historically interesting to wonder whether Aristotle himself succeeded in grasping the force of Plato's teaching. The negative conclusion is common enough, but not the easier to justify. For, if Aristotle did not bring to the Academy a mind superlatively penetrating and comprehending and if he shrank from twenty years' devotion to the living thought of his Master, if he lacked the 'pietas' that disposes the well-ordered disciple, our persuasions might well be bent by the textual criticisms. (True enough, in his later writings he fustigates some more gullish predecessors, but he does not fail in honor and reverence to those whose work paved the way for his own, least of all, to Plato.) Rather he followed the Master as long as he lived and taught, and held his friendship to the end. When, therefore, in the elaboration of his own thought, he departs from fundamental Platonic conceptions, does he reject them too harshly and to his own hurt, missing some vital connection, or is he only making the necessary intellectual incisions, painful by their nature, but required by honesty and for the good of the thought itself? At least, all the circumstances argue for the latter. Then, let the difficulties be solved another way. If we do not always see the force of his criticism, neither do we see the bent of the minds to which it was directed. If later writers have judged it too hard, perhaps they are assigning to Plato's words, from the vantage point of the development of centuries, a content he himself never knew.

On two lesser points, Mr. Armstrong's treatment of Aristotle's system is at least arguable. He accounts the principle of individuation, which Aristotle put in matter, for material individuals, as certainly inadequate and even contradictory, and goes on to say that St. Thomas had to make heroic efforts to present it in a reasonable and Christian sense, which puts the Common Doctor in the position of trying to save a bad thing. But matter, for all that it is purely negative, does not lack characteristics, which are, naturally, negative characteristics. One of these is that it renders form incommunicable, from which follows that indivision in itself which is the prime note of unity. Aristotle did not develop this principle to its perfection, as far as we know, but he seems to have hit the basic issue, and

certainly transcendent forms of individuals are of little help. As for difficulties in applying this principle to immaterial substances, there are none. Angels are unities by the same principles by which they are being, by themselves, without the need for introducing material principles into their order.

The second point in question is Aristotle's doctrine of the will. Mr. Armstrong indicates that he unnecessarily limits the object of deliberate choice to means and not ends in the VIth Book of the *Ethics*, while in other places he speaks clearly about deliberation in regard to ends, an apparent contradiction in texts. But Aristotle in the VIth *Ethics* is examining only one act of the will, that of election, which presupposes the end and regards the means alone, so that an equivocation in the word 'choice' has to be avoided.

There is a word to say about Plotinus. There is a slippery adjustment involved in describing his thought, a deceptive prejudice to be skirted at the penalty of embracing a great misconception, or, more likely and equally unfortunate, of relegating him to the pigeon-hole of fuzzy, fantastic dreamers. It has a double fundament, neither part entirely avoidable. First of all, the philosophers generally conceived their cosmic principles in an outward-looking way, grasping phenomena as external effects of external causes, and, most important, perceiving the causality as external. Then, the whole validation of their systems depends on recourse to objective data. But Plotinus looked into his own soul and there saw his principles of the universe. If we conceive of his thought as taking its origin from the external phenomena around him, we lose all its force and peculiar character. Plotinus went inward in his search for truth, and it is this direction of his mind that is the key to his work. Without constant recurrence to his introspective approach, his words tend to lose the sense of reality. His concepts cannot be divorced from their genesis and sustain their force. Although it is true that Plotinus accepted into his own thought the inheritance from the Greeks, the whole vitality and originality and therefore peculiar power and sovereign value of his system is that he transmuted them in the fire of his own inward-turning genius. The One and the Nous and the All-Soul contain only sparse meaning if we do not know them in terms of the almost unmeasurable living power and movement of the soul.

The second source of bias is the absence of proper terminology for spiritual being, forcing a dependence on expression by metaphor. Unfortunately the Plotinian metaphors are couched in the language of place and local motion, and so the unwary reader is confirmed in his first misapprehension.

The author sees this problem and introduces Plotinus' thought with an analysis of his character and temperament and an emphasis on the genuineness of his mysticism. Yet, the description of his system would be more compelling with more persistent reference to the quality of its genesis.

In mentioning the mysticism of Plotinus, the author skirts a confusion

of the natural and supernatural orders, leaving open a question that ought to be closed. It is no more than one sentence, but in it he grants the possibility of true supernatural contemplation on the part of one who lacks the first elements of the supernatural life. Later on, in the chapter on St. Augustine, he again steps over the impassable gap, repeating the thesis that St. Augustine mistook the Divine Mind of Plotinus for the Logos of St. John, and, moreover, never corrected his mistake. Granting that the first part of the text in the Seventh Book of the Confessions lends itself to this interpretation, certainly the whole of the text does not. First of all, it is inconceivable that St. Augustine would think of the Son Himself, equally God with the Father, as identical with the subordinated and dependent second hypostasis of Plotinus. And when we come to the words: "Again I read in these books that they had changed the glory of Thy incorruption into idōls and divers images," where the saint is recalling the inferiority of the Plotinian teaching, we can see the Christian writer perceiving under the light of faith the deficiencies of merely natural insight. Because he accepted from the philosopher what he saw was good, and praised him and marvelled at him for having it, we cannot conclude that he put him among the inspired. Even his early enthusiasm would not explain this. He always saw too distinctly the difference between the naked mind darkened by the Fall and the enlightened mind purified by faith.

While the work aims at an overall coverage of the philosophies of the ancient times, it has to assume a certain natural proportion of parts, so that Plato with Socrates, Aristotle, Plotinus and St. Augustine occupy better than half the book in their own rights, and infiltrate the rest as their thought influenced the thought that followed them. Nevertheless, the accounts of the other philosophies are not slighted, and deserve special mention for the clarity and vigor in which they are cast, and for the able digestion of the often fragmentary and obscure works which they represent. The Pre-Socratics and the Stoics are especially well done, and it is here that Mr. Armstrong's ability to draw up an effective interpretation is of notable value.

Mr. Armstrong has produced an able and useful book. It achieves its purposes in a readable and scholarly manner, and, in the end, leaves the reader well disposed towards more works from the same source.

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Barbara Celarent. By THOMAS GILBY, O. P. New York: Longmans Green.
Pp. 319 with index. \$4.00.

In his introduction, Fr. Gilby points out that he is not writing a manual on logic but rather he is explaining a habit of mind and method. This is his purpose and the author adheres to it throughout. For Fr. Gilby, clear thinking becomes a virtue attached to friendliness. Man owes it to his fellowmen to reason accurately and express himself correctly. "Logic is part of the courtesy of conversation" (p. 3) writes the English Dominican.

The central theme of the book is to show how logic is related to dialectics and dialectics to philosophy and theology. In the first part of the work, the author delineates the limits of logic. No false claims are made for his subject and any relationship to the exaggerated positions of the later scholastics on the power of logic are discredited. The *Organon* of Aristotle is briefly explained and the objects of logic are given. In a footnote (p. 31) the author gives the formal and material division of logic but it is simply a nominal one wherein the first three books of the *Organon* are placed under formal logic and the last three under material logic. Thus there is avoided the hopeless confusion created by some of the manualists who have practically limited logic to the *Prior Analytics* at the cost of demonstrative logic.

Parts two, three, and four get at the very heart of the subject. Part five considers fallacies and part six, which concludes the book, gives the outline and arguments of an actual scholastic disputation. Fr. Gilby covers the entire field of logic and brings in besides many useful and necessary notions for understanding scholastic philosophy, particularly analogy. For completeness in coverage the book matches any textbook in logic and it surpasses all in its reader appeal.

The title of this work, *Barbara Celarent*, is an indication of the spirit in which it was written. Such a title seems to imply that the book is a novel. Certainly Fr. Gilby's approach to his subject is novel but there any resemblance to fiction ends. The subheading of the opus is: "A Description of Scholastic Dialectic." No description has been written that has such fluency of style and engaging presentation of material as has *Barbara Celarent*. Fr. Gilby has done for St. Thomas the philosopher what Fr. Walter Farrell did for St. Thomas the theologian. He has written a companion to the philosophic thought of the Angelic Doctor.

Barbara Celarent is no mere restatement of what has been said innumerable times before by admirers of scholasticism. On the contrary, the brilliant use of examples and the consistent and successful application of logic and dialectics to every day life, makes Fr. Gilby's book one of significance. Only a few examples need be cited to indicate the wit and wisdom of this volume. Writing of modern trends in logic, the author notes: "Mathe-

mathematical logic cannot operate without some of the philosophical assumptions that traditional logic alone is able to match; while the traditional logic on its side should respect the convenience of this special symbolism for the exhibition of pure logical form and relations and for working with the concepts of mathematical physics. It is a legitimate extension of the methods employed by Aristotle and an instrument of the liaison between the special sciences. A precious rule of criticism should be respected; let data be explained in their own proper terms. Criticism should proceed from within a subject. Music should not be defined by colour, nor life by non-biological concepts, nor identities by equations, nor quantities by qualities, nor literature by history, nor scholastic theology slighted for not providing the loving recognition of the divine presence." (p. 128)

Fr. Gilby is realistic about his subject. He points out that St. Thomas, towards the end of his life, regarded his theological writings like chaff. And adds Fr. Gilby: "... logic is even dustier." But he immediately notes that "... both are necessary if ultimately we are to be caught up into the vision where nothing is wanting. In the meantime logic should go into dialectics as theology goes into liturgy and mathematics into music." (p. 17) In praise of the system which he is expounding, he writes: "One recommendation of the thomist philosophy is that nothing is too far-flung to engage its interest; there is a place for all the sciences; it offers an organization without friction under a law that is polite and not despotic, in a society rather than a community." (p. 22) Neat little comparisons are characteristic of the work, such as: "... logic is like soda-water, made to a formula; but dialectic is like champagne, and cannot be resolved into its elements." (p. 33) Speaking of the syllogism, Fr. Gilby says: "At first sight the method may appear clumsy and full of repetition, yet we recall again the distinction between the mechanics of a thing and its spirit, and in effect it is an economical form of argument, the very repetitions, as with saying the rosary, being expected to quiet and fix the attention." (p. 204)

On almost any line in the book, the reader will run across a sudden and unexpected witticism. These are either original with the author or else he quotes from his vast knowledge of literature. Thus in such a sedate chapter as that on analogy: "Happy convents, bosomed deep in vines, Where slumber abbots, purple as their wines." (p. 81) Or again there is the sly remark: "... the concepts of canon law can be transferred only by analogy into the science of moral theology." (p. 257)

From what has been quoted, no one should conclude that Fr. Gilby has merely written a humorous treatment of scholasticism. There is so much serious matter that the average reader will be amazed at how much more there is to the Aristotelian-Thomistic way than he had imagined possible. A system of philosophy that rests on a great tradition has the inevitable danger of lapsing into complacency. The author points out that the very

greatness of Aristotle made philosophy stand still for centuries. (p. 249) To restate Aristotle and St. Thomas is not to advance their thought beyond the stage of communicating it to pupils. New problems will be solved not by quoting the two masters as one might cite the Bible; their principles must be applied and developed. Anything less than that only proves that the student of this system of philosophy has missed its central point of universality. This, in substance, is the secondary theme of *Barbara Celarent*.

Special chapters deserve special mention. The one entitled "Necessity and Fact" brings out clearly the difference between necessary and contingent propositions. Here are shown the roots of the Thomistic metaphysics and its distinction from idealism. Continuing somewhat in the same vein is the chapter called "Sense and Sensibility." In a short but brilliant paragraph, Fr. Gilby explains what he understands by the intellectualism of St. Thomas. At no time does the author discredit science's method but the intellect always remains superior to the sense. The chapters on induction and deduction should prove this to any reader.

Everything about *Barbara Celarent* is delightful and instructive. It is a book that all students of philosophy should read regardless of what system or systems of thought they prefer. Those who never could visualize themselves as profound thinkers will be pleased at how much they can learn from the superb prose of Fr. Gilby and his lucid examples to cover all subtle points.

There is no book in English that covers in such excellent style and with such broad and incomparable strokes the entire system of Aristotle and St. Thomas. Although not a long work, for those who have read the Stagirate and the Doctor of the Schools, there can be no doubt that every bit of the Aristotelean-Thomistic system has been touched at least by inference when not explored to the full. This is one book on philosophy that everyone should enjoy.

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The Wisdom of Catholicism. Edited by ANTON C. PEGIS. New York: Random House, 1949. Pp. 1017. \$6.00.

This anthology contains the following thirty-five titles in English: St. Ignatius of Antioch, To The Romans; St. Basil the Great, On Reading Greek Literature; St. John Chrysostom, On Charity To The Poor; St. Augustine, The Confessions (end of Book 8 to Book 10) and The City of God (Book 19); Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy (Books 4 and 5); St. Anselm, The Proslogion; St. Bernard, On The Necessity of Loving God; Anonymous, Jesu Dulcis Memoria; St. Bonaventure, The Ascent of the

Mind to God (Prologue and Chapters 5-7); St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles* (I, 2-8; III, 25, 37, 48; IV, 54); Dante, *Divine Comedy* (Paradiso); Petrarch, Letter to Denis of Borgo-San Sepolcro; Villon, The Ballade To Our Lady; Chaucer, *Canterbury Tales* (The Parson's Tale, Part 1); Thomas à Kempis, *The Imitation of Christ* (Book 2); St. Thomas More, *The Four Last Things: Death*; Erasmus, *The Paracelsis*; St. Teresa of Avila, *The Interior Castle* (Seventh Mansion); St. John of the Cross, *The Ascent of Mount Carmel* (Book 1, Chapters 1-13); St. Robert Bellarmine, *On The Ascent of The Mind To God*; Pascal, *Pensées* (Selections); Newman, *Apologia Pro Vita Sua* (Part 7); Peguy, *A Vision of Prayer*; Leo XIII, *Christian Philosophy*; Pius XI, *On Reconstructing The Social Order*; Pius XII, *On The Mystical Body of Christ*; Claudel, *The Satin Slipper* (First Day, Scenes 1 and 5, Third Day, Scene 8); Belloc, *The Restoration of Property* (pp. 7-21); Chesterton, *The Catholic Church And Conversion* (pp. 57-72); Undset, Kristin Lavransdatter (III, The Cross, Chapters 5-7); Gilson, *St. Thomas Aquinas* (Master Mind Lecture) and *Medieval Universalism* (Harvard Lecture); Maritain, *Ransoming The Time* (pp. 115-140).

The book also contains a brief "Preface" and an "Introduction" which essays to define the theme of Catholic wisdom; a ten to twenty line introduction to each author; footnotes which are almost exclusively references to Scripture and other sources; and a "Bibliography" indicating the sources of the selections published in this volume. For the most part the best available English translations were used. There are a few exceptions. For example, the Sheed Translation of the *Confessions* is preferable to the Pusey used here; and while the Peers translations of St. Teresa were chosen, Peers was rejected in favor of Lewis in the case of St. John of the Cross. In six instances the translations here published are new, three of them having been made by the editor.

In his "Introduction" the editor states his view of the theme of Catholic wisdom:

" . . . The eternalizing of man's life, the salvation of the world of time in and by eternity, has been the great theme and occupation of Catholic writers over the centuries . . . Because man is such a veritable wayfarer and pilgrim, living by faith and hope and love in the world of time, he has probed within the recesses of his own being in order to understand even a little of the mystery of the ways of God to him. There is, in truth, nothing else for man to do. For his very existence as a spiritual being is in itself an invitation—an invitation from God his Creator—to discover his deepest center, and to weigh the meaning of the hunger of his head and of his heart. And though Catholic thinkers have meditated on the mysteries of human existence in many ways, they have unfolded in their several ways the outlines of a common spiritual ideal, an ideal and odyssey" (pp. xxiv-xxv).

The name of that odyssey, probably, is transformation into Christ—the

destruction of the tough shell of the merely natural man that the seed of the supernatural may, by the Divine goodness, grow. If such is the theme of Christian wisdom, it is not difficult to understand almost all of Dr. Pegis' inclusions. Two present a problem. What Belloc has to say about economics is both true and splendid; it is also characteristically Belloc; but it *is* economics, not sapiential literature, and it is not specifically Catholic. Gilson's address at the Harvard Tercentenary is a noble thing—an entirely natural plea for the acknowledgement of truth. It is difficult to see anything Catholic in it.

Leaving aside these two entries, what we have here in less than a thousand pages is an anthology of Catholic wisdom from the middle of the second to the middle of the twentieth centuries—almost two thousand years in one thousand pages. No one will deny that the editor has an admirable degree of courage.

Any anthology is a mutilation. A great work is an organic whole, and to "lift" a section of it is like embalming an arm. But there are two kinds of "selections" and so two kinds of anthologies. The first has some objective justification due either to the nature of the subject matter or to the verdict of history. If, for example it is imperative to "cut" the *Confessions*, it does make sense to omit the last three books, for the subject matter permits such a break. Again, if one is to edit a lengthy anthology of Greek literature, it is not impossible, however difficult, to determine what has been historically more significant, and what less. The second type of anthology, excellently illustrated by Maurice Baring's *Have You Anything To Declare*, is based exclusively on the taste of the anthologist. There is no possibility of praising or blaming this second type of anthology. One can only say "Such is the anthologist's taste" and then judge that it is or is not in accord with one's own taste.

In the nature of the case, the editor of this volume has to produce an anthology of the second type, based on his taste alone. The vast living literature of Catholicism for the past two thousand years cannot, according to any rational principle, be imprisoned in any one thousand pages. An indefinite number of equally valid, entirely different thousand page anthologies of the same subject matter could be published.

These reflections are not a criticism of the present volume, but a suggestion of the limitations of this type of anthology. A definitive short anthology of Christian wisdom is an intrinsic impossibility. Still, one is grateful to know where Dr. Pegis' preferences lie, especially because of his admirable taste. Perhaps, the permanent value of his work is that it constitutes an implicit invitation to each reader to draw up his own anthology.

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La Mère du Sauveur et Notre Vie Intérieure. By REGINALD GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, O. P. Paris: Editions du Cerf. Pp. 389.

La Mère du Sauveur et Notre Vie Intérieure is a speculative and devotional analysis of the important theses of Mariology.

In the first chapter the famous Dominican treats of Mary's Divine Maternity as the source of all her glory and of all her privileges. The following order can be established in the divine plan of Redemption. First of all God wished to manifest his infinite mercy by determining to redeem man from sin; at the same moment He decreed that the Word should be made Flesh. He then chose Mary to be the Mother of the Redeemer and to be crowned with glory. As a consequence, He decided to give Mary all the graces and merits by which she would be able to deserve her special glory. Thus her fulness of grace is a consequence of her Divine Maternity rather than the reason for her choice to this high position.

The Incarnation is beyond doubt the source of all human merit after original sin. And since God wished Christ to be born of a Mother, the Divine Maternity is a necessary condition of the Incarnation with which, in the mind of God, it is associated. Among the merits of the Incarnation are all the graces bestowed on Mary, which are a consequence not only of the Incarnation but also of her own Maternity. It is right, therefore, to conclude that the primary dignity of Mary is to be Mother of God, and that her grace and glory depend upon it. It is not because she is the greatest Saint, but because she is Mother of God that we honor her with the special cult of hyperdulia. The honor of being Mother of God is greater than the glory of all the saints in heaven.

Mary's initial grace begins with the moment of her Immaculate Conception, by which she was preserved from original sin and from its consequences. It is sometimes believed that St. Thomas denied this great privilege of Mary. The author examines St. Thomas' teaching most accurately and shows how he did not actually deny the Immaculate Conception. On the contrary, both in the early and the last stages of his theological teaching he expressly says that she did not incur original sin. If in the *Summa* and in some other texts he would seem to deny it, these passages must be interpreted as meaning only that Mary "ought" to have incurred original sin, no mention being made as to whether she actually did incur it or not. Attention is also drawn to the fact that St. Thomas distinguishes between conception and animation and that he explicitly says that she was purified after her animation; this can be interpreted with reference to a posteriority of nature and not to one of time, a distinction frequently met with in his writings, meaning that her preservation followed not in time, but as a consequence of, her animation. This would not be at all contrary to the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, since the preservation of Mary from original sin must have taken place when her soul was created

and could not have occurred at the simple conception of her body which, in the mind of St. Thomas, preceded animation.

The author then examines the consequences of her Divine Maternity, namely the fulness of her grace, her right to be our Mother, and her mediation of grace.

There are three phases in the bestowal of grace to Mary, the moment of her Immaculate Conception, that of the Incarnation, and that of her death. All theologians agree that at the end of her life her degree of grace was greater than that of all the saints and angels taken together. Some, however, do not think that this can be said of the first phase, others not even of the second. The author, with the great majority, shows why it must also be true at the very beginning of her existence. This opinion seems to be the most reasonable, and the most worthy of the great holiness of Mary.

As a result of this immense initial grace, Mary possessed in the highest degree all theological and moral virtues and the gifts of the Holy Ghost. This presupposes the use of reason and free-will from the very first moment of her existence. The author shows how a great number of theologians admit this to be quite possible at least in a transitory fashion (p. 77). He goes on to demonstrate with S. Francis of Sales, St. Alphonsus, Terrier, Hugon and others that it is difficult to conceive that Mary should have afterwards been deprived of their use; such deprivation would have interrupted her progress in grace, charity and merit (p. 81).

However this may be, it is certain that from a very young age Mary never ceased to increase in grace. All men are obliged to strive towards an ever higher degree of love for God. Mary was no exception. Each act of virtue of Mary was more perfect than the preceding one, and the more she approached to God, the more fervent and generous was the intensity by which she was drawn towards him.

Her charity increased by means of her merits and of her prayers. There is no such thing as an indifferent act; that is to say, every single act of a soul in the state of grace must be either good or bad. Now all the actions of Mary were good, each being better than the preceding one, and thus she was continually obtaining new merits and a new increase in grace. Her grace also increased by prayer. Through the mercy of God, we can often obtain by prayer an increase in grace which we have not actually merited, if our prayer is fervent and humble. Mary's prayer was the best that could be offered to God, and no one can tell how much love of God and graces she obtained by it (p. 96).

There is a most interesting note (p. 98) on the increase of grace in the Christian soul. Every act of virtue merits an increase of grace, but to obtain it this act must be at least as fervent as the preceding one. A tepid act, namely a less fervent one, merits the increase but does not obtain it at once. The author examines the question as to when the increase takes place in such a case. The obvious solution would be that it takes place the

next time a really fervent act is accomplished; but the author remarks that this is not at all certain because, although a fervent act obtains at once the increase due to that act, we cannot be sure that it also obtains what is due for less fervent acts of the past. Only very fervent acts of charity and very fervent prayers, such as those we make at Holy Communion, can settle this account, and the author adds that such acts can be probably made also by the souls in purgatory. These souls cannot merit any new increase of grace or glory, but as they gradually become purified by their sufferings, they also become more holy and dear to God and thus their acts of love of God would seem able to obtain what is already due to them through their past merits but which they had not yet received on account of their tepidity.

Father Garrigou-Lagrange then passes in review the principal events of the life of Mary, emphasizing how each one in its own way was the cause of a great increase in grace and merit: the Visitation, the Virginal Birth of Christ, the Presentation, the flight into Egypt, the hidden life, the sorrowful life, the Descent of the Holy Ghost.

Communion and Mass were particular moments of grace for Our Lady. She was not a priest although her dignity of Mother of God was greater than that of a priest, so she assisted at Mass said by St. John and received from him Holy Communion (p. 126). Better than anyone else she was able to believe that the Holy Sacrifice is the immolation of the same Victim Who shed His Precious Blood for us on Calvary, and that it is the source of all grace and merit.

To this sacrifice of her Son she united her own self as Mediatrix and Co-redemptrix of mankind, and received Communion with more fervor and love than is possible to anyone else. There was no obstacle in Mary to the great graces Communion is meant to produce in the soul. Each Communion was more fervent than the preceding one and thus she gave us the most beautiful example of Eucharistic devotion.

Finally, the author examines Mary's principal virtues, to show how each of them attained a very high degree of perfection: faith, hope and charity, the cardinal and moral virtues, together with the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Regarding faith, he asks if the Blessed Virgin ever had on this earth an immediate vision of God like that of the saints in heaven. The common opinion is that she did have it in a permanent way as Christ did, otherwise she would not have had the virtue of faith. But if St. Augustine and St. Thomas believe that St. Paul enjoyed for a few instants the beatific vision, it would seem difficult to deny such a privilege to the Mother of God.

The last chapter on the grace of Our Lady concerns her death and her Assumption. By this time her grace had increased beyond all imagination, and thus her glory in heaven must exceed that of all the other saints together.

The rest of the book is devoted to the mediation and power of Mary

(pp. 174-298), to which a chapter is added on the devotion to Our Lady and another on St. Joseph.

In this section Father Garrigou-Lagrange examines the doctrine concerning Our Lady's association in the work of Redemption as a secondary and subordinate cause. By the part she took in our redemption she merited to become our Mother, transmitting to us the life of grace which Christ obtained for us through His sacrifice. She was made Mother of all men at the foot of the Cross.

The universal mediation of Mary is a consequence of the part she played in our redemption. There is only one perfect Redemptor and Mediator, Christ. But Christ makes use of others to help Him to dispose men to receive the benefits of Redemption: they become secondary mediators between God and their fellow-men. This is true of all priests but in a special manner of Our Lady. She exercises this mediation by meriting, satisfying and praying for us.

Strictly speaking only Christ can merit for us; His infinite merits are based on the justice of God Who is obliged to accept them. Mary's merits are based on the mercy and kindness of God Who, out of love for the Mother of His Son, accepts her good works for those for whom she offers them, namely her children. Theologians say that she merits for us "*de congruo*" not "*de condigno*" as Christ. In this manner Mary merited for us all that Christ merited out of strict justice. Such is the common opinion of the Church. The same is to be said of the satisfaction she offered for our sins by suffering the greatest of all martyrdoms. It is in this sense that Mary is called the Co-redemptrix.

With regard to her prayers which she continues in heaven for us, it would be temerarious to deny the power of her intercession. She is the universal Mediatrix of men, and no grace is ever given to man without her intervention. To be heard by God, our prayers must be made at least implicitly through her intercession.

There follows an interesting chapter (p. 240) on the manner in which Mary distributes grace to our soul, and the author thinks it highly probable that she is not only a moral cause, but an instrumental physical cause of our sanctification.

The universal royalty of Mary forms the subject of one of the last chapters. Mary is really and truly Queen of the whole universe, endowed with all the authority and power of a Queen. Whereas Christ is King because He is God and because He deserves to reign over those He redeemed from the bondage of Satan, Mary is Queen because she partakes of this dignity of her Son as His Mother and as Co-redemptrix of men. Her kingdom is one of mercy; she does not make laws or judge mankind as does her Son, but she has the power to distribute all the wealth of heaven and to issue orders to those over whom she reigns. She is Queen of the Angels

who obey her in all that concerns the reign of Christ; Queen of all Saints who owe their glory to her intercession; Queen of the souls in purgatory to whom she applies her own satisfactions in order to bring their sufferings to an end; she even reigns over Satan whose head she crushed and who fears and obeys her. St. Thomas adds that her kingdom of mercy is also felt by the poor souls in hell who are punished less severely than they deserve on account of her intercession and merits, and who on certain days, like perhaps that of the Assumption, do not find their sufferings so hard to bear (p. 285).

She is especially Queen of priests by protecting and sanctifying them and helping them to celebrate Mass with more fervor.

The author then deals with devotion to Our Lady. He first of all establishes the nature and reasons of the cult of hyperdulia due to her and answers those who pretend that this cult cannot be traced to the origin of the Church or that it is injurious to the honor due to God alone.

He then examines the advantages of the most popular devotion to Our Lady, namely the Rosary, and those of a total consecration to her in accordance with the teaching of Saint Grignon Maria de Montfort. The result of this consecration is a "mystical union" to Mary, which makes us partake of her humility, her faith, and of her great love of God.

The chapter on S. Joseph is meant to show that he is the greatest of all Saints, greater than St. John the Baptist, the Apostles and all the others, because of his intimate union with the Mother of God and the mystery of the Incarnation.

To close this marvelous treatise on Our Lady the author passes in review the manifestations of the great devotion of France to Mary. From Clovis and St. Remi to St. Jeanne of Arc, from then to the French Revolution and finally to our own days, France has ever loved and honored Mary. Many times Our Lady has saved this great country, but she did so especially when she sent Jeanne of Arc, and when later on she saved France from the Huguenots and from their heretical domination.

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Man and His Works. The Science of Cultural Anthropology. By M. J. HERSKOVITS. New York: Knopf, 1948. Pp. 678, with index.

The author, who teaches anthropology at Northwestern University, is widely known for his studies on the culture of the Negro and on other subjects pertaining to the analysis and description of civilizations. The present work covers the whole field of cultural anthropology. Primarily

intended as a textbook for students, it is a modern and highly readable summary of the facts and theories which make up this particular science. Anthropology means literally: science of man; here, however, as with many other writers on allied subjects, it means chiefly man as living with others in a society, creating a civilization, and undergoing all the changes the historical view shows as having occurred since man arose from his most primitive state. Years ago the psychologist Karl Buehler remarked that psychology has to make use of three approaches, none of which is sufficient in itself, but may, when combined with the other two, enable us to understand better the nature and the working of the human mind. Man knows about his mind, can study its manifestations in others, and its products in the achievements of the individual as of the group. Cultural anthropology is concerned with the material furnished mainly by "man's works."

Besides the brief introduction explaining the nature of anthropology, there are six chapters: The Nature of Culture; The Materials of Culture; The Structure of Culture; the Aspects of Culture; Cultural Dynamics; Cultural Variation. A summary of 36 pages submits a "theory of culture" and a discussion of "anthropology in a world society." A bibliography of 19 pages and a detailed index are added. There are 66 figures in the text and 18 plates.

Prof. Herskovits places before the reader an enormous amount of factual information which renders the book a valuable help in all studies concerned with man. He does, however, more, and by this his work becomes important in two respects. He presents not only his science and its achievements, but also an analysis of its methodology and its relations to other disciplines, and to the system of knowledge in general. Thus, his ideas become relevant for philosophy. He also considers the question of practical application; his views accordingly assume importance for world politics as well as for the understanding and solving of problems of lesser scope but hardly lesser weight.

The appraisal of the factual evidence demands specialistic knowledge and training. It is not a task for which this reviewer is competent nor a matter to be discussed in a periodical of philosophical intent. The general principles, however, underlying the interpretations and the outlook of the author deserve consideration.

Dr. Herskovits defines his standpoint as that of "cultural relativism" which he opposes to "absolutism" and the "ethnocentric" approach. He distinguishes between "universals" and "absolutes." By the former term he refers to certain features common to many civilizations and possessing definite values; whereas none can claim, as he sees it, absolute validity. Relativism, then, means that every culture must be envisaged and appreciated on its own merits, within the particular setting of place and time. Ethnocentrism is the prejudice which evaluates all foreign civilizations

from the angle of that which happens to be the student's own. To claim an absolute superiority for the "Euroamerican" culture is such a prejudice which tends to falsify our interpretation of other cultural groups.

It must be recognized that there is such an ethnocentrism and that it sometimes amounts even to a clear-cut parochialism, so much so that a true understanding of another people's culture, mode of thinking, customs and so forth is seriously impeded. This happens, indeed, not only in regard to civilizations which are widely different from our own, but even in regard to some which are rather close and belong to the same great cultural group. There is no doubt that many misunderstandings and, consequently, blunders in practical management of affairs, arise because of such ethnocentric prejudices.

But this question should be distinguished carefully from the other one concerning the objective value of this or that state of culture. It may happen that the ethnocentric attitude is based on false presumptions, that is, on the preference for the known and customary, and nonetheless is objectively right, because the subjectively motivated preference may have as its object a positive value. Just as a man may do what is objectively right although his reasons may be wrong. It is, therefore, a methodological fault to confuse the attitude of ethnocentrism with the objective evaluation of cultural phenomena. The anthropologist is entitled to say that such evaluation is not a problem pertaining to his discipline. This is indubitably a permissible view. But if he refuses to consider questions of objective evaluation, he cannot defend his relativistic approach as a general principle; he can only claim that it is a methodological principle within his discipline.

The two problems, of subjective preference and of objective preferability, are obviously of a markedly different nature. They are confused, one feels, because of the distrust the modern mind has developed for everything which can not be ascertained by the means called scientific or approximating the ideal of science. The cultural relativism as advocated by the author is a partial manifestation of the generally relativistic attitude which denies all possibility of objective evaluation. The question whether or not the Euroamerican culture, at least in some of its aspects, is objectively superior to that of other peoples cannot be answered by the comparative study of cultures; this study furnishes only the raw material for such an answer.

On the other hand, it is clear that ethnocentrism has been the cause of many misconceptions. Thus, the notion of the "primitive" mentality and civilization has been largely a product of the unconsciously assumed position that one's own culture is absolutely superior. It has also created the idea of progress as moving towards one's own preferred way of life as the objective ideal. The advances achieved by cultural anthropology since the beginning of this century have contributed in a noteworthy manner to the weakening of a false ethnocentrism.

It is equally true that every culture must be viewed, as it were, from within and in its totality. Any particular phenomenon within a given culture can be understood only when we are able to realize what its significance and function is within the culture to which it belongs; what it means to us, or would mean were it encountered within our own civilization, is not to the point.

Like most of the cultural anthropologists, the author takes his examples mainly from cultures which are widely different from ours. There are, of course, good reasons for this procedure. In our practical experience, however, we have to do not with the understanding of Melanesians or African Bushmen; we deal mostly with people belonging to the same civilization and nonetheless different, because of different histories, social standards, language, and so forth. One may learn much from such a work, once one realizes that the problems are basically the same in regard to far off and to closer cultures.

The author is, indeed, anxious to make the reader realize the general importance of cultural anthropology. He points out, justly, that this science may render great service not only in regard to the policies adopted by peoples of higher civilization in regard to those they consider inferior (as, e. g., on the part of the United States in regard to the Indians), but also in view of international relations in every sense.

One can perfectly agree with the author on this point as well as on his general condemnation of "ethnocentrism" of which nationalism is an extreme form. It is difficult, however, to follow him in his total exclusion of all kind of evaluation of cultures, as a whole or in their individual traits. It is quite true that science as such has nothing to say about values; it is preoccupied exclusively with things that are and not with those that ought to be. But as soon as a scientist sees sufficient reason for making practical suggestions, he either must limit these to mere technicalities, or cease to be a mere scientist and take a definite evaluative position. If he limits his assistance to the statesman to technical advice, he can only state by what means this or that end can be attained; he is not capable of making any responsible statement on the ends themselves. If he does make such statements, he has inevitably based them on evaluation. If, e. g., the anthropologist suggests to the Bureau of Indian Affairs that the culture of some Indian tribe should be preserved rather than destroyed and that the Indians should be encouraged in keeping alive certain forms of life rather than be lured or compelled into adopting the American way of life, the anthropologist bases this advice on an evaluation of his own. In a certain sense, his viewpoint is also ethnocentric, insofar as he shows a definite esteem for the particular sample of culture he wishes to see preserved.

It is impossible to refrain from all evaluation as soon as one has to deal with human affairs. If the scientist, in this case the anthropologist, believes

that he can keep aloof and avoid all evaluation whatsoever, he falls prey to a not uncommon self-deception.

But then, of course, the question returns and to the anthropologist it seems to be devoid of meaning: namely, that of the objective truth and goodness contained in the various cultures he studies. To repeat what has been said above: the mere fact that someone shows a preference for his own culture does not prove that he is wrong. He may quite well have a right idea, though his motivations may be insufficient or false or even immoral.

Culture appears to the author as something essentially subjective, that is, as existing in the minds of the members sharing a definite cultural atmosphere. He rejects the idea of culture having any kind of existence outside of these participating minds. Here too, one will agree with him; to conceive of culture as an existing entity amounts to something like a relapse into exaggerated Mediaeval realism. Nor can culture be credited with that sort of reality which Hegel had in mind when he spoke of the "objective spirit." But, as there is a right middle between exaggerated realism and strict nominalism, in what concerns the nature of "universals," so it seems that there is an intermediary position in regard to culture.

The basic error, which leads to the untenable sort of relativism advocated by the author is, one suspects, an offspring of a general trait of modern mentality, a trait which one may characterize as onesided subjectivism. This attitude, which depends to a higher degree on Idealism or on the developments of the Cartesian doctrine than is usually realized, tends to stress the mental act and to give little consideration to the contents with which this act is related. Though such contents may be called, in one sense, "subjective" and hence a matter for psychology to study, in another sense they are "objective," that is, they refer to something which is the intentional object of the mental state. That which is known is not a mental phenomenon, nor is that which is taken over by the individual through the influence of the social group, a process the author calls "enculturation," a mental state. Customs, beliefs, forms of life, all these things are to the individual mind "things." They are viewed, wrongly or rightly, as being as objective as truths are.

One gratefully acknowledges, when reading this book, the enormous amount of knowledge cultural anthropologists have collected. One also notes as a definite advance the clarification of many theoretical conceptions and the methodological progress which has been achieved in an amazingly short time. Modern cultural anthropology, to comment on this in passing, does not lend support to the extravagant theories on early stages of civilization which make up an important part in Freudian psychoanalysis. The psychoanalysts will be forced to revise thoroughly their doctrines on such matters. As an able presentation of facts and scientific procedures, this

book is probably one of the best. The philosophy back of it, however, is vitiated by the same prejudices which dominate modern thinking in so many fields.

The desire, on the part of this author and of many of others, to see the dignity of human nature recognized everywhere, in all forms of culture and in all peoples, is praiseworthy. Such an universal humanitarianism should not make, however, the student of cultural anthropology blind to the differences of value which are as real as those of technology or any other side of human activity.

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Chapters in Western Civilization. Selected and edited by the Contemporary Civilization Staff of Columbia College. New York: Columbia University Press, 1948. 2 volumes.

Challenges to Columbia University's various schools and departments have not been infrequent, although most of them have been directed in recent years at its Teachers' College. The undergraduate liberal arts college, however, has lately received more and more critical attention, particularly since the publication of *A College Program in Action* and the appearance of some published censures of the College penned by former members of its staff. These critical comments will undoubtedly be augmented by the appearance of *Chapters in Western Civilization*, which is a sort of textbook for the Contemporary Civilization course at Columbia College.

This course, in which students are divided into groups of about thirty-five and placed under the care of a young instructor in the College, is expected to familiarize the student with the historical antecedents of the problems which surround him. In existence for thirty years or more, the validity of its approach to the problem of transmitting historical knowledge has been frequently questioned. The latest questionings have come from widely—one might almost say wildly—dissimilar quarters: Thomas Merton's *Seven Storey Mountain* makes a number of caustic remarks on how little the student learns from this course—Merton was a Columbia man; teachers and writers of history at the last American Historical Society convention were practically unanimous in their disapproval of the method of the course, in the special section which was concerned with the methods of presenting broad survey courses. If the students feel they do not learn, and the teachers feel they cannot teach—Barzun, for instance, was sceptical while at Columbia—according to this celebrated and tested plan, then, perhaps, something in these texts will reveal at least one of the reasons for the difficulty.

Volume I begins with a two-chapter survey of the mediaeval period, and concludes with the French Revolution. Each chapter in this volume, as in the other, is a separate piece of work by an expert, although some men have written more than one chapter or part of a chapter. Volume II begins with the nineteenth-century Romantic movement and takes the narrative to the period between World Wars I and II. As is to be expected, the chapters are of varying degrees of worth and are presented with different degrees of skill. Oddly enough, the second volume seems to suffer much less from these difficulties than does the first, rather a reversal of the usual case in two-volume works.

Undoubtedly, unevenness in presentation could be a major difficulty to teacher or student, particularly where the chapter of one very well known figure is placed next to that of someone relatively obscure. The intrinsic difficulty, however, seems really to be that some of these experts are more than a little inept or badly-informed in their particular fields. A natural result would be the appearance of considerable insecurity or doubt in the minds of the readers. When this insecurity is augmented, as it is certain to be, by the diversity of group instructors, many of whom are not trained in history at all, it should be comparatively easy to see why students and teachers at Columbia are dissatisfied. As for readers outside Columbia, a few examples of the type of careless, inaccurate, and—in some cases—downright vicious writing these volumes contain should suffice to explain the situation to them.

In Chapter I, Marshall Clagett declares that the Christian Fathers held that ownership of private property was a man-made convention, *having no basis in natural law*. On the next page, he declares that the principle of separation of Church and State was a "living force in the West." In Chapter II, the same writer declares that "a system of sacraments began to grow" after 313 A. D. Following this remarkable historical observation comes a whole page concerning the hierarchical organization of the Church, in which Clagett indicates quite clearly that he does not even know that a diocese was originally an imperial administrative unit. He refers glibly to the *natures* of God, to Augustine's emphasis on love as though no other Christian writer had ever mentioned that virtue, to the monastic vows of "humility, chastity, and poverty," to Simon Magus's attempt to buy "the gift of the Holy Ghost," to a "virulent monastic movement" in Ireland which spilled over on to the Continent, to extreme unction as assuring the dying person of salvation, and to the determination by the High Middle Ages that "seven sacraments tended to be essential." These errors or misconceptions—which are a typical, not an exhaustive, list—are sprinkled throughout the first ninety pages of volume I.

Clagett is not even above the commission of such grammatical errors as "results . . . was," or "remainder . . . were," or of such scientific guessing

as his *tour de force* of identifying Jordanus de Nemore with Jordanus Saxo, on the sole ground that they had the same given name. After reading these first chapters, anyone might be pardoned for experiencing some slight bewilderment.

Harry Elmer Barnes takes up the discussion next, and adds an entirely new notion to the matter of the controversy between Boniface VIII and Philip IV. If it had not been for Guillaume de Nogaret, Barnes assures us, the other members of the French expedition would have killed the Pope! This new light on the character of Nogaret is matched by John Herman Randall's observation, in the chapter called "The Natural Man of the Renaissance," that St. Thomas "has hardly a trace of asceticism." Randall is also convinced that it was the printing-press which had "made it impossible ever to extirpate a living idea." One wonders how the living ideas he had been discussing as having been formulated before 1447 managed to survive.

When Barnes joins forces with Mitchell Garrett to discuss the Reformation, the results are hardly more satisfactory, although the writers do emphasize the fact that many abuses in the Church were not the cause of revolt but a means of excusing it. Nevertheless, allusions to the "larger magic of the Church and its sacramental system," to a ridiculous list of relics, and to a credulous acceptance of mediaeval legends as having been given credulity in the Middle Ages, cannot but be offensive. There is a serious error of fact in the statement that Henry VIII fell in love with Anne Boleyn *after* beginning suit for divorce from Catherine. A far more serious error of distortion and calumny is contained in the statement that "fierce theological intolerance once more became a major intellectual virtue in the Catholic Church." Listing all the errors in this chapter, as in the ones mentioned above, would be impossible and almost certainly useless. One may certainly hope, however, that the poor bewildered students at Columbia do not take too seriously Barnes's assurance that following the Ignatian Exercises will enable them to "reproduce when wanted" some "moments of exaltation and ecstasy."

One may hope, too, that the student will not be so completely dazed that he can derive no benefit from the remainder of this volume, which is relatively free from error, or from volume II, which contains chapters by William O'Shanahan on "Political Liberalism and Nationalism," and by Richard Hofstadter on "The Impact of Darwinism," which are masterpieces of their kind. It is even possible, in reading these chapters, to catch some glimpse of the ideal once held by the men charged with constructing the Contemporary Civilization course. These volumes show, however, that no amount of excellent binding or typography, no planning of chapters to cover certain great events or movements, no aspiring to form mature and truly liberal mentalities, can substitute for sound, unbiased scholarship, or for an

understanding of the limitations necessarily placed upon the teaching of any subject. Perhaps a great amount of puzzlement on the part of students, and of strenuous opposition on the part of teachers, might be avoided if the Columbia College plan could be radically altered and if the volumes under review could be subjected to a similar process. Only then can the valuable portions—about one-half—of these books do their best work.

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BRIEF NOTICES

An Index to Aristotle. By TROY WILSON ORGAN. Princeton: University Press, 1949. Pp. 181. \$5.00.

One abuse of St. Thomas has been made by those pseudo-students who think that the *Summa* can be used as an index. Without reference to the integral work, strange and unsound doctrines have not infrequently been advanced by these dabblers in knowledge from St. Thomas. Fortunately, Troy Wilson Organ does not make a similar mistake. He does not intend his *Index to Aristotle* to be a substitute for the reading of the whole of the Stagirite but rather he hopes it to be what an index is meant to be, simply a guide to an author's works. Just as one section of St. Thomas throws light on another section of the Angelic Doctor, so too is this the case of the closely knit and logical system of the Greek philosopher. It is to be hoped that this new guidebook to Aristotle will not result in distorting his teachings but rather in facilitating the student's depth of knowledge of this great thinker.

An Index to Aristotle is a thoroughly competent piece of scholarship. The compiler has used the eleven volume English translation of Ross and Smith, published by the Oxford University Press as his basis. Hence, the danger of conflicting translations of some technical words is removed. Nevertheless, the author does in many instances give the Greek equivalent of the word in parenthesis after the English translation in the index. The references are quite exhaustive and should be extremely valuable to any student. For the philosopher this handy reference book would seem indispensable.

The Soul. By ST. THOMAS AQUINAS. Translated by JOHN PATRICK ROWAN. St. Louis: Herder, 1949. Pp. 299 with index. \$4.00.

This translation of the *Questio Disputata : De Anima* of St. Thomas is a happy addition to the growing library of English translations of his works.

The text of St. Thomas, in one question of twenty-one articles, treats of the human soul, its nature, its union with the body, of potencies in general, of immortality and of the cognition of the separated soul. The treatment, however, is in greater length and detail than that of the corresponding parts of the *Summa Theologica* (I, qq. 75-77; 88, 89). Written within a few years of the First Part of the *Summa*, this Question contains the mature teaching of St. Thomas.

Doctor Rowan's translation is faithful and readable. The explanatory notes are brief but useful; the references to citations in the text are accurate; and the citations to parallel places are complete. The translator has added an index of nine pages which includes proper names and topics, an excellent contribution to the text.

All in all, here is the psychological doctrine of St. Thomas on the cardinal topics of the science presented faithfully, clearly, with generous aids for the student. It is a good book for reference, for courses, and for use in the seminar.

Epistemology. By FERNAND VAN STEENBERGHEN. Translated by Martin J. Flynn. New York: Wagner, 1949. Pp. 324 with index. \$4.00.

Aristotelians and Thomists have long stood in need of a good English manual in epistemology for use in teaching undergraduates. This present translation, though perhaps somewhat advanced and difficult, is probably the best book on the problem of knowledge that has appeared in English.

The author presents epistemology in four sections: a preliminary and historical introduction; analytical or descriptive epistemology; critical epistemology; and conclusions concerning realism, error, and the divisions of the sciences.

The heart of the book is in the middle two sections where the author gives first a kind of phenomenology of human knowledge, describing what appears to consciousness, and then moves on to justify human knowledge by appealing chiefly to the affirmation of being. The exteriority of the world is established by reflecting on our conscious life and discovering that the felt objectivity of the corporeal world must be real and unadulterated by the sense organ since the organ is what the world is to the extent that it is spatial, extended, physical. "In this instance, the *modus recipientis* coincides with the *modus recepti*" (p. 216). Besides, several organs like the eye and tactile receptors can cross-check each other in determining the objective and extended character of matter.

The translation reads very smoothly, and there are copious subdivisions, footnotes that are complete without being overburdening, a bibliography, and indexes of both topics and names. All of this should recommend this work for the college classroom.

However, despite its many positive features, there are certain doctrinal difficulties about Van Steenberghen's approach which show that the final textbook on epistemology has not appeared, at least in English.

First, the author seems to view his subject not as a part of metaphysics to be studied near the end of the philosophical enterprise, but as a prolegomenon that must be hurtled at the beginning. Kant did enough damage to show the futility of this program. As a result of this inversion of episte-

mology's place, Van Steenberghen has to go through much of the philosophy of nature and of metaphysics in the analytical section of his book. This is a proof that the critical problem is not at the threshold of philosophy.

Secondly, the author pivots his solution of the knowledge problem on consciousness. Descartes' problems, then, must be faced anew. Such a beginning, as Gilson argues, prejudices the discussion of knowledge in favor of idealism. Van Steenberghen hardly answers this challenge in his treatment of it (pp. 97-98).

Thirdly, the author does not believe that the validity of first principles should be discussed in epistemology. They are defended, he thinks, in metaphysics. But has he not invoked these laws in connection with the "affirmation of being"?

Fourthly, the author is inclined to the Galileo-Lockean view of secondary qualities. Had he put epistemology in its proper metaphysical perspective, he could have availed himself of the conclusions by the philosopher of nature that secondary qualities are formal and not just the mechanisms disclosed by physics.

In spite of such difficulties, this book is worth the consideration of any teacher searching for a satisfactory textbook in epistemology.

Introduzione alla Psicologia. By A. GEMELLI and G. ZUNINI. Milan:

University of the Sacred Heart, 1949. Second Edition. Pp. 505.

The first edition, of 1947, was out of print within one year. This is the more remarkable, since this volume is not an "introduction" in the usual sense of the term. A good deal of factual knowledge, going beyond the mere fundamentals, is presupposed. The book introduces one not so much to psychology as to an understanding of this science, its different schools, and problems. It gives a survey of various approaches with the intention of integrating the historical development of the studies on the manifold questions of psychology with the actual state of knowledge. Although P. Gemelli has his own, very definite conceptions, the views of other scholars are stated in admirable objectivity. Not only the student who, after having acquired some elementary knowledge of this science, wishes to become acquainted with its general viewpoints and principles, but also the scholar, the specialist, and the philosopher will derive much profit from a reading of this work. Its nineteen chapters, each accompanied by extensive bibliographies, comprise the whole field of psychology.

Psychology means here: empirical study of mental phenomena and of human nature. Problems of a strictly philosophical kind are not discussed. This does, of course, not preclude that the whole treatise is pervaded by a philosophical spirit nor that its study might not be useful to the philosopher.

Quite to the contrary: the objective and complete survey of problems and viewpoints ought to be welcome to anyone concerned with the problems of human existence, be they envisaged from a speculative or an empirical angle. To-day's speculative psychology often suffers from an insufficient understanding of the ideas current in contemporary psychologies and, therefore, misses the point in criticism and fails to consider facts of which it has to render account.

The authors maintain a perfect balance in their appreciation of the various psychological methods. They neither side with the pure experimentalists or behaviorists nor with those who stress exclusively introspection; rather they conceive of the methodology in psychological inquiry as "dualistic," that is, as needing the data of self-observation together with those to be obtained by objective studies.

Having justified this viewpoint in the second chapter, they proceed to expose their views on the relations of psychology and biology. The unity of the human being renders necessary the use of biological studies in psychology, although no complete understanding can be attained by such studies alone. The recognition of the unity of the person by Aristotle is pointed out and so also the same idea as presented by many later writers. There is no mention of modern "psychosomatics"; but one can easily gather how little new there is in this approach, however much it be acclaimed as an innovation to-day.

The following chapter on "The data of psychological experience and their characteristics" is of particular interest, the more since it contains a searching criticism of certain modern notions, as proposed by Boring and by the "operationalistic" school. Here as in other parts of the work, the contributions of psychologists of all countries are considered, and American psychology is often referred to and quoted. The authors remark, with perfect justice, that most of the controversies of to-day are but repetitions of those of older times. The main problem of psychology is to render account of the one fundamental fact: that mental life manages to unify the multiplicity of data mental activity produces. This aspect is ignored by those who are satisfied with enumerating and describing factual data. Other schools have claimed to deal with this basic trait, but have only either coined some formulae, as the configurationalists, or limited their explanations to relations of some mental functions, as did the structuralists. The critics of these theories, like McDougall and the psychoanalytic schools, have in turn been guilty of a far going disregard of the facts of consciousness. A new synthesis is needed. In a last paragraph the authors state, without elaborating, that the existing confusion may be traced back to the kind of dualism Descartes had introduced.

This review must be satisfied with listing the topics treated in the subsequent chapters. They are: conscious and unconscious mental activities;

perception ("simple sensations" are justly viewed as mere abstractions); memory; emotional life; reason and will; language (to the study of which, as one knows, Gemelli himself has notably contributed); instincts; intelligent animal behavior; human conduct; social conduct; personality; problems of character.

There is not one chapter from which the reader might not gain new insights and a better understanding of the subject-matters under discussion. The philosopher, in particular, who is sometimes a little too contemptuous of the empirical data the psychologists collect and of their theories, may come to appreciate the work done more than he did before. He also may discover that there are tasks for him to do besides repeating the old hal-lowed formulae. The topics listed in the index alone may indicate to him how much worth his while the study of this work may be. To do this is not only profitable but rewarding in other respects, for there is hardly any other such book which would "introduce" the reader in so clear and pleasant and stimulating a manner into a field as wide and as important than that covered by this book. It shows the mastership of a great scholar who also is a great teacher and a brilliant stylist.

Reason to Revelation. By DANIEL J. SAUNDERS, S. J. St. Louis: Herder, 1949. Pp. 224, with bibliography and index. \$3.50.

Today, for the first time in many centuries, the Catholic Church is assuming an ascendancy in the attention of thinking men. Non-Catholics are looking at it from two points of view: the one a hopeful view, tinged with a bit of sentimentalism, a bit of envy of Catholics, and a half understood desire "to be one myself someday"; the other, one of suspicion and distrust for the power it wields, together with a constantly more articulate wish to curb its growth and influence.

The holders of neither of these views, however, understand the Church. They are impressed, perhaps in spite of themselves, by its continued existence, its tranquillity in the face of universal intellectual unrest, its solidarity of outlook, its conservativeness, its unflinching support of Christian beliefs even in the face of bitter persecutions. For these reasons, both those favorable and unfavorable to the Church give it the favor of their sincere, if grudging, admiration.

To present Catholics with the means of explaining the foundations of that Church is the aim of this book. Foundations are fundamentals, and every discussion must come to fundamentals if it is to be fruitful. In orderly fashion, the author sketches these fundamentals, beginning with the basic notion of the very existence of the supernatural, that is, the possibility of God's communication to man of truths beyond his natural

ken, the content of that communication, the Mysteries of Faith, and the existence and function of miracles. Next, he studies the medium of that communication, the Gospels, their authenticity, the credibility of the facts they narrate about our Blessed Lord, His Divinity, miracles, prophecies, and the truth of His Resurrection.

All this is done thoroughly but briefly. The scientific presentation of the subject does not suffer from the easy style of the author. Particularly well done are the chapters on the Gospels where considerable effort has been made to present the objections as forcefully as possible, and to refute them carefully and clearly. Lay readers may find these chapters a bit difficult, for they appear to presuppose some knowledge of formal exegesis.

Because of its appreciation of difficulties, and its clear presentation of the truth, *Reason to Revelation* should find a receptive audience among priests, clerical students, and the educated laity.

Elternschaft und Gattenschaft (Parenthood and Marriage). By ALBERT MITTERER. Vienna, 1949. Herder. Pp. 160.

This is one more treatise by Professor Mitterer, formerly of the Seminary of Brixen (Bressanone), now of the School of Theology at Vienna, in which the empirical knowledge and the scientific or biological ideas of St. Thomas are set over against those resulting from modern research. Prof. Mitterer has devoted to these problems a large number of books and articles which he lists on two pages in the introduction of this volume. Particularly, he refers to a preceding work, *The Generation of Organisms, particularly of Man, according to the Conception of the World in St. Thomas and in Present Times* (Vienna 1947) as necessary prolegomena to this book; since the first book is not available, it is doubtful whether full justice can be done to the present treatise.

The general tendency of the author's works is to show that the changes brought about by the development of science, physics or biology, forces us to abandon many of the ideas of Aquinas, ideas which are viewed as so fundamental that the edifice of Thomistic philosophy seems to crumble. But Prof. Mitterer goes even farther; he apparently believes that many of the notions presupposed by or implied in moral theology and Canon Law must be modified to be in accordance with modern scientific discoveries. On this aspect of the author's work this reviewer is not competent to pass judgment.

It is, of course, obvious that in our times many things are viewed differently than they were in the Middle Ages. It is, however, questionable whether the changes and advances in empirical knowledge have so fundamental an importance for philosophy that they would force us to abandon

a large part of traditional doctrine. The question will be answered differently by those who—as many moderns do—believe that philosophy has to follow conscientiously and even slavishly the march of empirical knowledge, and by those others who believe that the foundations of philosophy are broad and strong enough to allow for taking account of any ascertained fact whatsoever. The latter conviction is not peculiar to Scholastic philosophers. It suffices to read the late Ernest Cassirer's study on the theory of relativity to realize that according to this thinker the validity of Kantianism is not at all endangered by the recent developments in physics, although Kant taught that Euclidean geometry is endowed with *a-priori* certitude and thought in the same manner of Newtonian physics. One may ask, likewise, whether and how far the differences in the ideas concerning the facts of parenthood, generation, and so forth, affect philosophical views and moral conceptions.

This reviewer, in fact, cannot see that the new ideas and facts do force us to abandon to the same extent, as the author apparently assumes, the tenets of Thomism. Nobody, indeed, will affirm that the views of St. Thomas on facts are to be maintained at any cost; after all, Scholastic philosophy fought a losing battle against the new physics which superseded that of Aristotle; there was a loss of prestige for quite some time, but Scholasticism recuperated and was able to incorporate the modern ideas without abandoning any of its basic principles. It may well be that the same obtains in regard to Thomistic and modern biology.

Moreover, one gets the impression that the author, however much he is master of the scientific aspect of his problems, is less capable of dealing with their strictly philosophical side. This is visible, particularly, where he discusses the relation of parent and child. He writes (p. 52): "To which kind of relationship belongs (biological) parenthood? The great change which has to be reported here is that this relation is no longer an accidental one, but substantial and, therefore, belongs no longer into the category relation, but by way of reduction to the category of substance." This statement is based on the declaration that "the parents are the substantial whole out of a part of which the child is brought into existence by way of development." It seems hardly necessary to subject this statement to a further examination; it obviously confuses several things which ought to be kept apart. It may suffice to point out that the development, say, of the oak tree out of the acorn is a substantial change but the relation which the acorn has to the tree or the tree to the acorn remains nevertheless an accident of either of these things. Parenthood or sonship, likewise, are accidents of father and son respectively, quite independently of the kind of physical process which brought the son into existence. Thus, it is rather unintelligible what precisely the author means with his statement, or with one following as a sort of corollary, that the "logical relation of likeness

(*similitudo*) existing between parents and child is already with St. Thomas not an accidental likeness, but a substantial likeness (*similitudo naturae*). To-day their causal relation, too, is substantial." The author refers to S. Th. I. q. 27, a. 2. c.; but this text defines *generatio* as distinguished from other modes of becoming and has not the meaning the author attributes to it.

Similar criticism could be raised against other passages. The one discussed here, however, may serve as an illustration. This does not amount to a thorough rejection of the author's work. He is indubitably right when he demands that full account be taken of the data modern science has accumulated and that these must be incorporated in any system of philosophy of nature, including of course human nature. There are many valuable discussions of what the author calls *Treuelternschaft*, a word coined by him, and best translated by parental trusteeship; under this heading he comprises all moral obligations resulting from the biological fact of parenthood. This trusteeship corresponds to the *fovere* in St. Thomas or to the *nutrimentum, instructio, disciplina*, supplied by the parents. Prof. Mitterer is convinced that in this regard, too, one has to go beyond St. Thomas whose conception appears to him insufficient and vitiated by his defective knowledge of biology.

There is a lengthy discussion of ethical questions related to sexuality. Again, St. Thomas is severely criticized. Among other things, he is said to have viewed the act of copulation only as an extrinsic act and to have overlooked the relevance of this act for the individual himself. This is deduced from the statement that the sexual urge is viewed by St. Thomas only as one towards *delectatio*, whereas he should have considered the fact of "instinctual satisfaction" (*Triebbefriedigung*); one senses here a definite influence of certain theories, especially of the psychoanalytic doctrine. It seems to this reviewer that the contradiction the author believes to find between the doctrine of St. Thomas and *Casti connubii* is non-existent. His argument is this: St. Thomas recognized in the matrimonial act only a means for the *generatio prolis* and denies to this act legitimacy if this intention is not present. In *Casti connubii*, however, it is stated that cohabitation is "not against nature . . . even though no new life can arise, be it because of natural conditions, certain times, or some defects." What the author, however, overlooks is that the latter statement presupposes, of course, the intention, that is, the inner attitude of the cohabitants in consequence of which they would intend to procreate if the circumstances did permit this.

Nor can this reviewer convince himself that the critique of St. Thomas' views on trusteeship are as defective as the author believes. But to enter into any further analysis would lead too far.

All the objections against the standpoint of Prof. Mitterer notwithstanding, it must be gratefully acknowledged that he has at least the

merit to have started a discussion which may lead to a fuller clarification of many points in the ethics of married life and the parent-child relations. One may disagree, and probably will disagree, with many of the author's assertions; but one will still profit by his provocative treatment of all these questions.

The Catholic Church in the United States. By THEODORE ROEMER, O. F. M. Cap. St. Louis: Herder, 1950. Pp. 444. \$5.00.

A good history of the Catholic Church in the United States has for long been a necessity. Not only scholars but the Catholic (and non-Catholic) reading public would appreciate a good history of an institution which has existed in the United States as an organization since the founding of the Republic itself. As things now stand there is only one history of the Catholic Church in our country and that is the four volume work by John Gilmary Shea, the last volume of which was published in the nineties. Shea's work was a good one for its time but a great deal has happened to the country and the Church since 1892. Furthermore, historical research has gone forward considerably since Shea's time, and, in the light of its findings, Shea's errors could be corrected.

Of the Catholic scholars who longed to see the work of Shea replaced by a more modern treatment none desired it more than Monsignor Peter Guilday of the Catholic University of America. It was to that end that the series of doctoral dissertations called *Studies in American Church History* was begun by students under Dr. Guilday's direction, and the beloved scholar himself cleared a great deal of difficult ground by his own works on Carroll and England, to mention only two titles. In Dr. Guilday's early years, however, the time was not ripe for a history of the entire American Church, and, in his later years, pressure of work and ill health prevented his undertaking the task. However, it would seem that he thought that the time had come when it could be done, for in his declining years, he urged others to undertake the task. The first man to follow Dr. Guilday's suggestion, Theodore Maynard, fell far short of the mark. He was not a trained historian, and although he has written considerably upon historical subjects, he has never acquired an historical sense. His *Story of American Catholicism* certainly was not what Dr. Guilday had in mind. The present work was also written upon the suggestion of Dr. Guilday. It is better than Maynard's eccentric attempt but it is still far short of the mark.

Father Roemer attempts to tell in one volume the story of the Catholic Church in the United States. This seems to be the wrong approach. It is improbable that a good compendium can be produced before a major work is written, and this study owes its principal defect to the lack of a major

work in the field—it is notably lacking in proportion and perspective. Events and personalities of major importance are frequently treated very briefly. For example: the fine work done by Archbishop John Hughes in breaking the back of trusteeism (which the author ineptly dubs “Trustce-mania”) in New York and dealing to it its death-blow in the American Church, is covered in one sentence. Father Samuel Mazzuchelli, the great Dominican missionary of the Northwest, is mentioned only indirectly and his entire life work summarized in five words. Another great Dominican, Archbishop Langdon Thomas Grace, the second bishop of St. Paul and one of the leaders of the hierarchy in his day is not even mentioned. There are others in a long list of great men whose lives had a definite influence upon the history of the American Church, whom Father Roemer barely mentions or doesn't mention at all.

On the other hand, he goes into considerable detail upon some men and events. He devotes a whole chapter, entitled Charity, to a history of the Society for the Propagation of the Faith and the *Leopoldinen-Stiftung*, important movements, indeed, but not that important. While passing up more important men, he gives considerable space to men of lesser stature. Fathers Stephen Badin, Charles Nerinckx, and Gabriel Richard, for example, were great missionaries but they certainly were not greater than many a missionary who receives no mention whatsoever.

This lack of proportion in the work is not due to any bias upon the author's part. Indeed, one of the great virtues of the book is its moderation and prudence. One of Shea's outstanding characteristics was his bias; he was a man of strong likes and dislikes. Father Roemer shows no such quirks in his writing. He avoids unearthing buried hatchets. He does not use the muck-rake that is so dear to the “everything-must-be-told” school. He seems to appreciate the fact charity should be practiced even by the historian.

The writing is at times heavy and the sentence structure at times so involved as to be incomprehensible. There are other evidences of poor proof reading such as misspelling and typographical error that should prompt a careful re-reading of the text before it goes into a second printing. The index, too, is in need of more work.

The Mystical Evolution in the Development and Vitality of the Church.

Vol. I. By JOHN G. ARINTERO, O. P. Trans. by Jordan Aumann, O. P.

St. Louis: Herder, 1949. Pp. 377. \$4.50.

Although this work in the original is almost 40 years old, it sounds a theme that many American Catholics are fast becoming attuned to—the wonders of the life of grace and holiness. So it is good to hear the theme

again with variations peculiar to the man who has done as much as anyone else to make it resound once again in the Church.

In 1908 Fr. Arinterro projected a four volume work on the development and vitality of the Church. The first volume, *Organic Evolution*, treated the constitution of the Church and its visible progress; the second *Doctrinal Evolution*, is concerned with the great question of the evolution of the dogmas of the faith; the third, *Mystical Evolution*, treats of the nature and growth of the spiritual life of the Church; the last volume, *Divine Mechanism*, sets forth the laws which govern the evolutionary development of the Church.

Only the first half of the third volume, *Mystical Evolution*, is translated here: a second volume will present us with the complete exposition of the mystical life of the Church. (Perhaps by the time it appears we will be calling for a translation of the other three volumes of Fr. Arinterro's work.)

Fr. Arinterro sets about his task systematically: he presents us with the traditional doctrine on the divine life of grace in the soul, manifesting it in all its glory as a participation in the intimate life of God Himself. Especially illuminating and delightful is the section on the familiar relations which the soul contracts with the Persons of the Most Holy Trinity through grace and the infused virtues and gifts.

We know that life is never a static thing, but a dynamic flow of activities. The supernatural activities of the Christian soul are shown to be sharings in God's own activities. Life also means growth, yet, unlike natural life, the life of grace grows without subsequent decline. To those who have read the mystical writings of other modern masters of spirituality, this may sound a bit hackneyed. They will be amazed to find how new it all sounds under the pen of Fr. Arinterro. As he himself explains: "We prefer, then, to imitate as much as possible the method of the Fathers in not abstracting, much less separating, one concept from the others. Like the Fathers, we shall always observe the reality itself, but from different points of view, multiplying the aspects and the images for the sole purpose of seeing better that inexpressible and integral whole which no number of terms or concepts can exhaust." (p. 66)

In pursuance of this method, Fr. Arinterro has studied and meditated profoundly the innumerable symbols and images that tradition has employed to express the awesome reality of the life of grace in the soul. As a result, the writing is suffused with an unction that enables the reader to pass easily from the text to prayer.

The translation is excellent; one never adverts to its being a translation. The publishers have presented the work in a pleasant format.

Geschichte der Philosophie, I. Altertum und Mittelalter. By JOHANNES HIRSCHBERGER. Freiburg, i. B., 1949. Pp. 490.

The author, professor at the seminary in Eichstätt, wrote this book, of which the second volume will deal with modern and contemporary philosophy, "because no suitable textbook existed." He was faced with the problem of presenting his subject in a limited space and, therefore, with that of selection. He justly remarks that no one is more aware of the things left out than the writer himself and that to criticize him for this reason is hardly helpful. Every student of the history of philosophy has, of course, his idiosyncrasies and would like to see this philosopher considered to a greater extent, or that point brought out more clearly. Such preference being mostly dependent on personal interests, it is not fair to urge them; the one criticism which, perhaps, is objectively justified refers to the scant space given to Neo-Platonism. This philosophy deserves to be pointed out more forcibly to the student because of its being the first great synthesis of divergent ideas and because of its influence on medieval and modern speculation.

The two parts, Antiquity and Middle Ages, are nearly of equal length. In the first more than 50 pages are devoted to Plato, more than 70 to Aristotle which is as it should be. One gratefully notices that the philosophy of the Hellenistic period is treated more extensively than it is usual in such textbooks. The longest chapters of the second part are those on St. Augustine and on St. Thomas.

There are no footnotes, but there are ample references in the text and brief bibliographies for each chapter. Neither is there an index which presumably will be found in the second volume.

So far as this reviewer knows, this is the best textbook of its kind and might be useful, when translated, in colleges and even in graduate schools.

An American Utilitarian: Richard Hildreth as a Philosopher. By MARTHA M. PINGEL. New York: Columbia University Press, 1948. Pp. 225. \$3.00.

Part I of this book presents a short biography of Hildreth and an expository analysis of his *Theory of Morals* and *Theory of Politics*. Part II publishes for the first time the *Theory of Wealth* and the *Theory of Taste* neither of which Hildreth completed. Part III reprints "some brief polemics which though relatively unknown and not readily available, are representative of both his style and his philosophy." (p. 123) The book also contains a "Preface," a "Bibliography" adding thirty minor works to the only other published bibliography and a splendid "Index."

Hildreth's name is not unknown as an historian or a novelist and journalist, but Miss Pingel's work is the first attempt to present him as a philosopher. In this role he appears as a "follower of utilitarian principles first laid down by Hume and expanded by Bentham" (p. ix), who "chose to treat man in naturalistic terms" (loc. cit.). Sired by Hume and Bentham he may in turn, at least indirectly, have sired Peirce and James as Miss Pingel suggests (p. x).

Secularism is evident in his conviction that "a religion cannot and should not attempt to regulate morals, politics, or any of the practical businesses of life. Religion should deal with the supernatural and intangible; practical affairs being practical and mundane, belong to the realm of reason. In other words, religion can lead but does not teach; it is by its very nature despotic, not rational" (pp. 6-7). His pragmatism extends to morals: "... an act in itself could seldom, if ever, be considered either moral or immoral, but rather the terms were applicable to the actor who produced the action. If a 'selfish' or a 'bad' motive happened to lead to a 'good' act—that is, an act with good results, foreseen or not—that act would nonetheless remain good" (p. 14). There is an implicit totalitarianism in his denial of inalienable human rights: "... Laying aside as untenable the idea of indefensible rights, whether natural or divine, either on the part of the governors or the governed ..." (p. 36). His theory of art is superficial and is based in part on a materialization of the principle that art follows nature. Normally tolerant, he can in the heat of controversy, descend to abusiveness in the most wretched taste. The Church is referred to as "that filthy old hag" and as "the old battered Roman harlot, with all her wrinkles, rouge and rheumatism" (p. 169). It is only just to recall that a century ago such cheap rhetoric was rather common. The epithets just noted indicate Hildreth's style in controversy. In philosophy his pedestrian verbosity is reminiscent of Locke.

This book is a model of the art of resurrecting the second-rate. It depresses one to realize that secularism, pragmatism, statism and that intellectual superficiality from which, in part, these "isms" spring, were really so explicit in America a century ago.

The Philosophy of Existence. By GABRIEL MARCEL. New York: Philosophical Library, 1949. Pp. 90. \$2.75.

One of the minor tragedies in post-war Europe has been the gradual eclipse of the Lavelle-Le Senne series *Philosophie de l'Esprit* which had produced an impressive number of books during the late thirties. Perhaps the reasons for throttling this important collection are more economic than intellectual; the conquest of the paper problem had to be turned first to the acute textbook shortage which confronted French university life at the

war's end. At any rate, the reason for the decline of *spiritualistes* books is certainly not the rise of Sartre who would not get much of a hearing among the type of reader that had been patronizing the collection, *Philosophie de l'Esprit*.

The one man who has held his own and even grown in stature is Gabriel Marcel, sometimes referred to as a "Christian existentialist." His timely articles and conferences have been important events for the traditional French mind that has kept its faith in these times of peril, and it is significant that he was nominated to be the present Gifford Lecturer, which should have as its happy issue his first systematic book in philosophy.

This present book, his first that has been translated into English, is typically Marcelian and non-systematic. It is in fact a series of four essays, very discreetly chosen and equally as well translated by Manya Harari. The most notable chapter is the first, a translation of his "Positions et Approches Concrètes du Mystère Ontologique," a piece that Gilson brackets with Bergson's *Introduction to Metaphysics* as one of the truly inspirational documents of contemporary philosophy. It comes as close as any of Marcel's writings to summarizing his philosophy as a whole. In it, he inveighs against the "functional man" of the present, whose "ontological need" has not been taken into account by the typical positivist or pragmatist of the present. It is toward filling this need that Marcel consecrates his philosophy.

Though a Thomist would reject the over-all dimensions of Marcel's thought, it is a fact that his existentialism brings him into the same arena with Sartre and enables him to begin at roughly the same point as atheistic existentialism. That Marcel's conclusions are the exact antithesis of Sartre's atheism, a-moralism, and nihilism cannot be overlooked by Thomists or any truly rational philosopher. For Marcel, as for Sartre, man is *engaged*, but the full ontological force of that engagement leads to the sanities that alone can ground it. In Marcel's case, these grounding facts are explained in the light of such experiences as that of fidelity or hope or love, or, as he says in the third of the present essays, testimony. American thinkers will be interested in the suggestions of Roycean morality in Marcel, where loyalty becomes fidelity and is raised into an argument for a personal God. In fact, Marcel has written a book on Royce.

The second chapter, "Existence and Human Freedom," deals with Sartre and supplements, in effect, an essay that appeared in *Homo Viator*. It is even more incisive than his earlier study and marks again the typical Marcelian trait of trying, wherever he can, to find first what is good in philosophers that he is later forced to criticize.

The third chapter is "Testimony and Existentialism." The final "Essay in Autobiography" is taken from the book *Existentialisme Chrétien* (ed. E. Gilson, Paris: Plon, 1947), which unfortunately received scant mention in this country.

This book is recommended reading for modern philosophers. By naturalists, of course, it will be dismissed as "supernatural," for they are apparently undisturbed by the challenge that there may be other and deeper approaches to the real besides their scientism. For Thomists and scholastics in general, this book, as a study in metaphysics and natural theology, will be provocative, fascinating to read and elusive to appraise.

Existentialism. By RALPH HARPER. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948. Pp. 175 with notes. \$3.00.

The title of this work is misleading. Existentialism, by convention, is associated with Heidegger and Sartre, and must be qualified in other uses. Harper, though influenced by Heidegger and Sartre, is more of a Christian existentialist but unlike Gabriel Marcel and rather like Fr. Guthrie and Fr. D'Arcy.

Harper feels that philosophy, as a whole, has neglected an important hint in the Judaeo-Christian tradition on the mystery and interiority of the person. Even Socrates was more of an intellectual than an existential-minded philosopher. But the intellect, by its universals and its abstractions, overshoots the concrete mystery that is the self and that can only be known by an "intuition." So, at any rate, Harper argues.

Harper finds that Kierkegaard had deep insight into the nature of man, the flesh-and-bone man of experience. Kierkegaard had a "dialectic," with man presented as a creature of paradoxes, where freedom meets with necessity and the finite mingles with the infinite. In such ambiguities, reason is unable to light man's path and leads him instead to despair, but the antimonies can be surmounted by the intuitive "leap," compensating for the failure of intelligence and really moving beyond it.

Heidegger and Sartre are also discussed. Though Harper rejects their nihilism, he sympathizes with the general direction of their efforts toward the concrete and non-rational factors in human existence. This direction Harper would retain without committing himself to its final destination when taken alone.

Such a project, taking the broad method of a system without the conclusions to which it leads, is a stiff challenge. Harper meets it with what he calls the "interiorized scholasticism" of Pierre Rousselot and Fr. Guthrie. Both men exalt the element of love and in many ways elevate it beyond intelligence in power and dignity. In addition to Harper, they both influenced Fr. D'Arcy in his *Mind and Heart of Love*, and the conclusions of this "interiorized scholasticism" can be stated in Fr. D'Arcy's terms: Man is a composite of essence and existence; essence is the aim of action directed toward the self, and existence is the testament of what is God-like

about man. In the respect for existence and its laws, there is a thrust toward God, but because essence and existence are united in man, there is no conflict between Eros and Agape in a truly realistic psychology.

Harper's work is a stimulating one, carefully thought out, well written, and showing an acquaintance with the history of his subject, though chapters on Jaspers and on Marcel would have been in order. But what has he said that can appeal to a truly intellectual philosophy since the intellect must certainly be the final judge of whether Harper's ideas are right or wrong? Even at first sight, the juxtaposition of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre along with scholasticism appears eclectic, and this is further reflected by a consideration of his "interiorized" version of essence and existence. Is it not true that essence is likewise a participation in God, especially in its formal element? In Fr. Guthrie's and Fr. D'Arcy's thought, there is likewise not enough respect for the relations of matter, form, and subsistence in man which all precede the existential act.

Harper would seem to accord too much weight to the personality of man and not enough to his nature. Rousselot, in his *Intellectualism of St. Thomas*, felt that Aquinas had neglected the individual. But Aquinas, in accepting Plato's argument that *scientia est de universalibus*, gave reasons for the impossibility of a philosophy of individuals while insisting that philosophy must be *from* individuals—the sense data where knowledge begins. Man is tortured, because he cannot push further into the concrete of individual existence, as Harper points out in his concluding remarks. But love and existentialism cannot solve his dilemma—love, that is, when taken alone. It is not the good that makes man free. It is the truth that does so. This means that even will can prosper most in an atmosphere of "interiorized scholasticism" or "Christian existentialism" but under the light and law of intelligence.

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